UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-41053
Summary Calendar
DIONEL DE LA CRUZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
Lower Court M-98-CV-128
August 28, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dionel de la Cruz, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of his former employer, the Lower Rio Grande Valley Development
Council (the “Council”). The district court dismissed de la
Cruz’s claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. De la Cruz argues
that his supervisors at the Council discriminated against him and
in favor of female employees in the following matters: denying
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
him a pay increase after he completed an introductory review
period; denying him promotions to several positions with the
Council; retaliating against and defaming him after he resigned
his position with the Council; constructively discharging him;
denying him pay for hours worked; giving him a low performance
evaluation; and denying him per diem expenses for an out-of-town
training program.
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). The burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas
is well known. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). The plaintiff must make a prima facie case to
support a claim of discrimination by showing that: (1) the
plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified
for the position in question, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) others similarly situated were more
favorably treated. Once that showing has been made, the burden
of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. See
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. The burden of production,
however, remains at all times with the plaintiff.
After reviewing the briefs, we agree with the district court
that the Plaintiff has not met his burden of production here.
First, the Council successfully demonstrated that they had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for treating de la Cruz
differently with respect to his lack of a pay increase upon
completion of his introductory review period.
De la Cruz’s appellate contentions with respect to his
remaining claims are conclusional. He fails to refer to the
record on appeal or cite legal authority for most of his claims.
His brief is so inadequate with regard to his denial-of-
promotions claims that they must be deemed abandoned. See Yohey
v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); FED. R. APP. P.
28(a)(9). In any event, the Council presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that de la Cruz was not discriminated
against with respect to job promotions, as the women who were
awarded the positions in question were more qualified than he.
De la Cruz’s claims regarding denial-of-pay, retaliation and
constructive discharge have been and remain similarly
conclusional.
Finally, de la Cruz failed to demonstrate that he was given
a low performance evaluation and denied travel expenses as a
result of discriminatory motives. No genuine issue of material
fact exists with respect to these claims. See FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
After conducting a de novo review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we perceive no reversible error in the district
court’s decision. See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d
1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.