NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 5 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEOFFREY ROBERT LAWSON, No. 17-35832
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00184-RMP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BRENT CARNEY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 3, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, FARRIS, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Geoffrey Robert Lawson appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Williams, 791
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lawson’s
RLUIPA claims for damages because RLUIPA does not allow for damages against
state officials sued in their official or individual capacities. See id. at 1031
(recognizing that RLUIPA does not authorize suits for money damages against
state officials in their official or individual capacities).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lawson’s free
exercise claim because Lawson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether defendants engaged in any conduct that caused a deprivation of his free
exercise rights. See id. at 1031-32 (elements of a § 1983 free exercise claim); Starr
v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (elements for supervisory liability
under § 1983).
The district court properly determined that Lawson’s claims for injunctive
relief stemming from the temporary suspension of his kosher diet are moot because
there is no dispute that the correctional facility reinstated Lawson’s kosher diet,
and there is no reasonable expectation that defendants will discontinue access to
the diet in the future. See Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031 (a case is moot when there is no
longer a live controversy as to which relief can be granted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lawson additional
opportunities to conduct discovery because Lawson failed to show that he
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diligently pursued his previous opportunities or that additional discovery would
have precluded summary judgment. See Qualls ex rel. Qualls v. Blue Cross of
Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1994) (district court abuses its discretion by
denying additional discovery only when movant diligently pursued previous
opportunities and shows that additional discovery would preclude summary
judgment); see also Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.
2003) (“A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny
discovery, and a decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the
clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and substantial
prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Ninth Cir. R. 28-1(b)
(“Parties must not append or incorporate by reference briefs submitted to the
district court . . . or refer this Court to such briefs for the arguments on the merits
of the appeal.”).
Lawson’s motion for leave to file a late reply brief (Docket Entry No. 34) is
granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at Docket Entry No. 33.
Lawson’s motions for an extension of time to file a substitute reply brief, a
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temporary injunction, and appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 34) are
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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