UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5027
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHUCKIE DALE WOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:09-cr-00339-NCT-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2011 Decided: June 15, 2011
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew A. Victor, VICTOR VICTOR & HELGOE LLP, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chuckie Dale Wood pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to distribution of cocaine hydrochloride, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B) (2006), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). The district court
sentenced Wood to a total of 262 months’ imprisonment, comprised
of 262 months on the drug count and a concurrent 120 months on
the firearm count. Wood appeals, challenging his sentence. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381,
387 (4th Cir. 2010). This review requires appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties,
and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above,
below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the
record an individualized assessment based on the particular
2
facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wood first contends that the district court erred by
failing to resolve his objection to a two-level adjustment in
his offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.1(b) (2009) for possessing a firearm. However, as Wood
concedes, the two-level adjustment did not affect his Guidelines
range because he was sentenced as a career offender.
Wood does not dispute the calculation of his career
offender Guidelines range, but argues that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to carefully
consider the § 3553(a) factors and provide an adequate reason
for its sentence. A district court is not required to
“robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” on the
record. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.
2006). The sentencing court’s explanation must be “sufficient
‘to satisfy the appellate court that [the district court] has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United
States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
Reasons articulated by a district court for a given
sentence need not be “couched in the precise language of
§ 3553(a)” as long as the reasons “can be matched to a factor
3
appropriate for consideration under that statute and [are]
clearly tied to [the defendant’s] particular situation.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007). After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court
analyzed the arguments presented by the parties and gave a
sufficient explanation for the sentence it selected. Although
the court did not couch its analysis in the precise statutory
language, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was implicit in
the district court’s reasoning. We find no abuse of discretion
and conclude that Wood’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Where there is “no significant procedural error,” we
next assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
taking “‘into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
range.’” United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 345-46 (4th
Cir.) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
307 (2010). If the sentence is within the appropriate
Guidelines range, this court may consider it presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
Wood argues that the record is devoid of an
explanation of why his 262-month sentence, the bottom of the
Guidelines range, was not greater than necessary to comply with
the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a)(2). The district court
4
responded to every argument Wood made in an effort to obtain a
lower sentence, explaining why it found his assertions and
evidence unpersuasive. As previously stated, although the court
did not expressly tie its reasoning to particular § 3553(a)
factors, consideration of the factors was implicit in the
court’s analysis. Finally, the court concluded, “[c]onsidering
the length of time you’ve been involved in the offenses, and the
things I said earlier, I simply cannot see going below the low
end of the advisory guidelines.” Taking into account the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Wood’s sentence
is substantively reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Wood’s sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5