[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10532 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 21, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:06-cr-00147-VMC-MCR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MYRON CHRISTOPHER CANTY,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 21, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Myron Christopher Canty appeals his 77-month total sentence, imposed at
resentencing, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of
counterfeit currency, 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 922(g)(1). Following our remand in
United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2009) (Canty I), the district court
recalculated Canty’s sentence absent an armed career criminal (“ACCA”)
enhancement. As part of the revised calculations, the district court applied a base
offense level of 24 for Canty’s firearm offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2), after finding that his prior convictions for opposing an officer with
violence and escape while in transport were crimes of violence.1
On appeal, Canty argues the district court’s determination that both prior
convictions were crimes of violence was erroneous. With respect to his conviction
for opposing an officer with violence, Canty asserts that the district court could
not conclude that it was a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)
because Florida’s resisting-with-violence statute did not actually require violent
force, and did not qualify under § 4B1.2(a)(2) because the statute did not require
that an offender purposely use force. Canty also argues that escape while in
transport did not qualify under § 4B1.2(a), asserting that it was not similar in kind
1
Canty conceded that a third conviction, for cocaine possession, was a serious drug
offense, and therefore the district court needed to find that only one additional conviction
qualified as a crime of violence for scoring under § 2K2.1(a)(2).
2
to the purposeful, violent, and aggressive offenses enumerated in § 4B1.2(a)(2)
because it may be committed passively and any risk it bore was not inherent in the
act itself but rather in the possibility of interruption.
We affirm Canty’s sentence based on two recent decisions of this Court that
have held both of his potential predicate crimes were crimes of violence. In
United States v. Nix, 628 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2010), this Court held that a
conviction under Fla. Stat. § 843.01 was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We have previously held that cases decided under that statute’s
residual clause apply to residual clause cases under the career offender provision,
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.
2008). Similarly, in United States v. Proch, __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. Apr. 26, 2011),
we held that a conviction for escape from while being transported to or from jail
under Fla. Stat. § 944.40 constituted a crime of violence. Therefore, we affirm the
Canty’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.2
2
Canty’s request for oral argument is denied.
3