IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60351
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JERRY LEE QUINN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:96-CV-63-S
USDC No. 3:95-CR-83-ALL-S
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August 9, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jerry Lee Quinn, federal prisoner #10312-042, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate
his sentence. The district court granted Quinn a certificate of
appealability (COA) on only one of the five issues he presents in
his appeal brief: whether counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the use of his state conviction as the predicate for
his federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Quinn failed
to request a COA for the other issues he has briefed (and for
which COA was not granted). Thus, they are not properly before
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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this court. See United States v. Kimler, 150 F.3d 429, 431 (5th
Cir. 1998); Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1997).
Quinn was convicted of violating § 922(g)(1), which
prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been
convicted in any court of [] a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1). “[C]rime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is
defined in § 921(a)(20), which provides in pertinent part:
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be
determined in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any
conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for
which a person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored shall not be considered a conviction
for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon,
expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly
provides that the person may not ship, transport,
possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
Quinn argues that his state conviction did not result in the
loss of his civil rights and thus that his rights were “restored”
within the meaning of § 921(a)(20). He also contends that
because the restoration did not expressly prohibit possession of
firearms, he could not be prosecuted under § 922(g)(1). Standing
alone, Quinn’s claim that his civil rights were not lost does not
exclude him from the ambit of the federal statute; it applies as
long as the state prohibits a felon from possessing firearms.
Quinn’s argument regarding where in the state code the
firearms ban occurs is also without merit. Any “restoration” of
Quinn’s civil rights is irrelevant given Mississippi law’s
prohibition of possession of a firearm by a felon. See Miss.
Stat. Ann. § 97-37-5(1). This prohibition triggers the “unless
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clause” of § 921(a)(20) and satisfies the predicate for the
federal prosecution of Quinn. See Caron v. United States, 524
U.S. 308, 313 (1998). Quinn’s argument that the Mississippi
statute is ineffective because it stands apart from any
restoration provision is also without merit. As he argues that
his “restoration” operates by virtue of his never having lost his
civil rights, there would be no applicable statutory provision to
which the firearms possession bar could be tied.
Although a person who has been convicted of a felony in
Mississippi may apply to the court in which he was convicted for
a certificate of rehabilitation, a procedure which apparently
restores his right to bear firearms, see Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-
5(3), Quinn does not allege and the record does not indicate that
he had applied for or received such a certificate. Thus, Quinn
cannot show that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the use of his state conviction as a predicate for a conviction
under § 922(g). See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984).
Quinn’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED. His
arguments require only statutory construction and thus would be
unaided by the inclusion of further pleadings.
AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.