[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 28, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
No. 08-12289
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00416-CV-TJC
RANDALL SCOTT JONES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 28, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Randall Scott Jones (“Petitioner”) appeals the district court’s
denial of his section 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence.
Applying the deferential review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling was not
contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; we
affirm the denial of section 2254 relief.
I. Background
In 1987, Petitioner murdered two people. After his arrest by police,
Petitioner admitted that he had shot both victims.1
Petitioner was tried by a jury in Florida state court and was convicted of
several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Petitioner offered no
evidence during the guilt phase. During the penalty phase, Petitioner presented
evidence by an expert clinical psychologist, who discussed at length Petitioner’s
troubled history and mental health issues. The jury recommended (by a vote of
eleven to one) to impose the death penalty; the sentencing judge imposed two
death sentences for the murders.
1
For additional factual background in this case, see Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234,
1235-36 (Fla. 1990) (“Jones I”).
2
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the murder
convictions; but because of cumulative errors affecting the penalty phase, the
Florida Supreme Court vacated the death sentences and remanded the case for
another sentencing proceeding before a new jury. Jones I, 569 So. 2d at 1235.
Before the second sentencing hearing, Petitioner filed a pro se motion that
sought to discharge his court-appointed lawyer and to have a different lawyer
appointed. After Petitioner filed his pro se motion, Petitioner’s lawyer filed a
motion to withdraw from representing Petitioner. At a hearing on the motions,
Petitioner’s lawyer made this statement:
[T]o say merely that I am offended or that my feelings are hurt
doesn’t begin to describe my reaction to [Petitioner’s motion to
discharge his lawyer]. It is far deeper than that. I want nothing
further to do with Mr. Jones and I feel that it would be anomalous to
have me further represent a man who has said of me what Mr. Jones
said in his motion, and which I characterized in my motion for leave
to withdraw.
...
I cannot quantify the damage that may have been done to me
subconsciously or what I might fail to do for him without realizing
that I was doing it, that might, in fact, hurt him during the re-trial of
this case without intending to or wanting to. But, I feel that Mr. Jones
and I, at this stage, very badly need a divorce.
3
Although the trial judge heard argument, the judge conducted no evidentiary
hearing on this issue and denied both Petitioner’s motion to discharge the lawyer
and the lawyer’s motion to withdraw. In denying the motions, the judge stated
that, based on 30-plus years of experience with the lawyer, the judge “ha[d] never
known [the lawyer] to compromise his advocacy.” The judge also said that “a
substitute counsel could never match [the] defense counsel’s knowledge and
familiarity with the record of this case.”2
In the resentencing proceeding, the new jury also recommended (by a vote
of ten to two) to impose the death penalty; the sentencing judge imposed two death
sentences, concluding that the aggravating factors outweighed the statutory and
nonstatutory mitigating factors. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
sentences on direct appeal. Jones v. State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992) (“Jones
II”).
Later, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state trial court denied all of Petitioner’s
claims. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the 3.850 ruling and denied
2
A month later, just before the resentencing hearing, Petitioner renewed his pro se motion
to dismiss his lawyer. The lawyer also renewed his motion to withdraw. The judge denied the
motions.
4
Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus. Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55
(Fla. 2003) (“Jones III”).
Petitioner then sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. In a thorough, 126-page order, the district court
denied Petitioner’s request for habeas relief.
We granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on two issues:
1) Whether Jones was denied his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel when the trial
court denied his requests to remove his lawyer and his lawyer’s
requests to withdraw. (Ground I)
2) Whether Jones was denied his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer
failed to investigate and to present mitigating evidence at re-
sentencing in addition to that which the lawyer presented at the
original sentencing. (Ground II)
II. Discussion
“When examining a district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, we
review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings
of fact for clear error.” Cox v. McNeil, 638 F.3d 1356, 1360 (11th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
5
But, under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim
that has been considered and rejected by a state court unless it is shown that the
state court’s decision was “contrary to” federal law then clearly established in the
holdings of the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.
Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000); or that it “involved an unreasonable
application” of such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it was “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts” in the light of the record before the state court, §
2254(d)(2).
In this case, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, first, “the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient . . . [which] requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Second, the defendant must show that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. That is, “[t]he defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 2068.
Within the Strickland analysis, a lawyer’s decisions are shielded from later
second-guessing:
6
[S]trategic choices [by a defendant’s lawyer] made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable . . . . [C]ounsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary. . . . [We] apply[] a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.
Id. at 2066.
In reviewing Strickland claims under AEDPA, “The pivotal question is
whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.
This [inquiry] is different from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell
below Strickland’s standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
A.
Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his lawyer labored under a conflict of interest, a conflict that the state trial
judge refused to remedy: by denying Petitioner’s motions to dismiss his lawyer
and by denying the motions by Petitioner’s lawyer to withdraw from the
representation.
One part of Petitioner’s argument involves alleged ineffective assistance
before the lawyer’s motion to withdraw representation was filed: Petitioner
7
contends that his lawyer had a conflict of interest because he was an honorary
deputy sheriff and that, presumably as a result of the conflict, the lawyer declined
to call certain character witnesses and only did enough work to maintain
appearances. The second part of Petitioner’s argument is that, after the trial judge
denied the motion to withdraw by Petitioner’s lawyer, Petitioner received
ineffective assistance because his lawyer had disavowed him and that, given the
lawyer’s unfavorable disposition towards Petitioner, the lawyer could no longer
provide Petitioner with adequate representation.
1.
In Petitioner’s motion to remove his lawyer, Petitioner argued that the
lawyer operated under a conflict of interest because the lawyer held the position of
honorary deputy sheriff. Petitioner also argued that his lawyer had failed to call
certain character witnesses at the first sentencing hearing and that his lawyer only
did enough work to maintain appearances.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner “was not affected” by
the lawyer’s “entirely ceremonial title” of honorary deputy sheriff, Jones III, 845
So. 2d at 71 n.35, and that Petitioner established no prejudice under Strickland
8
because the lawyer had resigned the honorary deputy sheriff position before the
pertinent resentencing, id. at 71.
The Florida Supreme Court also concluded that “counsel was not ineffective
in his representation at points prior to the resentencing proceeding”: a conclusion
that rejected Petitioner’s claims that his lawyer was ineffective for declining to call
certain character witnesses and for supposedly only doing enough work to
maintain appearances.3 Jones III, 845 So. 2d at 71.
Later, the district court also concluded that Petitioner’s lawyer’s “honorary
deputy sheriff status did not interfere with his role as Petitioner’s defense counsel”
and that “there was no conflict of interest.” In addition, the district court rejected
the claim that the lawyer’s failure to call certain character witnesses showed
ineffective assistance.
We accept that no ineffective assistance was shown based on these claims.
The lawyer’s honorary deputy sheriff status posed no conflict of interest or
3
The Florida Supreme Court, in the 3.850 appeal, noted that it had once before
considered and rejected Petitioner’s argument that his lawyer should have been replaced. Id. at
71. In its earlier opinion on direct appeal after the resentencing, the Florida Supreme Court
considered whether the lawyer’s “assistance was ineffective because he ‘only does just enough to
maintain appearances’ . . . and [because the lawyer] refused to call any of unspecified ‘numerous
character witnesses.’” Jones II, 612 So. 2d at 1372. The Florida Supreme Court rejected those
claims on the direct appeal, explaining that the “complaints about [the lawyer’s] handling of the
prior sentencing proceeding do not provide a legal basis for challenging his prospective
performance in the resentencing.” Id. at 1373.
9
prejudice to Petitioner: Petitioner’s lawyer resigned his position of honorary
deputy sheriff before resentencing, and the Florida Supreme Court reasonably
concluded that no actual conflict of interest existed between the lawyer’s former
status and his representation of criminal defendants. See Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1355-58 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming in capital case the
state court’s rejection of same claim); Harich v. State, 573 So. 2d 303, 305-06
(Fla. 1990) (finding no actual or per se conflict of interest between lawyer and
criminal defendant while lawyer was special deputy sheriff).
We also accept the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that Petitioner’s lawyer
had not been shown to be ineffective in declining to call certain character
witnesses or in performing only enough work to keep up appearances. See
Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (deferring to a lawyer’s trial-strategy judgments).
Under AEDPA, we cannot conclude that Petitioner has shown that the
Florida Supreme Court’s decisions about these claims were contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as
determined by the United States Supreme Court or has shown clear and
convincing evidence that they were based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts.
10
2.
Petitioner also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because the trial judge denied the motions by Petitioner’s lawyer to withdraw from
the representation.4 Because his lawyer attempted to withdraw from the
representation -- and spoke particularly strong and renunciatory words in
attempting to do so -- Petitioner contends that the attorney-client relationship had
become “irretrievably broken” and that, thus, Petitioner received ineffective
assistance from that point forward.
Applying Strickland, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that “[n]o relief
is warranted on” the issue “that [Petitioner’s] counsel was ineffective because . . .
counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation affected the quality of
representation.” Jones III, 845 So. 2d at 71; see also Jones II, 612 So. 2d at 1373
(“We find that the refusal to dismiss [Petitioner’s lawyer] was within the court’s
discretion and that no error occurred.”).5
4
The judge also denied Petitioner’s pro se motions to dismiss his lawyer.
5
We reject Petitioner’s contention that no court ever addressed the fact that the judge
denied motions by Petitioner’s lawyer to withdraw from the representation. See Jones III, 845
So. 2d at 71 (“Specifically, Jones contends that . . . counsel’s motion to withdraw from
representation affected the quality of representation that he received to the point that it became
substandard.”); Jones II, 612 So. 2d at 1372 (“After Jones filed this motion, [Petitioner’s lawyer]
moved for permission to withdraw, claiming that Jones’ motion and allegations had created an
11
Later, the district court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court
committed no error in its review of this claim. The district court saw no conflict of
interest and no error in the state trial court’s handling of the motions aimed at
changing Petitioner’s lawyer.
We agree that Petitioner has made no showing that the denial of his lawyer’s
motions to withdraw as Petitioner’s lawyer rendered ineffective the legal counsel
Petitioner received from that point on. For a seasoned defense lawyer -- likely
accustomed to dealing with all manner of difficult and colorful clients -- to state in
open court that “I want nothing further to do with [my client]” is worthy of note.
But then the lawyer was required by the court to carry on with his difficult duty.
We do not -- and the law does not -- assume that lawyers will fail to do their duty,
even when the duty is painful and difficult. We expect that many lawyers in many
circumstances would like to be at liberty to relinquish their representation in a
particular case. But lawyers are not at liberty to stop when it might suit them, and
they know it. In cases like this one, ineffectiveness must be shown.
irreconcilable conflict that destroyed the attorney/client relationship.”). We see no indication
from the Florida Supreme Court’s opinions that it overlooked the motions to withdraw by
Petitioner’s lawyer when it rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims. A state court need
not spell out each of its reasons for us to accept the state court’s ruling on AEDPA review. See
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (requiring no explanation of a state court’s reasoning for a
reviewing court to determine whether the state court’s decision was unreasonable under section
2254(d)).
12
Petitioner points to no United States Supreme Court holding indicating that
the Florida Supreme Court was unreasonable in concluding that the denial of the
motions to change Petitioner’s lawyer did not establish ineffective assistance
going forward (based on denial of either the motions by Petitioner or the motions
by Petitioner’s lawyer).
Given the Florida Supreme Court’s reasonable conclusion that no actual
conflict of interest existed -- on any basis -- in this case, Petitioner’s reliance on
Cuyler v. Sullivan is unhelpful. See 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (1980) (concluding that
“[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who
raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance”). And Petitioner has failed to show
that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable in the light of Wood
v. Georgia. See 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103-04 (1981) (directing court to hold hearing
about possible conflict of interest where defendant’s lawyer had a third-party fee
arrangement).
13
B.
Petitioner also makes a specific claim about the lawyer’s performance at the
resentencing. Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance when his
lawyer failed to investigate or to present mitigating evidence from other witnesses
-- including from Petitioner’s sister, Trudy -- about Petitioner’s troubled
background before the age of five.
On this claim, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner’s
argument was “entirely conclusory” and that Petitioner had made an insufficient
showing of prejudice under Strickland. See Jones III, 845 So. 2d at 70 n.30. The
Florida Supreme Court determined that the jury was informed enough about
Petitioner’s early life through the expert psychologist’s testimony and that
additional testimony would not have changed the jury’s recommendation for the
death penalty. See id. at 69-70.
For similar reasons, the district court likewise concluded, under Strickland,
that Petitioner’s lawyer provided effective assistance, that Petitioner made no
showing of prejudice on this claim, and that no basis existed under AEDPA to
overturn the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling.
14
In the light of AEDPA, we accept that Petitioner’s lawyer provided effective
assistance and did not fail to investigate or to present sufficient mitigating
evidence at resentencing. Petitioner’s lawyer called an experienced clinical
psychologist at the resentencing and ensured that the psychologist was sufficiently
prepared to present a complete case for mitigation: the expert met with Petitioner
four times, the expert conducted extensive testing on Petitioner, and the expert
reviewed voluminous documentary evidence about Petitioner’s past. At the
resentencing, the expert offered wide-ranging details about Petitioner’s childhood,
upbringing, and background, including some commentary about Petitioner’s
background before age five. We agree that additional testimony from Petitioner’s
sister, or from other witnesses, would likely have been cumulative; and we
conclude that Petitioner has made no sufficient showing of prejudice under
Strickland. In addition, under these facts, we do not second-guess a lawyer’s
decisions about which witnesses to call and how to present mitigating evidence.
See Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1335-36, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2002).
Most important, Petitioner has shown neither that the Florida Supreme
Court’s ruling on this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States
Supreme Court nor shown clear and convincing evidence that the decision was
15
based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. The cases on which
Petitioner relies are too different from this case for us to conclude, under AEDPA,
that the Florida Supreme Court made an unreasonable ruling. See Wiggins v.
Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537-39 (2003) (concluding that defense lawyer
unreasonably limited his mitigating-evidence investigation to the presentence
investigation report and department of social services records and that the “failure
to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention”); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
Ct. 1495, 1514-15 (2000) (concluding that defendant’s lawyer failed to conduct “a
thorough investigation of the defendant’s background” where the lawyer failed to
prepare until a week before and failed to conduct an investigation that would have
uncovered graphic descriptions of defendant’s “nightmarish childhood”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas
relief for Petitioner.
AFFIRMED.
16