[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-10619 MAY 25, 2011
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:04-cv-00105-MP-AK
ROSS J. LAWSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee,
ALEPH INSTITUTE, INC.,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(May 25, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ross Lawson, a Florida prisoner, filed a pro se lawsuit against the Secretary
of the Florida Department of Corrections in his official capacity (the “DOC”) for
injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint,
Lawson alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and the Florida Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), Fla. Stat. Ann. § 761.01.1 Finding that
Lawson’s professed beliefs in Orthodox Judaism were insincere, the district court
dismissed the action as frivolous under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). On appeal, Lawson argues that the district court
erroneously dismissed his suit as frivolous, inappropriately resolved disputed
issues of fact about Lawson’s sincerity, and failed to afford him adequate notice
and an opportunity to present evidence before dismissing the complaint. After a
review of the record, we affirm.
I.
1
Lawson initially filed his complaint pro se. After eighteen months of litigation, Lawson
retained counsel, who filed an amended complaint. Counsel later withdrew. Lawson proceeds
pro se on appeal.
2
Lawson filed an amended complaint alleging that the DOC burdened his
practice of Orthodox Judaism by, inter alia, denying him access to Kosher meals,
denying access to daily and weekly religious services, and denying his right to
observe Jewish holidays.2
The DOC moved to dismiss the complaint as frivolous because Lawson’s
religious belief were not sincere. It also requested dismissal as a sanction against
Lawson for filing a frivolous lawsuit. In support of the motion, the DOC
submitted records of Lawson’s canteen purchases, which included poor boy
sandwiches, cheeseburgers, and numerous other non-Kosher items. The DOC
submitted several affidavits as well, including ones from Sergeant Dean Bevis,
Chaplain David Kyle Giddens, and inmate Joseph Wiley. Bevis stated that the
prison meal program served three meals a day and that inmates were eligible for an
alternative entree. Bevis noted that Lawson had chosen the regular meal option
while housed in administrative and disciplinary confinement. Chaplain Giddens
stated that, based on his interactions with Lawson, Lawson was not sincere in his
religious beliefs. He noted that Lawson had not attended Jewish morning prayer
services over the past year and had rejected an offer for a work proscription for
2
He also requested an emergency preliminary injunction requiring the DOC to provide
Kosher meals and to exempt him from the grooming code. The district court denied the
preliminary injunction and Lawson does not appeal from that order.
3
Saturdays because he had “too much legal work to do.” Inmate Wiley, the canteen
operator, stated that Kosher items were designated with a “K” on the canteen
menu, he had sold non-Kosher items to Lawson, and he had seen Lawson eat non-
Kosher foods.
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Lawson filed a motion to strike the
affidavits, disputed the content of the affidavits, and submitted affidavits of other
inmates to establish that he had been deprived of the opportunity to practice his
religion. He also submitted grievances and other documentation for the district
court’s consideration.
The magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed as
frivolous because there was evidence that Lawson’s religious beliefs were not
sincere.3 Over Lawson’s objections, and after considering Lawson’s motion, the
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
II.
3
At the time of the magistrate judge’s recommendation, Lawson had not filed a response
to the motion for sanctions. Lawson had timely tendered his response to the prison mail system,
but his objections were not docketed in the district court until after the magistrate judge’s report.
In any event, the district court considered Lawson’s response and the evidence before adopting
the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
4
On appeal, Lawson first argues that the district court abused its discretion
by dismissing the action as frivolous. We review for abuse of discretion the
district court’s dismissal of an in forma pauperis action as frivolous under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d
1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). We also review for abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision whether to sanction pursuant to its inherent power. Barnes v.
Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998). “A district court abuses its
discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th
Cir. 2001).
Section 3(a) of RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a
“substantial burden” on the religious exercise of a prisoner, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. “Although RLUIPA
bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s
religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), the Act does not preclude inquiry into
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the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 725 n.13 (2005). Thus, “prison officials may appropriately question whether
a prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is
authentic.” Id.
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) provides that the district court shall dismiss the
case of a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous or
malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100
(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). “The
PLRA accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of
the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (quotation omitted). Additionally, a district
court may dismiss a complaint as a sanction pursuant to either Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) or its inherent authority to manage its docket. Betty K
Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). Dismissal
with prejudice is an extreme sanction. Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th
Cir. 2006). Thus, regardless of the source of the court’s authority, the district
court must find both that the party against whom the sanction is imposed engaged
6
in a “clear pattern of delay or willful contempt” and that a lesser sanction would
not suffice. Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337-38.
On review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing Lawson’s action as frivolous. Although Lawson argues that the district
court impermissibly resolved disputed issues of fact, the district court was
permitted to “pierce the veil” of Lawson’s factual allegations to determine the
authenticity of his religious beliefs. Based on Lawson’s canteen purchases and on
the affidavits submitted by the DOC, the district court found that Lawson
repeatedly ate non-Kosher food, never attended Jewish prayer services, and
refused a work proscription for the Sabbath because the proscription would “mess
up his lawsuit.” We will not disturb these findings, which contain ample support
in the record.
Although Lawson energetically denied and attempted to rebut these
conclusions, Lawson’s protracted failure to observe the most basic aspects of his
faith was highly probative, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing the action as frivolous.
III.
7
Lawson next argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing the action without affording him adequate notice and an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut the DOC’s motion for sanctions.4
Due process requires that a party have adequate notice of the consequences
of the conduct for which he has been sanctioned. See Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962). But not every order entered without notice and a
preliminary adversary hearing will offend due process. Rather, to determine the
adequacy of the notice and hearing, this court will consider in large part whether
the record shows that the party was aware of the consequences of his own conduct.
Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Inc., 775 F.2d 1440, 1452 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citing Link).
Here, Lawson filed a motion to strike, objections to the magistrate judge’s
report, and a memorandum of law. He included several affidavits, grievances, and
other documentation for the district court’s consideration. In granting the motion
to dismiss, the district court expressly considered and rejected Lawson’s argument
and evidence. As the district court noted, during five years of litigation, Lawson
4
Although Lawson objects that he was entitled to notice under Rule 11, the DOC moved
for sanctions and dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), not under Rule 11. Additionally,
although Lawson objects that the dispositive motions deadline had expired and that the motion
for sanctions was the functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment, the DOC moved
for sanctions not for summary judgment, and the district court expressly found that no party was
prejudiced by the delay in the revelation of the evidence.
8
“has had an opportunity to respond to every allegation and motion, and has
responded, often and at length. His responses included extensive factual recitation
and legal citations.” In sum, Lawson received adequate notice and opportunity to
present evidence before the district court dismissed the action.
AFFIRMED.
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