UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-6376
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROBERT CY MANN, a/k/a B,
Defendant - Appellee.
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
(S. Ct. No. 10-5860)
Decided on Remand: June 16, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jenifer Wicks,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
This case returns to us on remand after the Supreme
Court granted Robert Mann’s petition for certiorari, vacated our
judgment in United States v. Mann, 373 Fed. Appx. 350 (4th Cir.
2010), and remanded for our consideration in light of Henderson
v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. __ (2011).
We previously held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) deprives
the district court of jurisdiction to grant a motion to
reconsider the denial of a motion for a sentence reduction six
months after denying the original motion. Following the Supreme
Court’s remand order, we asked the parties to file supplemental
briefs addressing whether the Court’s holding in Henderson
affects our ruling in the case at hand. After reviewing those
briefs and the Supreme Court’s opinion, we conclude that it does
not. Accordingly, we reinstate our initial order vacating and
remanding the judgment of the district court.
We detailed the facts of this case in our original
opinion and so only briefly summarize them here. On May 27,
2008, Mann invoked § 3582(c) and the retroactive crack cocaine
amendment to the Guidelines and moved for a reduction of his
sentence. On July 14, 2008, the district court denied the
motion, finding Mann “ineligible for an adjustment of sentence,
as [his] drug weight exceeds 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base.”
See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 706, 711, 715, § 2D1.1(c)(1)
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(amendments not applicable to offenses involving 4.5 kilograms
or more of crack). On July 22, 2008, Mann moved for
reconsideration of the July 14 order. After appointing counsel
for Mann, on January 26, 2009, the district court granted the
motion for reconsideration, explaining that “after further
review,” it concluded that the record did not explicitly
establish that Mann was responsible for 4.5 kilograms of crack
cocaine. The Government appealed that order.
In Goodwyn v. United States, we held that § 3582(c)
divests a district court of jurisdiction to modify a sentence
except in those cases specifically authorized by statute. 596
F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2010). One specifically authorized
exception occurs when the Sentencing Commission retroactively
lowers the Guidelines range for an offense. § 3582(c)(2). When
that happens, we held that § 3582(c) gives a district court one
-- and only one -- opportunity to apply the retroactive
amendments and modify the sentence. Id.; see also United States
v. Redd, 630 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011). For this reason, §
3582(c) forbids a district court from ruling on a motion to
reconsider a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction order. If Goodwyn
remains good law, then Mann cannot prevail here.
We do not believe that Henderson disturbs our holding
in Goodwyn. In Henderson, the Supreme Court held that a
veteran’s failure to comply with a 120-day filing deadline did
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not affect the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court. 131 S. Ct.
at 1200. The Court concluded that the provision establishing
that filing deadline was not a jurisdictional bar because it:
(1) did not speak in jurisdictional terms, (2) had not
historically been treated as jurisdictional by the Supreme
Court, and (3) was part of a nonadversarial system of
administrative review by Article I courts. Id. at 1203-06.
None of those factors is present here.
Most significantly, the provision at issue here
provides that “[t]he court may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed,” subject to specific exceptions.
§ 3582(c)(emphasis added). Thus, the text here speaks in terms
of “the classes of cases” in which an Article III court has
“adjudicatory authority.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130
S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010). In sharp contrast, the 120-day filing
deadline in Henderson required a “person adversely affected” to
file a notice of appeal. 131 S. Ct. at 1204. By addressing the
adjudicatory authority of the court itself rather than an
obligation of a party, § 3582(c), unlike the provision at issue
in Henderson, explicitly imposes limitations on the district
court’s substantive authority to modify a sentence. See United
States v. Smith, 438 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2006).
The context against which Congress enacted § 3582(c)
also requires us to consider it jurisdictional. At common law,
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a court could not modify a final judgment in a criminal case
after the expiration of the court term at which it was entered.
United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914). After the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribed a specific window
of time during which a court could modify a criminal sentence,
the Supreme Court continued to treat these time limits as
jurisdictional. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473
n.2 (1947); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189, 189
n.17 (1979).
Finally, this context also makes clear that Congress
has not shown the same special solicitude for criminal
defendants as it has for veterans. Unlike the process for
review of decisions on veterans’ benefits, sentencing hearings
are generally adversarial. See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32
(procedures for sentencing); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.
708, 720 (2008)(explaining that Rule 32 provides for “focused,
adversarial development” of record at sentencing). Moreover,
unlike the Article I court at issue in Henderson, Article III
courts preside over sentencing hearings. See Henderson, 131 S.
Ct. at 1204 (distinguishing prior precedents treating a
statutory limit as jurisdictional as “cases involv[ing] review
by Article III courts”).
Accordingly, the rule we announced in Goodwyn still
stands. When the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the
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Guidelines range, the scheme that § 3582(c) establishes provides
a district court with one -- and only one -- opportunity to
apply the amendment to the Guidelines and modify the sentence.
§ 3582(c)(2). The district court lacked jurisdiction to grant
Mann’s motion to reconsider after its original denial of his
motion for a sentence reduction. Accordingly, the judgment of
the district court is
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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