UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4930
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RONALD BROOKS CAMPBELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:07-cr-00131-F-1)
Submitted: August 21, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Andrea T. Barnes,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Brooks Campbell pleaded guilty to the first
count of a two-count indictment charging him with possession of
a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012), and possessing stolen firearms, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(i) (2012); the district court sentenced him to 180
months of imprisonment in November 2008. The court subsequently
granted Campbell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion filed pursuant
to this court’s decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d
237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated the prior judgment as to
Count 1 of the indictment, and reinstated Count 2. Campbell
pleaded guilty to the charge in Count 2 of the indictment and
the court sentenced him to time served followed by five years of
supervised release.
Six months after his release into supervision,
Campbell’s probation officer filed a motion seeking revocation
of Campbell’s supervised release for various alleged violations.
After a hearing, the district court determined that Campbell had
violated the terms of his supervised release, revoked his
supervised release, and sentenced Campbell to twenty-four months
of incarceration with no period of supervised release to follow.
Campbell now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Campbell first argues that the district court violated
his due process rights by failing to determine that there was a
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factual basis for the revocation. As Campbell failed to raise
this issue in the district court, we review this challenge for
plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993). Campbell must demonstrate, therefore, that (1) the
district court erred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights. Id.
“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes procedural . . . limitations on the revocation of the
conditional liberty created by . . . supervised release.”
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “In considering whether a
district court's findings in support of a supervised release
revocation are sufficient, this court must consider the district
court's written findings, together with the hearing transcript
and the rest of the record, and determine whether these
materials permit the court to determine the factual basis of the
district court's decision.” United States v. Driggers, 27 F.
App’x 152, 153 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (citing United
States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 832 (4th Cir. 1992)). The
district court need only find a violation of a term of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); see United States v. Armstrong, 187
F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). Moreover, “[a] defendant's
supervised release cannot be revoked without a full hearing
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unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily admits to the
allegations against [him] and waives [his] rights under Rule
32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” United
States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the record and the
relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district court
did not commit plain error in revoking Campbell’s supervised
release.
Campbell next challenges the sentence imposed by the
district court. We review a sentence imposed as a result of a
supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a district court must
consider the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the
Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory requirements of
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583 (2012), “the court ultimately has
broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a
term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461
F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). And although
“[a] court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a [original]
sentence . . . it still must provide a statement of reasons for
the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our
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review of the record leads us to conclude that the sentence is
not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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