UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4814
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JERMAINE LAMAR SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:03-cr-00330-REP-11)
Submitted: March 13, 2014 Decided: March 26, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia D.
Roberts, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Nicholas J. Xenakis,
Research & Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Michael C. Moore,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jermaine Lamar Smith admitted several violations of
the conditions of his supervised release and was sentenced to
six months of imprisonment and an additional twenty-four-month
term of supervised release. On appeal, Smith argues that the
district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for
imposing that sentence. We disagree.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider
whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438. Only if we find the sentence
procedurally or substantively unreasonable, must we decide
whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors and the policy statements contained in
Chapter Seven of the Guidelines. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. The
district court also must provide an explanation of the chosen
sentence, although this explanation “need not be as detailed or
specific” as is required for a sentence imposed upon conviction
of the underlying criminal offense. United States v. Thompson,
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595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). An explanation of sentence
upon revocation of supervised release “should . . . provide . .
. assurance that the sentencing court considered the § 3553(a)
factors with regard to the particular defendant before him, and
also considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by
the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, the district court’s comments during Smith’s
revocation hearing do just that. See Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(noting that “district court’s reasons for imposing a within-
range sentence may be clear from context, including the court’s
statements to the defendant throughout the sentencing hearing”)
(internal citation omitted). The district court engaged Smith
at length regarding his failure to make sufficient efforts to
search for employment and ultimately rejected Smith’s suggestion
that a limited job market excused his neglect. See Moulden, 478
F.3d at 655 (noting that revocation sentence is intended “to
sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of
the court-ordered supervision and to punish the inherent breach
of trust indicated by the defendant’s behavior”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court also pressed Smith on
whether, in light of his record, six months’ imprisonment was
sufficient to “get [Smith’s] attention” and correctly disagreed
with Smith’s suggestion that deterrence was not a proper
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consideration when imposing sentence. See United States v.
Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
district court appropriately considered whether revocation
“sentence would adequately deter violations of supervised
release”).
Additionally, echoing its concern regarding Smith’s
ability and motivation to find employment, the district court
explained that an additional term of supervised release would
hopefully help Smith secure a job and avoid further
incarceration. See United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197-
99 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that district court is permitted to
consider need for rehabilitation when imposing term of
supervised release), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013).
Accordingly, this is not a case where the district court failed
to offer any explanation for its sentencing decision or where we
are forced to “guess at the district court’s rationale.” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2009); see
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
Because there is also no indication that Smith’s
sentence is substantively unreasonable, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (explaining that
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if district
court states proper basis for concluding that defendant should
receive sentence imposed). We dispense with oral argument
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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