UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-6996
TROY GOODMAN, SR.,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INCORPORATED, Under M.O.C.C. Control
or the State of W.Va’s Control,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:09-cv-00122)
Argued: March 22, 2011 Decided: April 28, 2011
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
ARGUED: Myra Hiott Chapman, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF
LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph M.
Farrell, Jr., FARRELL, FARRELL & FARRELL, PLLC, Huntington, West
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neal L. Walters, Melody E.
Akhavan, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate
Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
Megan E. Farrell, FARRELL, FARRELL & FARRELL, PLLC, Huntington,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Troy Goodman, Sr. appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his civil rights complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I.
Goodman alleges the following facts, which we accept as
true and we construe in the light most favorable to him, see
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991),
recognizing that liberal construction of his pleadings is
especially appropriate here because he is a pro se litigant
raising civil rights issues, see Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736,
738 (4th Cir. 2009). Goodman is incarcerated at the Mount Olive
Correctional Complex in West Virginia. On December 9, 2008, he
received a pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine from a nurse
employed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”). At that
time, the nurse gave Goodman a pamphlet issued by the federal
government that explained the vaccine and its associated risks.
Further, she advised him to seek medical attention in the event
he suffered any allergic reaction to the vaccine injection.
On December 11, 2008, Goodman experienced adverse reactions
to the vaccine, including swelling and redness in his arm,
3
breathing problems, and hives. He asked a prison official 1 “for
medical assistance” and “to see the doctor, or nurse, for
reactions from the shot,” J.A. 7, 14, but the prison official
denied Goodman’s request and threatened him with a “write up” if
he was not having any reactions. Goodman then “told the CO to
forget about it” and that he would “act as if it didn’t happen.”
J.A. 14.
II.
Goodman instituted this § 1983 action seeking monetary
damages for violations of his Eighth Amendment right to freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the case was screened by a magistrate judge, who
submitted a proposed recommendation to dismiss the case for
failure to state a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. Goodman filed objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation and dismissed Goodman’s complaint.
Goodman now appeals.
1
It appears from Goodman’s complaint that he directed his
request toward “the night worker, or the CO” (i.e. correctional
officer), whom he also refers to elsewhere in his filings as
simply a “prison official.”
4
We review a district court’s order granting a motion to
dismiss de novo, Schatz, 943 F.2d at 489, and we will dismiss a
complaint “if it does not allege ‘enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Giarratano v.
Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must
allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,” which includes “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, “a
prisoner must prove two elements: (1) that objectively the
deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and
(2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Johnson v. Quinones, 145
F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The first element “is satisfied by a serious
medical condition,” while the second element “is satisfied by
showing deliberate indifference by prison officials.” Id. Mere
negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference;
“[b]asically, a prison official ‘must both be aware of facts
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from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”
Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Thus,
a prison official may be held liable for deliberate indifference
only where “the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light most
favorable to Goodman, we conclude the district court properly
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Goodman
alleges that after requesting to see a doctor or nurse, the
prison official warned him that he would receive a “write up” if
he was not having the complained-of reactions. At that point,
Goodman admits that he withdrew his request for assistance and
told the prison official to “forget about it.” The official
could have reasonably inferred from Goodman’s response that he
was not experiencing any of the alleged reactions; regardless,
having received the instruction to “forget about it,” and under
the facts of this case, no prison official could be deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner’s medical need by taking no further
action. Therefore, we conclude that Goodman’s factual
allegations do not support a finding that the prison official
had a sufficiently culpable state of mind of deliberate
indifference.
6
Goodman also argues that the factual assertions made in his
objections should be considered and liberally construed along
with the allegations in his complaint in determining whether to
dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim. As such,
Goodman contends that dismissal of his complaint was improper
because he asserts in his objections that the nurse, in addition
to the prison official, knew of but disregarded his medical
condition. J.A. 29. Thus, regardless of whether he had
withdrawn his request to the prison official, Goodman argues the
nurse still had an independent obligation to respond to his
request and failure to do so constituted deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. However, Goodman cites no supporting
authority, nor have we found any, for the proposition that, when
reviewing a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, factual assertions contained in the plaintiff’s
objections to the magistrate’s recommendation must be viewed in
the same light as factual assertions contained in the initial
complaint. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (requiring district court
to make de novo review of magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations to which objection is made, and permitting the
court to receive further evidence); Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170,
183 n.9 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hether to consider such evidence
rests within the sound discretion of the district court.”).
7
We decline to decide this issue here because even if we
accept as true all of the factual assertions made in Goodman’s
complaint and objections and construe those facts in a light
most favorable to him, we conclude he has failed to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Goodman does
not allege that he spoke directly to the nurse to inform her of
his medical condition, 2 nor does he allege that anyone told the
nurse of his condition. All he alleges is that the nurse knew.
This allegation, with nothing more, is not sufficient to support
a finding that the nurse had a sufficiently culpable state of
mind of deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. 3
Therefore, because Goodman has failed to allege facts
sufficient to support a finding that the prison official and
2
Goodman’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument that
Goodman does not allege he actually talked to the nurse, but
only that the nurse knew of his condition. Moreover, Goodman’s
complaint and objections indicate that his communication to the
nurse was indirect, rather than direct. For example, he told the
CO “to tell the nurse” to write him up, J.A. 14; and he “ask[ed]
to see a nurse, or doctor,” J.A. 28.
3
We note that, to the extent the nurse was aware of
Goodman’s condition, on this record it was necessarily the
result of the prison official informing her. And, assuming the
prison official did communicate Goodman’s request to the nurse,
there is no basis to believe he failed to convey Goodman’s full
conversation, including the fact that he had withdrawn his
request for assistance. Nothing in Goodman’s complaint suggests
the contrary.
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nurse were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, he has
failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
order dismissing Goodman’s complaint.
AFFIRMED
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