UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5109
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TRACY BERNARD REDFEAR,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00028-RLV-DSC-5)
Submitted: June 17, 2011 Decided: June 29, 2011
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James E. Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tracy Bernard Redfear pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to conspiracy to possess at least fifty
grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced
to ninety-two months in prison. Redfear now appeals. His
attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the sentence but
stating that there are no meritorious issues for review.
Redfear was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but has not filed such a brief. We affirm.
After thoroughly reviewing the transcript of the Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that the court fully
complied with the Rule. Further, we find that Redfear knowingly
and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that there was a
factual basis for the plea.
According to the presentence investigation report
(PSR), Redfear was responsible for at least fifty but less than
150 grams of cocaine base, for a base offense level of 30. See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2009). Two
levels were added for firearm possession. See USSG §
2D1.1(b)(1). Three levels were subtracted for acceptance of
responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1(a). Redfear’s total offense
level was 29, his criminal history category was IV, and his
advisory Guidelines range was 121-151 months. However, because
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Redfear was statutorily subject to a minimum of twenty years in
prison, his Guidelines range became 240 months. See USSG §
5G1.1(b).
The district court overruled Redfear’s objections to
the PSR. The court first found that a preponderance of the
evidence established that Redfear was responsible for a quantity
of drugs as described in the PSR. The court then determined,
based on the discovery of weapons in a motel room occupied by
Redfear and other conspirators, that the firearm enhancement was
warranted.
The Government moved for a downward departure pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) and USSG § 5K1.1. In support of
the motion, the Government informed the court that Redfear had
been cooperative and truthful and had testified at the trial of
a coconspirator. Additionally, the Government stated that
Redfear’s criminal behavior stemmed largely from his addiction
to crack cocaine and that Redfear, “a lower level player” in the
conspiracy, had never profited substantially from his
involvement in the drug trade. The Government suggested that
the court impose a 120-month sentence.
Defense counsel urged the court to impose a sixty-
month sentence. In support of this request, counsel noted
Redfear’s drug addiction, his commendable work history and his
having met his commitments to his family.
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The district court adopted the PSR. After stating
that Redfear’s Guidelines range was 240 months, the court
granted the motion for downward departure, departed to offense
level 26, criminal history category IV, and imposed a ninety-
two-month sentence. In imposing sentence, the court referred to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) and commented that Redfear’s
assistance was “extensive, significant, truthful, and timely.”
The court also mentioned Redfear’s drug addiction, his minor
role in the conspiracy, and his family and community support.
We conclude that the sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The court properly calculated Redfear’s
Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and
sufficiently explained the variant sentence. See id.; United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008).
After reviewing the entire record in accordance with
Anders, we conclude that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
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on his client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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