United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 09-2235, 09-2239
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JUAN A. MEISES, a/k/a DAVID VAZQUEZ-COSS, a/k/a JUAN A. MIESES,
and JOSE L. REYES-GUERRERO,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Leval,* and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Leslie W. O'Brien for appellant Reyes-Guerrero.
Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant Meises.
Courtney L. Coker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson Pérez-
Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division,
and Luke Cass, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.
May 13, 2011
*
Of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellants Juan Mieses1 and Jose
Reyes-Guerrero were arrested in a reverse sting operation after
they drove to a sham drug deal, with a third co-defendant, in a
vehicle containing $100,000 in cash.2 A jury found both appellants
guilty of a single drug conspiracy count. On appeal, the pair
claim that their convictions must be vacated because of three
significant errors at trial: (1) the government's use of improper
overview testimony from the lead law enforcement agent in the case,
(2) the indirect admission of the third co-defendant's out-of-court
statement implicating appellants, and (3) the district court's
refusal to allow the jury to hear an audiotape recorded on the day
of their arrests.3 Reyes-Guerrero further asserts that he is
entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
As we shall explain, the overview testimony at issue here
was improper and, to its credit, the district court acknowledged
the error when it considered appellants' post-trial motions for
acquittal. See United States v. Reyes-Guerrero, 638 F. Supp. 2d
1
The indictment and other court documents spell "Mieses" as
"Meises," and we do likewise in the official caption of this case.
In the remainder of the opinion, however, we adopt the spelling
used by Mieses in his brief.
2
In a classic sting operation, an undercover agent attempts
to purchase drugs from a suspect. In a reverse sting, agents offer
to sell drugs to their targets. United States v. Pinillos-Prieto,
419 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2005).
3
Only Mieses challenges the admission of the audiotape.
-2-
177, 185-90 (D.P.R. 2009). We also conclude that the district
court erred in allowing testimony revealing the co-defendant's
inculpatory statement. Those two significant errors entitle
appellants to a new trial, and we therefore vacate their
convictions and remand for such new proceedings.4
I.
A. Factual Background
The facts underlying appellants' convictions, viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, see United States
v. Poulin, 631 F.3d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 2011), are as follows.
Puerto Rico Police Sergeant Roberto Cruz, a member of a
federal drug task force,5 worked undercover in 2007 in an
investigation targeting Genito Toribio-Custodio ("Custodio"), an
alleged trafficker who operated in the Dominican Republic and
Puerto Rico. Also participating in the undercover investigation
was Marcos Antonio Torres, a longtime drug trafficker who had been
a paid government informant since 2005.6 The undercover operation
4
We explain in Section II why we reject Reyes-Guerrero's
sufficiency argument.
5
At the time of the trial in this case, Cruz had been
assigned to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration's
(DEA) Task Force for fourteen years.
6
Torres testified that he began drug trafficking when he was
sixteen and continued until he was arrested about two decades
later.
-3-
ended prematurely when Custodio detected surveillance units and
fled from Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic.
Seeking to reactivate the investigation the next year,
Cruz instructed Torres to solicit Custodio for a cocaine deal in
Puerto Rico. On June 19, 2008, in the first of a series of
recorded phone calls, Torres informed Custodio that he had 220
kilograms to sell. Initially cautious, Custodio asked Torres if he
still communicated with Cruz, whom Custodio did not trust. Torres
said they were not in touch. Although Custodio originally said he
would travel to Puerto Rico within a few days, he instead arranged
for his "partner" – Dario Pereyra-Rubis ("Rubis") – to carry out
the deal. A few days later, during a meeting in San Juan that
Torres recorded, Rubis expressed interest in buying 150 kilograms
of cocaine and proposed paying for them after his clients paid him.
Torres told Rubis that he could deal only in twenty-five kilogram
amounts, and he would provide the drugs only if Rubis brought
$100,000. Rubis contacted a client by phone to advise that a deal
was in the works, and he then left to consult with the client face-
to-face.
In a follow-up phone call with Custodio, who had already
spoken with Rubis, Torres repeated his refusal to defer payment for
the drugs and offered to accept a $100,000 deposit. In another
phone call the same evening, when Rubis insisted on getting the
drugs without cash down, Torres told Rubis that his buyers should
-4-
come with the money "so that they are present in the negotiation"
and they "know where their money is." Rubis said he would continue
to try to reach an agreement.
Sensing continuing mistrust on the part of Rubis and
Custodio, Cruz arranged for Torres to show Rubis sham kilograms of
cocaine – packages of wood wrapped with the type of tape commonly
used by drug traffickers. Their meeting at a shopping center on
June 26 was videotaped, and Cruz also was on the scene as part of
the surveillance team. Rubis's concerns apparently were resolved
when he saw the "cocaine," and Torres testified that Rubis became
"in a hurry to make the deal."
In a series of conversations between Rubis and Torres on
the morning of June 27, the deal was confirmed for fifteen
kilograms at $14,000 apiece, with $100,000 in cash to be paid on
the spot and the balance due a day later. Torres testified that,
in the first call, Rubis reported that he was "with the people, the
owners of the money with the money; and that he was desperate to
. . . make the deal, and he didn't want the people to get bored and
leave." They agreed to meet at 2 p.m., and in a subsequent call
Torres told Rubis to come to the shopping center where they had
previously met.
DEA Task Force members, including Cruz, set up
surveillance with videotaping equipment near the shopping center.
Agents saw Rubis arrive at the shopping center alone in a green
-5-
Mazda that belonged to appellant Reyes-Guerrero, briefly leave the
area, and then return with Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero in a Ford
minivan. Mieses was driving, Reyes-Guerrero was in the front
passenger seat, and Rubis was sitting in the back. Mieses dropped
Rubis off near where Torres, equipped with a small audio recorder,
was waiting, and then drove on a short distance before parking the
van. When Torres asked why Rubis was late, Rubis replied that he
had arrived earlier, but he needed to wait for "the owners of the
money" to come with the cash. After Torres complained that he did
not want to meet anyone else, Rubis explained that "the people"
would not give the money to him (i.e., Rubis) because they did not
trust him. Asked if the owners were there yet, Rubis said they
were "in their car," and he then escorted Torres to the minivan.
Torres testified that, as they proceeded to the vehicle, Rubis
assured him that these individuals were trustworthy and that he had
previously carried out drug transactions with them.
According to Torres, when he and Rubis arrived at the
passenger side of the van, Reyes-Guerrero rolled down his window
and Rubis briefly introduced the men. Reyes-Guerrero directed them
to "get in" the car, but Torres refused because he feared being
kidnapped. Torres then asked if they were ready; Mieses replied
"yes" and Reyes-Guerrero nodded. Torres asked to see the money,
prompting Mieses to reach behind his seat and, with Reyes-
Guerrero's help, pull out a shoe box. Reyes-Guerrero passed the
-6-
box to Torres, who opened it and asked how much money it contained.
After responding "$100,000," Mieses asked about "the merchandise,"
and Torres told him that it was in his car. Mieses then asked,
"How are we going to do this?" Torres responded that he would
return to his car and drive off, and the others should follow. As
Torres walked away from the minivan, he passed his hand over his
head in a prearranged signal to let Cruz know that he had seen the
money and the deal was underway.
Significantly, although the conversation between Torres
and Rubis in the parking lot was recorded by the device Torres
carried, the exchange among the men at the minivan could not be
heard on the tape. Cruz attributed the glitch to background
traffic noise at that location, and Torres testified that a gap is
not unusual when he carries a recording device. Cruz and the other
Task Force members were too far away from the minivan to hear the
men talking, and the jury thus heard only Torres's account of what
was said there.7
After Torres signaled Cruz, Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero
were quickly arrested, and Rubis, who had tried to flee, was
apprehended several blocks away. A blue Reebok shoe box containing
$100,000 was recovered from the van, and a subsequent inspection of
7
In fact, no transcript was made from any part of that day's
audiotape, and the tape was not played for the jury. Torres's
testimony was thus the only evidence on what was said throughout
the June 27 episode, including during the exchange between Torres
and Rubis before they approached the minivan.
-7-
the vehicle revealed a hidden compartment beneath the rear floor.
Rubis indicated a willingness to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities, and he was interviewed at the DEA offices by Cruz and
another Task Force agent. Cruz testified that, after the
interview, the targets of his investigation changed, and he
reported that Reyes-Guerrero and Mieses were immediately processed
and detained. Rubis, Reyes-Guerrero, and Mieses were all charged
with a single count of conspiracy to possess five or more kilograms
of cocaine with intent to distribute the drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §§
846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
B. Procedural Background
During appellants' five-day trial in February 2009, the
government presented the details of the reverse sting largely
through the testimony of Cruz and Torres. The jury also heard the
audio recordings of the preparatory telephone calls involving
Rubis, Torres, and Custodio and saw the videotapes of the sham
cocaine display and the attempted transaction. Despite defendants'
objections, the court allowed the prosecutor to ask Cruz what role
defendants played within the drug trafficking organization. Cruz
identified Mieses as "one of the buyers," and Reyes-Guerrero as
"the other buyer." Cruz also described them as the "owners of the
money." Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero defended by arguing "mere
presence," attempting to persuade the jury that they were merely
-8-
bystanders to Rubis's drug deal.8 The strategy was unsuccessful,
and both men were found guilty.
In post-trial motions for judgments of acquittal,
appellants challenged the court's instruction on "mere presence"
and asserted that the court erred in allowing Cruz to present
overview testimony that was based on hearsay. They further argued
that the evidence adduced by the government was insufficient as a
matter of law to support the guilty verdicts.
In a thorough and thoughtful opinion, the district court
acknowledged that Cruz's testimony about appellants' roles in the
drug transaction had been improperly admitted, Reyes-Guerrero, 638
F. Supp. 2d at 190, and that the error "may have constituted
sufficient grounds for the granting of a new trial pursuant to a
harmless error standard." Id. at 179 n.1. Because the defendants
had not moved for such relief, however, the court addressed only
their request for acquittal. Id. It concluded that Torres's
testimony alone provided ample support for findings of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, id. at 192-93, and it therefore denied the
motions.9
On appeal, appellants raise four arguments. First, they
jointly reiterate their contention that admission of Cruz's
8
Rubis disappeared after posting bond and has not been tried.
9
The court rejected the appellants' claim of instructional
error.
-9-
overview testimony – specifically, his assertions that they played
the role of buyers – was reversible error. Second, they challenge
the admission of Cruz's testimony about his post-arrest interview
with Rubis. They argue that Cruz's revelation that after the
interview the targets of his investigation changed necessarily
implied a statement by Rubis identifying Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero
as co-conspirators in the drug deal. Admission of that implied
out-of-court statement, they assert, violated their rights under
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Third, Mieses
challenges the court's refusal to allow the jury to hear a portion
of the audio recording made by Torres on June 27. Mieses insists
that the recording was relevant to the jurors' appraisal of
Torres's testimony about the conversation at the minivan and why it
was not captured on the tape. Finally, Reyes-Guerrero renews his
sufficiency argument, which is where we begin our discussion.
II.
Reyes-Guerrero argues that he is entitled to a judgment
of acquittal because a conspiracy charge requires proof of the
defendant's "own words or actions" and the record in this case
involves only "the mouth of the government informant." He asserts
that Torres's uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to support
a finding that Reyes-Guerrero was a knowing and voluntary
participant in a conspiracy, see United States v. Bristol-Mártir,
570 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2009), and he insists that the jury could
-10-
properly conclude only that he happened to be present when Rubis
transacted a drug deal.
Reyes-Guerrero undervalues the evidence against him.10
The testimony of a single witness can be enough to support the
government's case, United States v. De La Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18,
24-25 (1st Cir. 2010), and even the uncorroborated testimony of an
informant may suffice "to establish the facts underlying a
defendant's conviction," United States v. Merlino, 592 F.3d 22, 30
(1st Cir. 2010). The jury assesses witness credibility, United
States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d 581, 596 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010),
and the jurors in this case were properly informed about Torres's
drug-dealing past and cautioned about accepting his testimony.11
Moreover, the government did not rest solely on informant
testimony to rebut Reyes-Guerrero's mere presence defense. The
government also introduced recordings of phone conversations,
videotapes, and Cruz's testimony based on direct surveillance. The
early phone conversations between Torres and Rubis indicated that
10
For purposes of our sufficiency analysis, we do not consider
the testimony of Cruz to which appellants have objected.
11
In its pre-deliberations charge to the jury, the court gave
the following instruction:
You have heard the testimony of Mark Anthony Torres.
He provided evidence under contract agreements with the
Government and received money from the Government in
exchange for providing information. Some people in this
position are truthful when testifying. Still, you should
consider the testimony of Mark Anthony Torres with
particular caution.
-11-
Rubis was acting as a broker for buyers who were reluctant to part
with their cash before obtaining drugs, and the events on the
morning of the scheduled transaction permitted the jury to infer
that appellants were those buyers. Moreover, Rubis reported in one
call that he was with the "owners of the money," and he later
appeared for the deal with Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero – and the
money. Reyes-Guerrero's travel to the scene of the transaction, in
a vehicle containing a hidden compartment suitable for transporting
drugs, was his own conduct that has considerable significance in
light of the other evidence. In addition, Rubis told Torres he
originally had arrived early for the transaction but then was
delayed because he had to wait for the buyers. That explanation as
recounted by Torres – i.e., Rubis's early arrival and subsequent
return – matched the observations of the Task Force agents on the
scene.
The informant testimony, if believed by the jury, was
particularly damaging. Torres testified that Reyes-Guerrero nodded
his head when asked if he was ready to proceed with the deal,
signaling active participation. Although Torres's report that
Reyes-Guerrero had helped to retrieve the box of money from behind
the driver's seat was more ambiguous, it was nonetheless additional
evidence that the jury could have viewed as proof of Reyes-
Guerrero's complicity in the transaction. The jury thus had before
it sufficient evidence pointing to Reyes-Guerrero's guilt.
-12-
Although a guilty verdict was not inevitable – as we
explain below – our rejection of Reyes-Guerrero's sufficiency claim
is not inconsistent with our decision to vacate appellants'
convictions. Our concerns, and the stakes, are considerably
different when we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a jury verdict than when we assess the impact of discrete
evidentiary errors on that verdict. If even the properly admitted
evidence would not permit a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the government has failed to prove its case and
the defendant is entitled to acquittal. If, instead, the properly
admitted evidence is sufficient to prove guilt, but other,
erroneously admitted evidence might have influenced the verdict,
our concern is that the defendant was denied a fair trial. The
remedy in such circumstances is a new trial, not acquittal.
Here, taking into account only the evidence whose
admission is not challenged, the record was sufficient for a jury
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes-Guerrero was more
than an innocent bystander to Rubis's transaction. Hence, we
affirm the district court's denial of his motion for acquittal.
III.
Appellants assert three evidence-related errors. Two are
claims of wrongful admission of testimony by Cruz: his overview
testimony identifying appellants as the buyers in the drug deal and
his report about his post-arrest interview with Rubis. The third
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claim, raised only by Mieses, is that the court erred in refusing
to admit a portion of the audiotape recorded on the day of the
attempted cocaine purchase. We discuss the merits of each of these
contentions before turning to the question of harmless error.
A. Cruz's Overview Testimony
In United States v. Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2009), we reviewed at length why the government must be wary of
using a law enforcement agent in a multi-defendant drug trial to
provide an "overview" of the prosecution's case, and we sharply
criticized the U.S. Attorney's Office in Puerto Rico for its
repeated improper use of the practice. See id. at 16-27; see also
United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 117-20 (1st Cir. 2004). Both
Flores-de-Jesús and our earlier decision in Casas particularly
condemned testimony from an agent, not based on personal knowledge,
describing the roles played in the drug conspiracy by individual
defendants. Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 16, 24; Casas, 356 F.3d
at 118-19. Such descriptions amount to impermissible testimony
from the agent "that each of the defendants was guilty of the
conspiracy charged." Casas, 356 F.3d at 119 (quoted in Flores-de-
Jesús, 569 F.3d at 24).
In similar fashion to Flores-de-Jesús and Casas, the lead
law enforcement officer in this case, Agent Cruz, was called as the
first witness at trial. He testified to the step-by-step
progression of the investigation, describing the phone calls and
-14-
meetings that culminated in the arrests at the shopping center. At
the end of the direct examination, after confirming that Cruz had
listened to all of the phone calls and audio recordings, conversed
with and supervised Torres, and watched the meetings between Rubis
and Torres that were videotaped, the prosecutor asked Cruz what
role each individual had played in the conspiracy. Cruz testified
that Rubis was "a broker within the drug trafficking organization,"
Mieses "in this deal was one of the buyers," and Reyes-Guerrero was
"the other buyer."
Flores-de-Jesús was issued approximately four months after the
trial in this case, between appellants' filing of post-trial
motions for judgment of acquittal and the district court's ruling
on the motions. In its decision on the motions, the district court
observed that Flores-de-Jesús had drawn "clear boundaries between
permissible and impermissible 'overview testimony' at the beginning
of trial." 638 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (citing Flores-de-Jesús, 569
F.3d at 19-20). It concluded that, although a case agent may
describe the course of an investigation to provide background
information, Cruz's pronouncement that the defendants were the
buyers was plainly improper. Id. The testimony did not satisfy
the requirements for lay witness testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 701, the court held, because it was "not based squarely on
-15-
personal knowledge." Id. at 189.12 Cruz was not a participant in
the attempted drug deal and, "[i]mportantly, . . . was unable to
hear any of the words allegedly spoken by the defendants at the
time the informant approached them to make the drug exchange." Id.
On appeal, appellants argue that the impermissible role-in-
the-offense testimony was reversible error entitling them to a new
trial. The government insists that Cruz's testimony did not
violate the principles outlined in Flores-de-Jesús and Casas
because, unlike the agents in those cases, Cruz directly
participated in every aspect of the investigation. The government
recounts the evidence to which Cruz was directly exposed – the
conversations and meetings between Rubis and Torres, and the
encounter at the van – and argues that Cruz's "testimony about
[appellants'] roles as buyers was based on his perception of events
that he participated in and was therefore proper lay opinion
testimony under Rule 701."
12
Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the
witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences
is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 701.
-16-
The government is correct that this case differs from Flores-
de-Jesús and Casas. Those cases both involved wide-ranging
overview testimony by law enforcement agents whose descriptions of
the conspiracies at issue relied heavily on information told to
them by others – i.e., on inadmissible hearsay – rather than on
their own personal knowledge. See Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 24;
Casas, 356 F.3d at 119.13 By contrast, Cruz played a hands-on role
in nearly every aspect of the investigation underlying this case,
and most of his testimony consisted of describing the sequence of
events that he had seen and heard. Such testimony is permissible
and "valuable to provide background information and to explain how
and why the agents even came to be involved with th[e] particular
defendant[s]." Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 19 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (first alteration in original).14
13
Overview evidence often provides an anticipatory summary
of the prosecution's case by previewing the testimony of other
witnesses. See Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 16-17. In Casas, the
circumstances were "particularly problematic" because the agent's
testimony "was likely based on the testimony of a cooperating co-
conspirator whom the government chose not to call at trial,"
leaving the defendants unable to cross-examine the cooperator or
"'challenge a conclusion drawn from what he had said.'" Flores-de-
Jesús, 569 F.3d at 24 n.8 (quoting Casas, 356 F.3d at 119).
14
Although testimony explaining why the investigation turned
its focus to a particular defendant is rarely competent evidence on
the principal question of whether the defendant is guilty, it can
be useful to avoid jury confusion and speculation as to why agents
suddenly began to conduct surveillance on the defendant. It can
therefore be acceptable despite its lack of relevance to the
question of guilt or innocence, so long as it does not involve
communicating incompetent and prejudicial information to the jury.
As we shall explain, the problems associated with evidence offered
-17-
In the way that matters to us here, however, this case is
equivalent to Flores-de-Jesús and Casas. Appellants challenge only
Cruz's testimony announcing their roles in the conspiracy. In
Flores-de-Jesús, we characterized the agent's role-in-the-offense
conclusion as "[t]he most troubling part" of his testimony. See
569 F.3d at 24. We observed that, "[w]hen a law enforcement
witness 'express[es] opinions as to defendants' culpability based
on the totality of information gathered in the course of their
investigation[],' these conclusory statements often involve
impermissible lay opinion testimony, without any basis in personal
knowledge, about the role of the defendant in the conspiracy." Id.
at 19 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir.
2005) (second and third alterations in original)).
Cruz's opinion on the defendants' roles was flawed in part by
just such a lack of personal knowledge. As the district court
pointed out, Cruz did not see or hear the only explicitly
inculpatory conduct attributed to appellants – the interaction of
Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero with Rubis and Torres at the minivan.
Cruz admitted that his knowledge of appellants' interaction with
Rubis and Torres came solely from Torres: "The informant is the
only one that can declare as to what happened there." Inevitably,
Torres's report about what he had observed inside the vehicle – the
to show the context of law enforcement actions can involve
violations of the hearsay rule or the Sixth Amendment. See infra
Part II.B.
-18-
most harmful evidence in the case – was part of Cruz's calculus in
ascribing roles to the defendants in the conspiracy.15
Hence, we agree with the district court that Cruz's challenged
testimony failed, at least in part, to satisfy the requirement that
lay opinions be "rationally based on the perception of the
witness," Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). As the Second Circuit has noted,
the "'traditional objective'" of Rule 701 is "to afford the trier
of fact 'an accurate reproduction of the event' at issue." Garcia,
413 F.3d at 211 (quoting advisory committee note on 1972 Proposed
Rules). Cruz neither saw nor heard the critical episode in the
15
Before eliciting Cruz's opinion on Rubis's and appellants'
roles, the prosecutor engaged in the following exchange with him:
Q: Did you listen to all the calls in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
. . .
Q: Did you have conversations with the informant
[Torres]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you supervise the informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you listen to the audio recordings of any meetings
the informant had with [Rubis]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you watch the two meetings that we viewed here
today?
A: Yes, sir.
The prosecutor then asked what role each of the three men had
played, "[b]ased on everything you observed." In the context of
the questioning, a jury would almost surely understand that Cruz's
response to this question was informed not only by what he had
"observed," but also by what he had heard in the audio recordings
and what he had learned from his conversations with Torres,
including an account of what happened in the minivan. As we
explain infra, even if that assumption is incorrect, the result
here would be the same.
-19-
investigation, and his opinions as to defendants' roles in the
conspiracy, based in part on Torres's perceptions of the
interaction, were thus inadmissible under Rule 701(a).16
Even if the government could argue that Cruz was capable of
inferring appellants' roles based only on what he had personally
observed, his testimony would still be impermissible because it did
not satisfy Rule 701's requirement that lay opinion evidence be
"helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). The nub
of that requirement is to exclude testimony where "'the witness is
no better suited than the jury'" to make the judgment at issue,
United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995)), providing
"'assurance[] against the admission of opinions which would merely
tell the jury what result to reach,'" United States v. Kaplan, 490
F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Rea, 958
F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory
committee's note on 1972 Proposed Rules)).
16
Indeed, the government's attempt on appeal to justify Cruz's
testimony as lay opinion within the scope of Rule 701 is
inconsistent with its argument at trial. When the defense objected
to the offer of Cruz's interpretation of the events, the government
responded: "This witness was supervising the informant. He told
him exactly what to do. He was on surveillance many, many times.
He heard the phone calls. . . . So he's a fact witness." Given
Cruz's lack of personal knowledge and other problems discussed
infra, his role-in-the-offense testimony did not qualify as either
fact evidence or proper lay opinion.
-20-
Cruz had no insight to offer the jurors based on personal
knowledge of the appellants' inculpatory conduct. Like them, he
had to rely on Torres's account of what occurred in the vehicle.
Like them, he heard the audio recordings of the phone calls.
Although he was present at the scene when surveillance videotapes
were recorded, the jurors watched the tapes of those encounters,
allowing them to see what Cruz had seen. Indeed, when asked on
cross-examination why he concluded that Mieses was a buyer, Cruz
responded: "Because Mr. Meises and Mr. [Reyes-]Guerrero were the
two that were in custody of the money at the time of the
intervention. They were the two that were protecting that money so
nothing would happen to it." In other words, Cruz inferred
appellants' roles not from any direct knowledge, but from the same
circumstantial evidence that was before the jury – effectively
usurping the jury's role as fact-finder.17 Moreover, as used by the
government, the testimony amounted to argumentative interpretation.
It was perfectly appropriate for the prosecutor to argue in
summation that the evidence of the defendants' actions and words
supported the inference that they were the buyers. But having Cruz
so testify amounted to simply dressing up argument as evidence.
17
Notably, Cruz's explanation relied on two levels of
inference beyond the undisputed fact that appellants arrived in the
vehicle with the cash: first, that appellants were guarding the
money and, second, that the money belonged to them. Neither
inference was based on conduct observed by Cruz.
-21-
The difference between Cruz's information and the base of
knowledge necessary to make a lay opinion helpful to the jury in a
case such as this is apparent when the circumstances here are
contrasted with a scenario described by the Second Circuit in
Garcia:
[W]hen an undercover agent participates in a hand-to-hand
drug exchange with a number of persons, the agent may
well testify that, in his opinion, a particular
participant, "X," was the person directing the
transaction. Such an opinion is based on his personal
perception of such subjective factors as the respect
various participants showed "X," their deference to "X"
when he spoke, and their consummation of the deal only
upon a subtly signaled approval by "X." By allowing the
agent to state his opinion as to a person's role in such
circumstances, Rule 701 affords the jury an insight into
an event that was uniquely available to an eyewitness.
413 F.3d at 211-12. Cruz, as he admitted himself, was not an
eyewitness with unique access to appellants' conduct; his testimony
could only have replaced, rather than aided, the jury's assessment
of the evidence.18 It was thus not admissible lay opinion
testimony. See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 213-14 (explaining that jurors
are not "'helped' within the meaning of Rule 701 by opinion
testimony that, in addition to telling them 'what was in the
evidence,' also told them 'what inferences to draw from it'"
(quoting United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir.
18
We note that the opinion of the law enforcement agent
described by the court in Garcia concerns an individual's
observable role in relation to other participants at the scene of
a drug transaction, not the individual's overall role in the
conspiracy. The latter would be more likely to rest on evidence
beyond the agent's perceptions at the scene.
-22-
2004)); see also 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 701.05 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed.,
2d ed. 2011) (noting that, to protect the jury's role as fact-
finder, courts must be wary of lay opinion testimony whose "sole
function is to answer the same question that the trier of fact is
to consider in its deliberations"); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210-11.
The usurpation problem that arises when a witness testifies to
opinions based on evidence that was also available to the jurors is
compounded when the witness is a government agent whose testimony
– as here – is effectively a judgment on the question of guilt or
innocence. This is one variant of the imprimatur problem we
described in Flores-de-Jesús and Casas. There, we focused
primarily on our concern that the government agent's preview of
other witnesses' testimony would endorse their testimony "in what
can only be viewed as an attempt by the government to bolster the
credibility of those later witnesses." See Flores-de-Jesús, 569
F.3d at 26; see also id. at 17-19; Casas, 356 F.3d at 120.19
Although the vouching concern also exists here to the extent
that Cruz's role-in-the-offense opinion implicitly endorsed
Torres's later testimony describing appellants' conduct in the
19
As we observed in Flores-de-Jesús, the government is
particularly eager for such testimony in drug conspiracy cases
"where so much of the government's case relies on the often
problematic testimony of confidential informants with unsavory
pasts or cooperating co-defendants with myriad credibility
problems." 569 F.3d at 26-27.
-23-
minivan, the problem with Cruz's testimony extends beyond vouching
for what the jury may perceive as a less credible witness. The
jurors were told that, based on the same evidence before them, an
experienced government agent had rejected appellants' mere presence
defense and concluded that they were participants in the
conspiracy. Given the effect on juries of the government's
imprimatur, see Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 18; Casas, 356 F.3d at
120, it was patently unfair for Cruz to present his view of
appellants' culpability. "It is . . . the jury's singular
responsibility to decide from the evidence admitted at trial
whether the government has carried its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." Garcia, 413 F.3d at 215; see also Grinage, 390
F.3d at 751 ("[T]he agent was presented to the jury with an aura of
expertise and authority which increased the risk that the jury
would be swayed by his testimony, rather than rely on its own
interpretation . . . .").20
In sum, Cruz's testimony about appellants' roles in the June
27 transaction lacked a foundation of personal knowledge of facts
essential to his opinion, usurped the jury's fact-finding function,
20
Cruz's law enforcement experience, of course, was not an
appropriate basis for his opinions as a lay witness. See Garcia,
413 F.3d at 216-17. Nor would the opinion have been proper if Cruz
had been qualified as an expert, which he was not. As we said
about similar testimony in Casas, Cruz's "testimony that particular
persons were members of the conspiracy was not an appropriate
subject for expert testimony." 356 F.3d at 120.
-24-
and improperly endorsed the government's theory of the case.
Hence, it is beyond debate that the testimony was wrongly admitted.
B. Cruz's Testimony about the Post-Arrest Interview of Rubis
1. Background
During cross-examination of Agent Cruz, Reyes-Guerrero's
counsel elicited the fact that Reyes-Guerrero was not a target of
the Task Force investigation until the day of the arrests. Cruz
specifically acknowledged that Reyes-Guerrero's name did not appear
in the four or five official investigative reports – known as "DEA-
6 reports" – that were prepared before that day. On redirect
examination by the government, Cruz confirmed that Reyes-Guerrero's
name did appear in the last such report, "the arrest report." When
the prosecutor followed up by asking about the contents of that
report, defense counsel objected and the court convened a bench
conference.
The final DEA report described the post-arrest interview of
Rubis by Cruz and another Task Force agent. In the bench
conference, the prosecutor explained that he would not try to
"elicit the actual statements" uttered by Rubis in the interview,
apparently recognizing that such testimony would trigger hearsay
and Confrontation Clause problems. Rather, he would ask about
Rubis's offer to cooperate, whether he was interviewed outside the
presence of the others, "[a]nd what did [Cruz] do after the meeting
was over." Reyes-Guerrero's counsel protested that evidence about
-25-
the interview would be hearsay because the prosecutor was "trying
to establish the truth of the matter asserted," and he emphasized
that "Rubis is not here."
The district court, after suggesting that any statement from
Rubis would be admissible as a statement by a co-conspirator,21
allowed the prosecutor to proceed. The following exchange then
occurred:
Q: Agent Cruz, the DEA-6 that I just asked you about,
without saying what is in that DEA-6, specifically, the
whole report, what's it about?
A: That report is an interview that was made to Mr. Rubis
Dario after the arrest.
Q: After all three were arrested?
A: Yes, after all three were arrested.
. . .
Q: Okay. Where were these two individuals while you were
interviewing him?
A: These two individuals were in the cell at the office.
Q: Why were they not in the interview?
A: Because the interview was being carried out with Mr.
Rubis only and with us because he had the intention of
cooperating with us.
Q: After this interview, did the targets of your
investigation at this point change?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay. After this interview, what did you decide to do
with Defendant [Reyes-Guerrero]?
Cruz then testified that the defendants were processed and taken to
a federal detention facility.
21
There is no question that the hearsay exception for co-
conspirator statements made "during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy," Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), does not apply to
Rubis's post-arrest statements. See United States v. Lombard, 72
F.3d 170, 189 n.25 (1st Cir. 1995).
-26-
On appeal, appellants argue that Cruz implicitly testified
that Rubis had identified them as co-conspirators, and they assert
that the indirect admission of Rubis's statement violated their
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as
described in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Under
Crawford, the admission of testimonial hearsay against a defendant
is prohibited unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at
trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
him. Id. at 68; United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 64
(1st Cir. 2010). Although Rubis was unavailable, having become a
fugitive, appellants had no prior opportunity to question him about
his interview statements.22
We begin our assessment of this claim with the government's
contention that the Crawford issue was not preserved.
2. Forfeiture
The government argues that neither appellant may pursue a
Confrontation Clause challenge on appeal because Reyes-Guerrero
objected at trial on hearsay grounds, without referencing the
Confrontation Clause or Crawford, and Mieses did not object at all.
22
Mieses mistakenly invokes Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968), which addresses the admission of a non-testifying
codefendant's out-of-court statements in a joint trial. Rubis was
not tried with Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero, and "a literal Bruton
objection" therefore "ma[kes] no sense." United States v. Cabrera-
Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir. 2009). We thus construe his
Confrontation Clause claim as a Crawford challenge. See id.
-27-
We can easily dispatch the argument as to Reyes-Guerrero.
Although the government accurately recites our precedent holding
that an objection on hearsay grounds will not preserve a
Confrontation Clause claim, see United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez,
617 F.3d 581, 594 (1st Cir. 2010), we have in the past looked to
the full context of counsel's colloquy with the court in
determining whether a Crawford challenge was preserved. In
Cabrera-Rivera, for example, we found it "obvious that counsel was
objecting to [defendant's] inability to confront the declarant"
where counsel had pointed to the declarant's unavailability at
trial. See 583 F.3d at 36 (citing counsel's statement that the
declarant "is not here to --"). We therefore concluded that the
defendant had preserved his Confrontation Clause claim. Here, too,
counsel plainly raised both hearsay and Confrontation Clause
concerns. See, e.g., Tr. Transcript (Feb. 19, 2009), at 10
("Because Rubis is not here, and . . . the attorney is trying to
establish the truth of the matter asserted because of this.")
(emphasis added); id. at 10-11 ("There's a . . . thin line, your
Honor, and it might . . . this hearsay information, your Honor, we
don't know which context it happens; and, also, Mr. Rubis, again,
is not here.") (emphasis added).23
23
As a practical matter, the same underlying concerns would
be at play if we addressed the testimony at issue here solely as a
hearsay problem, see United States v. Gomez, 617 F.3d 88, 96-97 (2d
Cir. 2010), and we would reach the same outcome. See also United
States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 56 n.6 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting
-28-
Mieses's counsel, by contrast, was largely silent throughout
the exchange on this issue. He participated in the sidebar
conference discussing the proposed testimony, however, and voiced
his agreement that the prejudice from the line of questioning
outweighed its probative value. In context, where the interests of
both defendants were identical, we are satisfied that Mieses's
counsel incorporated Reyes-Guerrero's more fully stated objection
into his brief comment.
We thus afford plenary review to both appellants' claims. We
generally review preserved evidentiary errors for abuse of
discretion, but "[w]e review de novo whether the strictures of the
Confrontation Clause have been met." Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d at
590 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Analysis
Out-of-court statements excluded from evidence under Crawford
must be both testimonial – i.e., statements an objectively
reasonable declarant could have anticipated would be used at trial
– and offered for their truth, thus constituting hearsay.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52; id. at 59 n.9; Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d
at 65. It is not disputed that Rubis's assertions in his post-
that the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause "'are generally
designed to protect similar values,'" though "the Supreme Court has
'been careful not to equate' them" (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 814 (1990)); Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 247 (2d Cir.
2002) ("[A]ccusatory assertions introduced without the testimony of
the accuser not only violate the Confrontation Clause, but they
also violate rules against hearsay.").
-29-
arrest interview were testimonial. The government also appears to
accept that testimony revealing an "actual statement[]" by Rubis
about appellants' complicity in the drug deal would be inadmissible
hearsay. It seeks to defeat appellants' Crawford claim on two
other grounds: (1) no actual statement, and thus no improper
hearsay, was introduced into evidence, and (2) Reyes-Guerrero's
counsel opened the door to the challenged testimony.24
a. No Statement
In the pertinent portion of the challenged exchange, Cruz was
asked, in essence, if Rubis had said anything during his interview
that changed the targets of the investigation and prompted the
defendants' arrests. Cruz answered affirmatively. The government
maintains that the prosecutor's examination was "adroitly focused
. . . on the actions that Agent Cruz took after speaking to Rubis,"
24
The government cites precedent for the proposition that
"[s]tatements offered for the limited purpose of showing what
effect the statement had on the listener are not hearsay," but it
makes no direct argument that we should view any statement by Rubis
as nonhearsay. See Brief of the United States at 53 (citing United
States v. Cruz-Díaz, 550 F.3d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 2008); United
States v. Bailey, 270 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2001)). Instead, in
the sentence immediately following its citations to Cruz-Díaz and
Bailey, the government asserts that "[t]here was no violation here
because Rubis's statement was not introduced." Even if we were to
generously view the government to be arguing, alternatively, that
admission of Rubis's statement was permissible because it was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that argument would
be unavailing. As we shall explain, the government offered the
evidence about Cruz's interview of Rubis to rebut an inference that
Reyes-Guerrero was not a participant in the crime – i.e., for the
truth of Rubis's implicit statement that Reyes-Guerrero and Mieses
were involved.
-30-
while appellants argue that "[n]o juror of normal intelligence,
hearing this exchange, could have failed to get the prosecutor's
point that Rubis, in his statement to the agents, had implicated
[him] as a co-conspirator." Reyes-Guerrero Brief at 21; see also
Mieses Brief at 32. Appellants assert that "the import of this
testimony is no less clear than if Rubis had been directly quoted."
Reyes-Guerrero Reply Brief at 5.
We agree with appellants that a reasonable jury could only
have understood Cruz to have communicated that Rubis had identified
appellants as participants in the drug deal. It makes no
difference that the government took care not to introduce Rubis's
"actual statements." Although the government could properly seek
to rebut Reyes-Guerrero's suggestion that the appellants were
innocent bystanders, it did so with testimony that plainly told the
jurors that Rubis said they were co-conspirators rather than with
the available evidence circumstantially pointing to their
culpability.
In United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006), we
declined to discuss Crawford's applicability to "testimony from
which . . . the jury would necessarily infer that the declarant had
said X, but which did not itself quote or paraphrase the
declarant's statements." Id. at 20-21. We observed that the
defendant in that case had made "no effort to explain why Crawford
should be read to extend" to such statements. Id. at 21. Here,
-31-
the issue is addressed head-on by both appellants. We conclude
that the right to cross-examine an out-of-court accuser applies
with full force in the circumstances of this case.
The opportunity to cross-examine the declarant "to tease out
the truth," Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67, is no less vital when a
witness indirectly, but still unmistakably, recounts a co-
defendant's out-of-court accusation. The concerns animating the
right to confrontation are especially acute when the statement at
issue originates from an ex parte examination by a law enforcement
officer. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51; id. at 51 ("An accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony
in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not."). Hence, if what the jury hears is, in
substance, an untested, out-of-court accusation against the
defendant, particularly if the inculpatory statement is made to law
enforcement authorities, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront the declarant is triggered. Accord Ryan v. Miller, 303
F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir. 2002) ("If the substance of the prohibited
testimony is evident even though it was not introduced in the
prohibited form, the testimony is still inadmissible."); United
States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A]lthough the
jury was not told exactly what words [the co-defendants] had
spoken, [the witness's] testimony clearly conveyed the substance of
what they had said.").
-32-
Indeed, any other conclusion would permit the government to
evade the limitations of the Sixth Amendment and the Rules of
Evidence by weaving an unavailable declarant's statements into
another witness's testimony by implication.25 The government cannot
be permitted to "circumvent the Confrontation Clause by introducing
the same substantive testimony in a different form." Ryan, 303
25
This risk of violation of the hearsay rule or the
Confrontation Clause reinforces the importance of prosecutors
understanding the limitations on so-called background or context
evidence. If, for example, such evidence includes the fact that a
known participant in the crime was observed conferring in
suspicious circumstances with the defendant, it can be useful and
acceptable for the investigating agent to explain that he began to
watch the defendant because of this observed meeting. It does not
follow, however, that the objective of explaining why the agent
focused on the defendant – or why the agent proceeded to arrest the
defendant – justifies prejudicial hearsay testimony. See Maher,
454 F.3d at 20 ("[I]nvestigating officers . . . should not . . . be
allowed to relate historical aspects of the case, such as
complaints and reports of others containing inadmissible hearsay.
Such statements are sometimes erroneously admitted under the
argument that the officers are entitled to give the information
upon which they acted.").
We take it to be common ground that the government may not
have an agent testify, "X told us that the defendant was involved
in the crime." Quoting X's out-of-court accusation remains
impermissible if the agent's testimony is changed to say, "We began
to investigate the defendant because X told us that the defendant
was involved in the crime," and the government seeks to justify it
by arguing that X's out-of-court statement was offered not for its
truth but only to explain why the agent focused on (or arrested)
the defendant. Nor does the result change if, instead of quoting
the out-of-court statement, the government communicates its content
to the jury by implication. In such instances, the relatively
minor "probative value [of the evidence of why the agent began
surveillance or made an arrest] is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice" that results from communicating the
accusatory hearsay to the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also Maher,
454 F.3d at 20 ("The need for this evidence is slight, and the
likelihood of misuse great." (quoting 2 Broun, et al., McCormick on
Evidence § 249, at 103 (5th ed. 1999)(emphasis omitted)).
-33-
F.3d at 248; see also, e.g., Mason v. Scully, 16 F.3d 38, 43 (2d
Cir. 1994) ("The fact that the content of [the co-conspirator's]
statement to [the detective] was not revealed in detail was
immaterial, for the plain implication that the prosecutor sought to
elicit . . . was that the conversation . . . led the police to
focus on [the defendant]."); People v. Cruz, 474 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("The prosecutor's questioning of [the
witness] concerning a conversation with [a non-testifying witness],
which directly preceded [the witness's] testimony that he made two
arrests in the case was improper inasmuch as it was designed to
create the impression in the jurors' minds that [the non-testifying
witness] had implicated the defendant . . . ."); People v. Felder,
485 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding error where
witness testified that "the complainant made a response following
which 'we patted down both subjects, placed them in handcuffs, and
removed them from the bar,'" because "[e]ven though [the
complainant's] response was not admitted into evidence, the
testimony left the jurors with the clear impression that . . . the
arrests were made as a result of this response").
We therefore reject the government's argument that Cruz's
testimony was proper because it omitted "the actual statements"
made by Rubis. See Maher, 454 F.3d at 23 ("[W]e are on firm ground
in warning prosecutors of the risks they face in backdoor attempts
-34-
to get statements by non-testifying confidential informants before
a jury.").
b. The Opened Door
The government suggests that, even if Cruz's testimony about
the interview indirectly resulted in the introduction of an out-of-
court statement, the testimony was nonetheless proper to rebut
Reyes-Guerrero's cross-examination eliciting the fact that the two
defendants were never mentioned in the investigative reports prior
to the incident at the van. In the sidebar discussion following
Reyes-Guerrero's objection at trial, the prosecutor stated that he
had avoided referring to the interview in his direct questioning
but defense counsel's focus on Reyes-Guerrero's absence from the
DEA reports had triggered a need for the testimony.
The government's argument on this issue borders on the
frivolous. The testimony elicited by Reyes-Guerrero's counsel
about the early DEA reports was proper evidence in support of
appellants' mere presence defense, showing that appellants had not
previously been known to law enforcement authorities. The
government does not explain in its brief how that testimony opened
the door to evidence on the content of Rubis's interview. At
trial, the prosecutor asserted that the evidence was necessary
rebuttal because, in context, the questioning on the early reports
was "diminishing [appellants'] culpability." That may be.
Defendants are entitled to cross-examine government witnesses in an
-35-
effort to diminish their own culpability, and the government is
entitled to counter with appropriate rebuttal evidence. The
evidence of appellants' absence from the earlier reports was
neither inaccurate nor misleading, and the government did not
contend otherwise. The government could properly have countered by
showing, for example, that appellants did appear in the final
report, which was prepared after the incident at the van and
described the transaction. By no means, however, did the cross-
examination testimony require or justify rebuttal that violated the
Confrontation Clause.
Moreover, the government's rationale essentially acknowledges
that the evidence of Rubis's accusation of complicity was offered
to establish the truth of the accusation – i.e., that appellants
were participants in the drug transaction, notwithstanding the
silence of the early reports. Hence, admission of Cruz's testimony
about the interview was improper.
C. Harmless Error
Both appellants argue that the errors described above entitle
them to a new trial. Reyes-Guerrero asserts that admission of
Cruz's overview testimony and the indirect admission of Rubis's
out-of-court statements each is reversible error on its own, and
Mieses additionally argues that the multiple errors require the
grant of a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine. See
-36-
United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 331-32 (1st Cir. 2001);
United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1993).
The inquiry to determine whether cumulative errors are
harmless is the same as for individual error, Meserve, 271 F.3d at
332, and we therefore think it most efficient to move beyond
individual analyses of harmlessness to consider the combined effect
of the two erroneously admitted portions of Cruz's testimony. "The
admission of improper testimony is harmless if it is 'highly
probable that the error did not influence the verdict.'" Flores-
de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 27 (quoting Casas, 356 F.3d at 121).26 The
government bears the burden to establish harmlessness, id., and the
inquiry requires a case-specific examination of factors that
include "the centrality of the tainted material," its prejudicial
impact, and any other indications that "the error affected the
factfinder's resolution of a material issue." Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d
at 1182 (quoted in Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 27); see also
Cabrera-Rivera, 583 F.3d at 36.
Without question, as we described in addressing Reyes-
Guerrero's sufficiency claim, there was ample evidence aside from
26
Constitutional errors, such as a Confrontation Clause
violation, require reversal unless shown to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Cabrera-Rivera, 583 F.3d at 36. In this
case, we use the non-constitutional standard that is more favorable
to the government because our harmless error analysis embraces both
constitutional and non-constitutional errors. The government is
unable to meet that easier test for showing harmlessness and,
hence, it could not meet the more exacting constitutional standard.
-37-
Cruz's improper testimony from which a reasonable factfinder could
infer that appellants played the roles that Cruz and Rubis
attributed to them. We strongly doubt, however, that the jury was
unaffected by Cruz's improper testimony, which communicated to the
jurors that Cruz, an experienced drug investigator, and Rubis, who
admitted his guilt, had both identified appellants as participants
in the conspiracy. We have recognized the "'devastating'" impact
of a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements, Cabrera-Rivera, 583
F.3d at 37 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136), and an essential
premise of our warnings about overview evidence is that jurors view
the testimony of law enforcement officers as especially
authoritative, see Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d at 17-18.
Importantly, the prosecution depended heavily on the
believability of Torres, a paid government informant. In
evaluating harmless error, we cannot presume the jury would have
accepted his testimony as readily without the corroboration
provided by Cruz's testimony. Indeed, consistent with standard
practice for informant witnesses, the court instructed the jurors
to consider Torres's testimony with caution. See Flores-de-Jesús,
569 F.3d at 26 (noting the "often problematic testimony of
confidential informants with unsavory pasts").
The other evidence of appellants' knowing involvement was
suggestive, but not overwhelming. In recorded calls on the day of
the arrests, Rubis said he was with the buyers, but he did not
-38-
identify them by name. Mieses and Reyes-Guerrero were seated in
the front of the minivan, while the known conspirator – and the
money – were in the back. That vehicle, with its hidden
compartment, was not registered to either appellant, and the
compartment was not visible to the driver or passengers.27 Cruz
testified that the video taken of the attempted drug deal does not
show Mieses talking at all – despite Torres's testimony that Mieses
made several incriminating statements. The jury in fact heard none
of the recorded conversations among the men that day – including
Rubis's statement, reported by Torres, that the owners of the money
were in the car – because the audio recording was not introduced
into evidence.
The government's heavy reliance on the informant's credibility
made the overview evidence particularly damaging in this case. In
effect, the jurors were told it was unnecessary to make their own
assessment of Torres's credibility because Cruz did it for them
when he announced unequivocally that appellants were "the owners"
of the money. Rubis's accusation validated Cruz's assessment. See
United States v. Gomez, 617 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The
improperly admitted evidence had substantial weight precisely
27
The minivan was inspected by DEA Task Force Agent Victor
Javier Salgado-Betancourt, who was trained to find secret
compartments in motor vehicles. He testified that the hidden
compartment he discovered was designed to open only when several
buttons or components inside the vehicle were activated at the same
time.
-39-
because it went to the core of the government's case against [the
defendant], placing an unimpeachable accusation before the jury.").
In sum, the tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's
case and potentially disastrous to the appellants' defense of mere
presence. The contested statements were not "'cumulative of other
compelling proof'" that the defendants "'committed the charged
[crime],'" United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537, 546 (1st Cir.
2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Barthelho,
129 F.3d 663, 670 (1st Cir. 1997)); rather, Cruz's testimony sealed
any gap the jury may have perceived between the circumstantial
evidence and a finding of guilt. Hence, we cannot say that it is
"highly probable" that the errors did not affect the jury's
resolution of the case and, accordingly, we conclude that
appellants are entitled to a new trial.
D. Exclusion of the Audiotape
Our conclusion that appellants' convictions must be vacated
based on the overview and Sixth Amendment errors makes it
unnecessary to rule on Mieses's contention that the district court
erred in excluding the audio recording made by informant Torres on
the day of the arrests. Because the issue is likely to arise again
in the new trial, however, we see value in examining this claim.
-40-
Torres testified that Mieses made several incriminating
statements during their encounter at the van,28 and Mieses's counsel
sought to cross-examine Torres with the recording, which all
parties agreed did not contain either defendant's voice. When
counsel asked for a ten-minute break during cross-examination to
find the relevant portion of the one-hour recording, the government
objected that the tape was incomplete and therefore both misleading
and prejudicial. The prosecutor also protested that the recording
was inadmissible without an English translation. The court
rejected admission of the recording, stating: "I don't see any
reason why I should admit this tape . . . . [T]his is too little,
too late."
Mieses's counsel again urged admission of the recording
following the government's redirect examination of Torres. Counsel
emphasized that "[t]he most important factor in this case is what
was said inside that van," and "the most important thing is that
the voice[s] of the Defendants are not heard there." The court
listened to the recording at counsel's request, but then reaffirmed
its initial decision, noting that it was "clear from all the
testimony" that the defendants' voices were "not heard in any
tape."
28
As described in Section I, Torres testified that Mieses
reported that the shoe box in the van contained $100,000, and he
asked Torres about "the merchandise," as well as "how are we going
to do this."
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Mieses presses an argument on appeal that was implicit in the
objections raised at trial, but not fully articulated there. He
argues that the crucial aspect of the recording is not that the
defendants' voices are absent – a fact that no one disputes.
Rather, he asserts that the jurors needed to hear the recording so
they could decide whether – as Torres claimed – the audio was
faulty, or whether Torres had fabricated the exchange in the
minivan. Stressing the plausibility of the latter view during oral
argument on appeal, defense counsel noted that, at a minimum, the
recorder should have picked up the statements that Torres claimed
to have made to appellants.29 Mieses insists that a translated
transcript of the recording should not have been a prerequisite for
its admission because the issue was not what was said on the tape,
but why the conversation described by Torres was not there – a
question of recording quality, not content.
Indeed, the government made much of the supposedly faulty
equipment in its closing argument, emphasizing that the critical
conversation was unavailable to be played for the jurors through no
fault of its own:
Couldn't get an audio of it. Agent Cruz explained to you
why. The wind was blowing. The equipment didn't half
work. . . . Electronics are that way. This equipment is
not perfect. People are not perfect. And how many times
in this trial did our equipment not work? How many times
29
When asked what is audible on the tape, counsel stated that
Torres and Rubis could be heard talking as they approached the van
and as they walked away from the van.
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does your cell phone drop a call? Think about your
common experience as an individual.
We could not get what happened in that van on audio.
Sure, I'd love to be able to play that to you. But that
doesn't take away what the informant – the man that sat
there – who was cross-examined for hours and hours and
hours. He didn't want to be here. His family didn't
want him here. You heard the testimony. But he
testified to you what exactly went on in that van.
Mieses's claim of error, briefly stated, is that exclusion of the
audio recording compromised his ability to respond to this
argument.
As noted, we need not decide whether the district court,
which received an imperfect articulation of Mieses's claim, abused
its discretion in excluding the audiotape. We observe, however,
that the absence of defendants' voices on the recording was
potentially significant evidence rebutting Torres's incriminating
account of their behavior. The government and the defense argue
different reasons for the recording device's failure to pick up
Reyes-Guerrero's and Mieses's voices. We see little reason why the
correct explanation should not be a jury question, as to which the
sounds captured on the tape itself might be potent evidence.
Assuming the lack of an English transcript of the recording was
adequate reason for the exclusion, defendants can prepare a
transcript before their retrial.
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IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the judgments of
conviction and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
So ordered.
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