NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 05 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 08-50033 U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. CR-02-00220-SJO-3
v.
MEMORANDUM *
PETRO KRYLOV,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 14, 2011 **
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, BYBEE, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Petro Krylov appeals his conviction and sentence, challenging the district
court’s failure to grant his motion for a mistrial. Although the district court never
formally ruled on his motion, we nonetheless treat the court’s failure to act as an
implicit denial of Krylov’s motion. See United States v. Stolarz, 547 F.2d 108, 110
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he entry of judgment amounts to an implicit denial of [a]
motion for a new trial.”). Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019, 1036 (9th Cir.
2010).
Krylov argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the government
improperly undermined his ability to present a duress defense by challenging the
link between his crimes and Russian organized crime syndicates. Specifically, he
contends that the government’s cross-examination of his expert witness, in which
the prosecutor questioned the link between Krylov’s crimes and a global Russian
mafia, contradicted earlier representations the government made in its motion to
empanel an anonymous jury, in which it contended that there was some link
between Krylov’s crimes and organized crime.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Krylov’s
motion for a mistrial. The prosecutor’s cross-examination of Krylov’s witness did
not violate the doctrine of judicial estoppel because the government did not adopt a
position “clearly inconsistent” with a previous one. See United States v. Ibrahim,
522 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, Krylov has not demonstrated
that the prosecution’s questions were designed to knowingly elicit false testimony
from his witness. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.
2
2003) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269–71 (1959)). Accordingly, we
hold that the prosecution’s cross-examination of Krylov’s expert witness did not
deprive him of a fair trial.
AFFIRMED.
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