UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4721
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ERIC LAMONT SMITH,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:03-cr-00306-RLW)
Submitted: May 3, 2011 Decided: May 26, 2011
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles D. Lewis, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Roderick C. Young, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Lamont Smith was convicted of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). He served his active sentence
and was released to supervision on January 30, 2008. After
learning Smith had been arrested on additional drug and firearm
charges, his probation officer petitioned the district court to
revoke supervised release. Smith admitted the violations, and
the district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment,
the top of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2009) policy
statement range. Smith noted a timely appeal.
Smith challenges the procedural reasonableness of his
supervised release sentence. He argues that the district court
failed to adequately consider the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006). He contends that the district court stated no
particularized reason why the sentence selected was no greater
than necessary, and he argues that the district court failed to
consider that Smith had received a lengthy sentence for the
offenses underlying his supervised release violations. Smith
does not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence.
2
In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439 (4th Cir. 2006)). Because Smith did not request a sentence
different than the one ultimately imposed, his sentence is
reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Thompson,
595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 578-79 (4th Cir. 2010). To establish plain error,
Smith “must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain;
and (3) the error affects substantial rights.” United States v.
Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009).
We review the sentence for significant procedural
error, including such errors as improperly calculating the
policy statement range, failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence, and failing to “consider the helpful assistance
contained in the [USSG] Chapter 7 policy statements along with
the statutory requirements of [18 U.S.C.] § 3583 and the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors applicable to revocation
sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A court need not be as detailed or
3
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still ‘must provide
a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.’” Thompson,
595 F.3d at 547 (quoting Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656).
We conclude that the district court adequately
explained the sentence imposed. “[W]hen a judge decides simply
to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not
necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Here, Smith made no argument
for a particular sentence, and only asked that the district
court consider that he had received a fourteen-year sentence for
the offenses comprising his supervised release violation. The
district court clearly considered and rejected this argument, as
reflected by the court’s remark that the flagrancy of Smith’s
violations evidenced the necessity of a higher sentence “to
promote respect for the law and provide for some deterrence.”
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4