UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4940
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID TISDALE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00498-BEL-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 27, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Joanna Silver, Staff
Attorney, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Ayn B. Ducao, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Tisdale appeals his conviction and 170-month
sentence for five counts of distribution and possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2006). Tisdale makes four arguments on
appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
First, Tisdale argues that, given the anti-shuttling
provision in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (the
“IAD”), the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment. We find that the district court did not
err in this regard because Tisdale had waived his rights under
the IAD pursuant to a broadly-worded waiver he had signed after
discussing his rights with his attorney. See Alabama v.
Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2001). We reject Tisdale’s
assertion that the waiver was limited to a particular detainer.
Second, he argues that the district court erred in
declining to review in camera the personnel records of two law
enforcement officers who testified at Tisdale’s trial. We
review a district court’s decision as to whether to conduct an
in camera review of materials for abuse of discretion. See In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Government had represented to the district court that
neither officer had any history of misconduct in his files
except that one officer had been accused of using excessive
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force; further, defense counsel had conceded that the present
case did not involve allegations of excessive force.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to review in camera the personnel files of the two law
enforcement officers. See id.
Third, Tisdale argues that the district court erred in
refusing to permit defense counsel to impeach a Government
witness through extrinsic evidence of a separate lawsuit. We
review a district court’s decision to limit cross-examination
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256,
273 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 262 (2010). The
district court had permitted defense counsel to cross-examine
the law enforcement officer about the fact that there was a
prior lawsuit, the general nature of the lawsuit, and that there
was a judgment against the officer. We find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence
it found to be collateral. See id.
Finally, Tisdale argues that the jury lacked
sufficient evidence to find that he sold crack cocaine.
However, given that Tisdale himself testified that he sold crack
cocaine, and that one of the law enforcement officers testified
that he purchased crack cocaine from Tisdale, we find that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Tisdale sold
crack cocaine.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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