UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1268
ROSE C. MERCHANT, Individually,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY MARYLAND; JACK B. JOHNSON,
Individually; DONALD E. BRIDGEMAN, Individually; BARRY L.
STANTON, Individually; ALFRED J. MCMURRAY, SR.; JOHN DOE “1”
THROUGH JOHN DOE “20,” Both inclusive; John Doe “1” through
John Doe “20” regardless of number being each a separate
individual and being fictitious and unknown to the Plaintiff
the persons or parties intended being former and or current
Prince George’s County Maryland Employees,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:09-cv-00256-DKC)
Submitted: June 7, 2011 Decided: June 21, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ardra M. O’Neal, THE O’NEAL FIRM, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Tonia Y. Belton-Gofreed, Associate County Attorney,
Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Dr. Rose C. Merchant appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to the Defendants on her claims
of employment-related gender discrimination and retaliation. We
affirm.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
granting summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th
Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may be granted only when “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007) (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). For a non-moving party to present a genuine issue of
material fact, “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the non-moving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
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Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Merchant first argues that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment on her discrimination claim
without permitting her an adequate opportunity to conduct
discovery. We review such a claim for abuse of discretion.
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244
(4th Cir. 2002). Merchant failed to file an affidavit with the
district court requesting additional time for discovery pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 56(d). Instead, she chose to notify
the district court of her desire for discovery through
statements in her opposition to the Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment.
We need not review Merchant’s claim given her failure
to avail herself of the proper procedure. Nguyen v. CNA Corp.,
44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[A] party may not simply
assert in its brief that discovery was necessary and thereby
overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply with the
requirement of Rule 56(f) 1 to set out reasons for the need for
discovery in an affidavit.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports
1
Rule 56(f) was the predecessor of Rule 56(d). Subsection
(d) carries forward without substantial change the provisions of
former subsection (f).
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Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998). Merchant’s
nonspecific requests for discovery in her opposition memorandum
did not serve as a “functional equivalent” of a Rule 56(d)
affidavit within the meaning of Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244-
45. Under the rule, Merchant was required to state “specified
reasons” why she could not “present facts essential to justify
[her] opposition.” Merchant failed in this regard. The
district court thus did not abuse its discretion in refusing
Merchant’s request for discovery. 2
Merchant also challenges the denial of her retaliation
claim. In assessing such a claim, the first step is to analyze
whether the plaintiff set forth a prima facie claim by
establishing that: (1) she engaged in protected conduct;
(2) she suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal link
existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
We agree with the district court that Merchant failed
to demonstrate that she engaged in protected conduct. Although
her complaint made general mention that she complained of gender
discrimination to her employer, she failed to bring forth the
2
Merchant also attempts to recast her denial-of-discovery
argument into a contention that the district court failed to
draw inferences in her favor and instead based its ruling
entirely on evidence submitted by the Defendants.
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sort of specific factual support necessary for her, the party
laboring under the burden of proof, to withstand a motion for
summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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