United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL INDUSTRIES PUBLIC
COMPANY LIMITED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee,
AND
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
2010-1480
__________________________
Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in case no. 09-CV-0229, Senior Judge Nicholas
Tsoucalas.
__________________________
Decided: June 17, 2011
__________________________
KENNETH J. PIERCE, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, LLP, of
Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him
on the brief was ROBERT L. LAFRANKIE. Of counsel was
VICTOR S. MROCZKA.
2 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, Assistant Director, Commer-
cial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for
defendant-appellee the United States. With her on the
brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General,
JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and MICHAEL D. PANZERA,
Attorney. Of counsel on the brief was AARON P. KLEINER,
Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration,
United States Department of Commerce, of Washington,
DC.
JEFFREY D. GERRISH, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee
United States Steel Corporation. With him on the brief
was ELLEN J. SCHNEIDER.
__________________________
Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
LINN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Sahaviriya Steel Industries Public Com-
pany Ltd. (“SSI”) appeals from a decision of the Court of
International Trade (“CIT”), Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub.
Co. v. United States (“SSI II”), 714 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2010), affirming the Department of Com-
merce’s (“Commerce”)’s final results in a changed circum-
stances review (“CCR”) under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b), Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances
Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,885 (May 15, 2009) (“Final Re-
sults”). In SSI II, the CIT held that, after revoking an
antidumping duty order with respect to SSI, Commerce
properly conducted a CCR to reinstate SSI in that order.
714 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. Because Commerce reasonably
interpreted and exercised its CCR and revocation authori-
ties under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675(b) and (d), this court affirms
the CIT’s decision.
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 3
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Antidumping Duty Order
On November 29, 2001, Commerce issued an anti-
dumping duty order on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat
products from Thailand (“the subject merchandise”).
Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Flat Products From Thailand, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,562
(Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 29, 2001) (“Order”). The Order
followed the filing of a petition and final determinations of
dumping and injury by Commerce and the International
Trade Commission (“ITC”). Id. at 59,563. In the Order,
Commerce found that SSI was selling the subject mer-
chandise at less than normal value and assigned SSI a
dumping margin of 3.86%. Id.
On November 30, 2004, SSI requested an administra-
tive review and revocation of the Order with respect to its
subject merchandise based on the absence of dumping for
the equivalent of three consecutive years. See Prelimi-
nary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review
and Intent to Revoke and Rescind in Part, 70 Fed. Reg.
73,197 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 9, 2005). Commerce
made the preliminary determination that SSI had not
sold the subject merchandise at less than normal value
during the first and third of three consecutive administra-
tive review periods, satisfying the three year requirement
based on an “intervening year” allowance. See id. at
73,201-02. In its request, SSI also included an agreement
(“the Certification”) signed by its president, stating that
SSI would not engage in dumping following the revoca-
tion. See id. at 73,201. The Certification reads, in rele-
vant part: “Should the department of Commerce conclude,
subsequent to revocation, that SSI sold the subject mer-
chandise at less than normal value, I certify that SSI
4 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
agrees to immediate reinstatement of the antidumping
duty order regarding the subject merchandise.” J.A. 80.
After the completion of a third administrative review
period, Commerce issued a final decision granting SSI’s
request for partial revocation from the Order. Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
Partial Revocation of Antidumping Duty Order and Par-
tial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,659 (Dep’t of Commerce May 17,
2006) (“Final Revocation Decision”). Commerce reasoned
that SSI continued to satisfy the requirements for revoca-
tion under its regulations, namely (1) no sales at less than
normal value for the equivalent of three consecutive years
and (2) the Certification of immediate reinstatement in
the Order in the event of resumed dumping. See Issues
and Decision Memorandum for the [Final Revocation
Decision], A-597-817, 2006 WL 1388746 (May 17, 2006).
The Order remained in effect with respect to the other
subject exporters and producers. See Final Revocation
Decision, 71 Fed. Reg. at 28,661. On August 1, 2006,
Commerce initiated a “sunset review” of the Order, Con-
tinuation of Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty
Orders, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,316 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 27,
2007) (“Sunset Review”), as required by
19 U.S.C. § 1675(c). Following this review, Commerce
published notice of continuation of the Order based on the
finding that revocation of the same “would likely lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping . . . and material
injury to an industry in the United States . . . .” Sunset
Review, 72 Fed. Reg. at 73,318. SSI participated in this
review proceeding, filing a brief in favor of full revocation
of the Order. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Pub. No. 3956,
Hot-Rolled Steel Products From Argentina, China, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Romania, South Africa, Taiwan,
Thailand, and Ukraine 4 n.8, 5 (2007), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub3956.pdf
(“USITC Pub. No. 3956”).
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 5
B. Commerce’s Changed Circumstances Review
On November 8, 2006, United States Steel Corpora-
tion (“U.S. Steel”) alleged that SSI had resumed dumping
and petitioned Commerce to conduct a CCR to determine
whether SSI should be reinstated in the Order. Initiation
of Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances Review, 73
Fed. Reg. 18,766 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 7, 2008) (“Ini-
tiation of CCR”). SSI submitted no fewer than ten letters
to Commerce contesting U.S. Steel’s petition on the
grounds that Commerce lacked the authority to conduct a
CCR to reinstate SSI in the Order. Id. at 18,767. Reject-
ing SSI’s argument, Commerce initiated the CCR, ex-
plaining that it possessed the statutory authority to
reinstate SSI in the Order and that doing so by means of
a CCR is consistent with the agency’s practice. See id. at
18,770.
SSI then filed suit in the CIT seeking a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Commerce from conducting the
CCR on the ground that Commerce’s actions were ultra
vires. Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. Co. v. United States
(“SSI I”), 601 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2009). The CIT dismissed the complaint as not ripe for
review. Id. at 1370. In dismissing the complaint, the CIT
addressed the merits of the ultra vires claim, holding that
Commerce acted within its implicit and explicit authority
to adopt regulations administering the antidumping
statute. Id. at 1367-68. Following SSI I, Commerce
issued a final determination reinstating SSI in the Order
based on the finding that SSI had resumed dumping at a
margin of 9.04%. Final Results, 74 Fed. Reg. at 22,886.
Following Commerce’s Final Results, SSI again
brought suit in the CIT, this time contesting its rein-
statement in the Order under a “mistake of law” theory,
arguing that Commerce unreasonably interpreted the
governing statute. SSI II, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74.
6 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
The CIT held that Commerce reasonably interpreted its
CCR and revocation authorities under 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1675(b) and (d), within the Chevron framework, and
accordingly affirmed Commerce’s Final Results. Id. at
1277. SSI timely appealed, and this court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
II. DISCUSSION
This court reviews a CIT decision regarding Com-
merce’s antidumping determinations de novo, applying
the same standard of review to Commerce’s determina-
tions as did the CIT. Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. United
States, 510 F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Accordingly,
this court will uphold Commerce’s determination unless it
is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (quoting 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(I)).
“[S]tatutory interpretations articulated by Commerce
during its antidumping proceedings are entitled to judi-
cial deference under [Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)].”
Pesquera Mares Australes Ltd. v. United States, 266 F.3d
1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Under Chevron, the court
first asks whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue; if so, the inquiry ends and the
Court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-43). If the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the issue, the court must ask whether Com-
merce’s interpretation is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 7
A. Revocation in Part Under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)
As relevant to the present case, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)
provides that “[i]n general . . . [Commerce] may revoke, in
whole or in part, . . . an antidumping duty order . . . after
review under [a periodic administrative review or CCR].”
Pursuant to Commerce’s regulations:
in determining whether to revoke an antidumping
duty order in part, the Secretary will consider:
...
(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the
Secretary previously has determined to have sold
the subject merchandise at less than normal
value, the exporter or producer agrees in writing to
immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as
any exporter or producer is subject to the order, if
the Secretary concludes that the exporter or pro-
ducer, subsequent to the revocation, sold the sub-
ject merchandise at less than normal value.
19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(i)(B) (emphasis added). Thus,
Commerce interprets the revocation “in part” language in
§ 1675(d) to permit conditional revocation, i.e. revocation
subject to reinstatement, if Commerce finds that a party
subject to an antidumping duty order resumes dumping.
SSI argues that Commerce impermissibly interpreted
§ 1675(d) to permit conditional revocation. According to
SSI, once Commerce revokes an antidumping duty order
with respect to a particular producer or exporter, “[t]he
order ceases to exist with respect to the merchandise for
which it has been revoked,” and accordingly cannot later
be reinstated without a new, formal injury determination
under 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Appellant Br. 25. To support its
finality argument, SSI relies on: (1) the revocation stat-
8 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
ute, providing that “[a] determination . . . to revoke an
order . . . shall apply with respect to all unliquidated
entries of the subject merchandise,” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(d)(3) (emphasis added); and (2) Commerce’s im-
plementing regulations, defining the word “revocation” as
“the end of an antidumping . . . proceeding,” 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.222(a) (emphasis added), not distinguishing be-
tween revocations in whole or in part in the definition.
SSI asserts that the statute is clear on its face that a
revocation is final, whether in whole or in part, and thus
this court should not give Chevron deference to Com-
merce’s interpretation. In the alternative, SSI asserts
that even if the court finds ambiguity in § 1675(d) and
applies Chevron deference, the court should not uphold
Commerce’s interpretation permitting conditional revoca-
tion in part of an antidumping duty order because Com-
merce went “far beyond any reasonable meaning that the
statute might bear” and created “statutory authority
where none exists.” Appellant Br. 32. Finally, SSI argues
that its Certification of immediate reinstatement in the
Order in the event of resumed dumping is not a conces-
sion of the reasonableness of the practice because Con-
gress has not conferred such power to Commerce, and
SSI, a private party, cannot confer the legal authority for
an agency’s action that is otherwise “illegal.” Appellant
Br. 33 n.94.
U.S. Steel and the Government (“Appellees”) counter
that Commerce properly interpreted its revocation au-
thority to allow for conditional revocation “in part.”
According to U.S. Steel, because the language of § 1675(d)
authorizes Commerce to revoke antidumping duty orders,
but does not state when Commerce must exercise such
authority, “the agency is charged with supplying its own
reasonable policies, standards and procedures.” Appellee
Br. U.S. Steel 21. Similarly, the Government argues in
its brief that because § 1675(d) does not define “in part,”
Commerce reasonably “filled this statutory gap” by im-
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 9
plementing procedures for conditional revocation in part.
Appellee Br. Gov’t 13. The Government also asserts that
SSI conceded the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpre-
tation of § 1675(d) by agreeing in its Certification to
immediate reinstatement in the Order in the event that
SSI resumed dumping. In its brief, however, U.S. Steel
states that it is not SSI’s Certification, but the authority
conferred by the statute, that is the basis of Commerce’s
authority to reinstate SSI in the Order. The Appellees
argue that a new injury determination was not required
to reinstate SSI in the Order because the revocation in
part was based solely on the cessation of dumping and did
nothing to disturb the ITC’s original injury determina-
tion, which included SSI’s subject merchandise.
As a policy matter, both the Appellees and the CIT
opinion below caution that absent Commerce’s ability to
immediately reinstate a party revoked in part from an
antidumping duty order, that party could simply refrain
from dumping for three consecutive years, obtain revoca-
tion in part, and immediately thereafter resume dump-
ing—effectively averting the antidumping duty order
until Commerce and the ITC make new, formal dumping
and injury determinations.
This court concludes that § 1675(d) is ambiguous and
that Commerce reasonably interpreted § 1675(d) to per-
mit the conditional revocation of an exporter or producer.
Section 1675(d)(1) gives Commerce the authority to
revoke antidumping duty orders “in whole or in part.”
This language provides minimal guidance other than
providing that the revocation should be carried out “after
review under subsection (a) [a periodic administrative
review] or (b) [a CCR] . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(1). The
language of the statute is silent as to the conditions that
might warrant the revocation of an antidumping duty
order or the particular circumstances that would trigger
such action. Thus, Commerce was left by Congress to
10 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
promulgate guidelines as to when revocations “in whole or
in part” are appropriate and to set forth the proper proce-
dures therefore. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“The
power of an administrative agency to administer a con-
gressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”).
Commerce interpreted its statutory authority under
§ 1675(d) in promulgating its revocation regulations at 19
C.F.R. § 351.222. Just as the governing statute distin-
guishes between revocations “in whole or in part,”
§ 1675(d)(1) (emphasis added), so too does Commerce in
its regulations: section 351.222(b)(1) governs revocation
“in whole,” and section 351.222(b)(2) governs revocation
“in part.” With regard to revocation “in part,” section
351.222(b)(2)(i)(B) provides that the Secretary should
consider whether the exporter or producer being consid-
ered for revocation “agree[d] in writing to its immediate
reinstatement in the order . . . if the Secretary concludes
that the exporter or producer, subsequent to revocation,
[resumed dumping].” While SSI’s Certification agreeing
to immediate reinstatement in the Order cannot give
Commerce any authority it does not possess, SSI’s com-
plaints about Commerce’s action ring hollow given SSI’s
express acknowledgement that it would be subject to
immediate reinstatement if dumping resumed.
In addition, Commerce’s interpretation of its revoca-
tion authority furthers the policy consideration of pre-
venting a party subject to an antidumping duty order
from refraining from dumping for three consecutive years,
obtaining revocation in part, and then subsequently
resuming dumping—effectively evading the antidumping
duty order. See SSI II, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
SSI argues that this evasion concern is “false” because
“[t]he statute provides [an] explicit and exclusive remedy
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 11
in § 1673” through “findings of dumping and injury.”
Appellant Reply Br. 18. SSI’s argument is incorrect for
two reasons. First, a new ITC injury determination under
§ 1673 would be an unnecessary administrative burden on
the ITC contrary to the intent of the antidumping statute.
See Am. Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1002-03
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (expressing the policy consideration in
the context of a preliminary injury determination of
“eliminat[ing] unnecessary and costly investigations
which are an administrative burden and an impediment
to trade”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States,
750 F.2d 927, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the idea that
“the Commission must conduct a review investigation in
the same ‘neutral’ manner as an original investigation”
and “not agree[ing] that a review investigation begins on
a clean slate just as though it were an original investiga-
tion to determine whether an antidumping order should
be put into effect”); Avesta AB v. United States, 689 F.
Supp. 1173, 1180 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1988) (“[A] request for
review of an affirmative injury determination [through a
CCR] and the resultant review investigation are premised
upon an underlying finding of injury from dumping . . .
which is entitled to deference and should not be disturbed
lightly.”). Second, as the Appellees correctly argue, no
new injury determination is required because the original
ITC injury determination includes SSI’s subject merchan-
dise and is not disturbed by the revocation in part:
The ITC’s injury determination [] does not exam-
ine the injury caused by discrete companies, but
rather the injury caused by all dumped exports
. . . . Even if one or more exporters in that country
may have been revoked from the order on the ba-
sis of absence of dumping, all dumped exports of
subject merchandise from that country continue to
cause or threaten material injury, pursuant to the
ITC’s affirmative injury determination.
12 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
Initiation of CCR, 73 Fed. Reg. at 18,771.
As Commerce explained, the original injury determi-
nation for the imposition of the Order remained valid and
in effect for all subject merchandise, including SSI’s.
Three months after its revocation in part from the Order,
SSI participated in Commerce’s Sunset Review of the
Order, filing a brief in support of full revocation of the
Order as to all subject merchandise. See USITC Pub. No.
3956 at 4 n.8. SSI’s post-revocation involvement in the
Sunset Review demonstrated that SSI remained within
the ambit of the Order, particularly because SSI’s subject
merchandise was still included in the injury determina-
tion giving rise to the Order.
This court agrees with the Appellees that Commerce’s
revocation in part was based on SSI’s cessation of dump-
ing and did not disturb the ITC’s injury determination. If
this court were to accept SSI’s assertion that the original
injury determination was somehow invalid as to SSI
because of the revocation in part, such a holding would
require the ITC to make an injury determination for SSI’s
subject merchandise separately from the other Thai
producers’ and exporters’ subject merchandise. As noted
in the Initiation of CCR, this is inconsistent with the
established ITC practice of evaluating the injury to a
domestic industry caused by all dumped exports, not
discrete companies. 73 Fed. Reg. at 18,771. Accordingly,
the CIT correctly held that no new injury determination is
required to reinstate a previously revoked party in an
existing antidumping duty order when the original af-
firmative injury determination includes the revoked
party’s subject merchandise and has not otherwise been
invalidated (for example, through a sunset review pro-
ceeding under § 1675(c) or through a revocation in full).
For these reasons, this court holds, applying Chevron
deference, that Commerce reasonably interpreted its
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 13
revocation authority under § 1675(d) to permit conditional
revocation in part of SSI from the Order.
B. Commerce’s Authority to Conduct Changed Circum-
stances Reviews Under § 1675(b)
19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1) governs Commerce’s authority
to conduct CCRs. The statute provides, in relevant part:
In general . . . [w]henever the . . . Commission re-
ceives information concerning, or a request from
an interested party for a review of—
(A) a final affirmative determination that resulted
in an antidumping duty order under this subtitle
...
(B) a suspension agreement accepted under sec-
tion 1671c or 1673c of this title, or
(C) a final affirmative determination resulting
from an investigation continued pursuant to sec-
tion 1671c(g) or 1677c(g) of this title,
which shows changed circumstances sufficient to
warrant a review of such determination . . . the
Commission . . . shall conduct a review of the de-
termination or agreement after publishing notice
of the review in the Federal Register.
§ 1675(b)(1) (emphases added).
SSI argues that Commerce lacks the statutory author-
ity to conduct a CCR to review the revocation of an anti-
dumping duty order. According to SSI, Congress
expressly limited Commerce’s authority to conduct a CCR
to the three situations described in the statute in subsec-
tions 1675(b)(1)(A)-(C). Looking to subsection (A), SSI
14 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
contends that “by selecting the word ‘that,’ Congress
restrict[ed] CCRs to those specific final determinations
resulting in an order and allow[ed] no others.” Appellant
Br. 19. According to SSI, conducting a CCR of a revoca-
tion is the opposite of a determination “result[ing] in an
antidumping duty order,” and thus Commerce’s interpre-
tation is impermissible in light of the express language of
the statute. Under Chevron, SSI argues that the analysis
ends at the express intent of Congress.
The Appellees counter that § 1675(b)(1) provides
Commerce with broad authority to conduct CCRs to
address changed circumstances sufficient to warrant
agency reconsideration of antidumping duty determina-
tions. U.S. Steel argues that the situation at hand falls
squarely within the express statutory framework because
(1) there was a “final affirmative determination resulting
in an antidumping duty order,” i.e. Commerce’s original
Order; and (2) there was a change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant review, i.e. the finding that SSI had
resumed dumping following revocation in part. In the
alternative, U.S. Steel argues that even if the CCR does
not fall squarely within the language of subsection
1675(b)(1)(A), the CCR in this case is still proper in light
of Commerce’s broad authority to conduct CCRs under §
1675(b). U.S. Steel relies on the CIT’s statement in
Mittal Canada, Inc. v. United States for the proposition
that
[t]he scope of Commerce’s authority to initiate
changed circumstances reviews under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(b)(1) is delimited only by the general re-
quirement that there be ‘changed circumstances
sufficient to warrant a review’ of the antidumping
order. Commerce’s discretion is broad, and the
range of matters subject to changed circumstances
reviews is wide.
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 15
461 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1332 n.7 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
Finally, U.S. Steel argues that under this court’s holding
in Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States (“TKS”),
529 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008), Commerce also possesses
the inherent authority to reconsider its decision to grant
SSI’s request for revocation in part.
Taking a slightly different approach, the Government
states that “subsection 1675(b)(1) does not expressly
authorize changed circumstances reviews for reinstate-
ment.” Appellee. Br. Gov’t 26. The Government’s argu-
ment aligns with U.S. Steel’s argument in the alternative,
that even if there is no express statutory authority, Com-
merce’s CCR authority is not limited to those circum-
stances specifically set forth in the statute, relying on this
court’s holdings in TKS and the CIT’s statement in Mittal
to support its argument.
In Mittal, which is not binding on this court, Com-
merce utilized a CCR to evaluate whether one company
was the successor-in-interest to another for the purpose of
assessing the appropriate cash deposit rate for that
company’s entries that were subject to an antidumping
duty order. 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1327. Although the CIT in
Mittal stated in a footnote that Commerce has broad
authority to conduct CCRs, “delimited only by the general
requirement that there be ‘changed circumstances suffi-
cient to warrant a review’ of the antidumping duty order,”
Id. at 1332 n.7, the issue in Mittal was not the scope of
Commerce’s CCR authority, but rather whether Com-
merce’s automatic liquidation regulation (19 C.F.R. §
351.212) and interpretation thereof were in accordance
with the law. Id. at 1327. Because the scope of Com-
merce’s CCR authority was not at issue in Mittal, this
court finds the parties’ arguments regarding the state-
ment in footnote 7 to be unavailing and the language in
that footnote to be similarly unhelpful in delineating the
16 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
scope of Commerce’s CCR authority as intended by Con-
gress.
The opinion in TKS warrants greater attention, as it
comes closer to addressing the issue in this case. In TKS,
the Japanese producer, Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd.
(“the producer”), submitted false information to Com-
merce during one of its yearly administrative reviews that
resulted in the company’s revocation in part from an
antidumping duty order. 529 F.3d at 1355, 1357. Com-
merce utilized a CCR to reconsider the tainted adminis-
trative review and reinstate the producer in the
antidumping duty order. Id. at 1357-58. The issue was
whether Commerce abused its authority under § 1675(b)
in conducting a CCR to reconsider its administrative
decision and reinstate the producer in the antidumping
duty order. Id. at 1358. This court upheld Commerce’s
reconsideration of the administrative review and result-
ing reinstatement on the basis of Commerce’s inherent
authority in preserving the integrity of the agency in the
face of fraud. Id. at 1361-62. SSI argues that this case is
different from TKS because: (1) TKS involved fraud that
undermined the legitimacy of the initial revocation deci-
sion; and (2) the court in TKS declined to consider the
precise limits of Commerce’s CCR authority.
This court agrees with SSI that the inherent author-
ity to reconsider articulated in TKS does not extend to the
facts of this case. In TKS, this court stated:
While Commerce labeled its proceedings as a
‘changed circumstances review,’ its actions . . . are
not properly characterized as such. For this rea-
son, the trial court was not required to decide
whether Commerce’s actions were consistent with
§ 1675(b)(1). Instead, the trial court correctly
ruled that Commerce, under the circumstances
SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US 17
presented, acted within its inherent authority to
protect the integrity of its proceedings from fraud.
Id. at 1361. In the present situation, Commerce utilized a
CCR to reconsider the revocation in part in light of a
finding that SSI had resumed dumping, not because of
any error or fraud in the original revocation proceeding.
Here, unlike in TKS, this court must decide whether
Commerce properly acted within the scope of its authority
under § 1675(b)(1). We hold that it did.
This court agrees with Appellee U.S. Steel that Com-
merce’s CCR of the Order fell squarely within the ambit of
subsection 1675(b)(1)(A) because Commerce was indeed
conducting a CCR of “a final affirmative determination
that resulted in an antidumping duty order.” This court
is not persuaded by SSI’s attempt to characterize the CCR
as an improper CCR of a revoked, non-existent antidump-
ing duty order. At no time did Commerce purport to
conduct a CCR of the revocation in isolation, but rather
reviewed the existing Order in light of changed circum-
stances, namely SSI’s resumed dumping. See, e.g., Initia-
tion of CCR, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,766 (“Petitioner requested
that [Commerce] reinstate the Hot-Rolled Steel Order [i.e.,
the original Order] with respect to SSI’s exports . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
As explained in Part A, the original Order remained
valid and in effect with respect to the other subject ex-
porters and producers. Just as Commerce may conduct a
CCR to evaluate an existing antidumping duty order for
the purposes of revocation in part (pursuant to
§ 1675(d)(1)), so too may Commerce conduct a CCR to
evaluate whether that party should be reinstated in that
order. Here, Commerce conducted a CCR of the Order, “a
final affirmative determination that resulted in an anti-
dumping duty order,” found that SSI had resumed dump-
ing, and thus reinstated SSI’s subject merchandise in the
18 SAHAVIRIYA STEEL v US
Order. Final Revocation Decision, 71 Fed. Reg. at 28,661.
As discussed in Part A, this dumping determination was
all that was necessary to reinstate SSI in the Order
because the ITC’s injury determination giving rise to the
Order included SSI’s subject merchandise and remained
unaffected by SSI’s revocation in part. Accordingly, this
court concludes that Commerce properly conducted a
CCR—under the express authority found in subsection
1675(b)(1)(A)—to reconsider the existing Order with
respect to SSI’s subject merchandise. Based on this
disposition, we need not address whether Commerce’s
CCR authority may extend to situations that fall outside
the express ambit of subsections 1675(b)(1)(A)-(C).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that
Commerce reasonably interpreted its revocation and CCR
authority and acted pursuant thereto with respect to
SSI’s revocation and subsequent reinstatement in the
Order. Accordingly, the decision of the CIT is affirmed.
AFFIRMED