IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-20947
Summary Calendar
HAROLD DELL JOYCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CORRECTION CORPORATION OF AMERICA;
FRED JOACHIM; ERIK LARSON; D. JOINER,
Lieutenant; JAMES CABINESS; J. BALDWIN,
Lieutenant; D. DANAS; D. KIMBILL; A. TAYLOR,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-97-CV-3903
--------------------
August 4, 2000
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Harold Dell Joyce, Oregon prisoner # 6738204, appeals the
summary-judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
lawsuit against Correction Corporation of America (“CCA”), a
facility in Texas where he was temporarily housed, and several
CCA officers, alleging that they had violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by providing him with inadequate conditions of
confinement, subjecting him to the use of excessive force, and
denying him adequate medical care. The district court also
dismissed Joyce’s claims against certain named defendants
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-20947
-2-
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
On appeal, Joyce briefs only the dismissal of his excessive-
force and denial-of-medical care claims. His claim that the
officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing
inadequate conditions of confinement is therefore waived, as is
any argument that the district court erred in dismissing his
claims against the other named defendants, pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2). See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th
Cir. 1993); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a).
Joyce has failed to demonstrate any error on the district
court’s part. In connection with his excessive-force claim, he
argues that the district court mistakenly required him to show
more than de minimis injury. As the district court determined,
the summary-judgment evidence shows that Joyce suffered, at most,
a de minimis injury. See, e.g., Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d
699, 704 (5th Cir. 1999), clarified on other grounds, 186 F.3d
633, 634 (5th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, Joyce is correct that
the absence of serious injury will not preclude relief under the
Eighth Amendment if the defendants acted maliciously with the
intent to cause harm. See id.; Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d
191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). However, as the district court also
determined, the competent summary-judgment evidence shows that
the defendants used de minimis force in a good-faith effort to
restore discipline and ensure their safety, and dismissal of the
excessive-force claim was thus not error. See Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Joyce next argues that the district court erred in
No. 99-20947
-3-
dismissing his denial-of-medical-care claim because there was a
material factual dispute regarding whether he received medical
treatment following the use of force. The defendants presented
affidavit testimony, incident reports, and medical records which
demonstrated that Joyce was examined by a nurse, who concluded
that no medical treatment was required. Although Joyce submitted
conclusional affidavit testimony that he had not been seen by a
nurse, it was insufficient to create a factual dispute. See
Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d
169, 180 (5th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the testimony was undermined
by his own admission, in his cross-motion for summary judgment,
that he had been seen by a nurse. The true nature of his
complaint appears to be that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent in denying his subsequent requests for medical
treatment. However, Joyce presented no evidence of a serious
medical need or that the defendants were aware of his medical
needs and deliberately disregarded the risk created by serious
need by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
Because there was not a factual dispute regarding whether
Joyce received medical treatment following the use of force or
whether Joyce subsequently requested medical treatment for a
serious medical need and was denied, summary-judgment dismissal
of the denial-of-medical-care claim was appropriate. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 847; Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir.
1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
AFFIRMED.