UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 00-41287
Summary Calendar
Dionel de la Cruz,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
Texas Visiting Nurse Service, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(M-99-CV-67)
September 27, 2001
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dionel de la Cruz appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Texas Visiting Nurse Service, Inc. (“TVNS”).
Mr. de la Cruz argues that genuine issues of material fact exist as
to his claim of gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
novo. Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d
164, 167 (5th Cir. 1999); Grimes v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1996). “Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Grimes, 102 F.3d at 139 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In
employment discrimination cases, the question is whether a genuine
issue of fact exists as to whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. Unsubstantiated
assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. Chaney,
179 F.3d at 167; Grimes, 102 F.3d at 139.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To
defeat a motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff must
initially make a prima facie case of discrimination. A plaintiff
makes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he
is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the
position he held; (3) he was terminated; and (4) after his
termination, the employer hired a person not of plaintiff’s
protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973); Grimes, 102 F.3d at 140.
By establishing a prima facie case for discrimination, a
plaintiff raises a presumption of discrimination, “which the
defendant must rebut by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Shackelford v. Deloitte
& Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999). The defendant
meets this burden “by presenting evidence that, ‘if believed by the
trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination
was not the cause of the employment action.’” Rhodes v. Guiberson
Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993)). If the
defendant presents sufficient evidence of nondiscriminatory
reasons, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant’s reasons are not “‘true reasons, but
were a pretext for discrimination.’” See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Texas
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
After having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we
conclude that Mr. de la Cruz failed to demonstrate a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether TVNS’s nondiscriminatory reasons
set forth for its actions were pretext. Therefore, we AFFIRM the
district court’s ruling for essentially the same reasons set forth
by the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, which was
adopted by the district court in its Order of Dismissal on October
25, 2000.