FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 21, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RAYMOND G. CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-5169
(D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00497-CVE-PJC)
JODI JOHNSON BAKER; KEVIN (N.D. Okla.)
GASSAWAY; ROSEMARIE L.
DAMILAO,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MARK BARCUS,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Raymond G. Chapman appeals from a judgment of the district court
awarding attorney’s fees in favor of the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
We affirm.
This is Mr. Chapman’s second appeal in this case. He filed his previous
appeal after the district court dismissed his suit and awarded attorney’s fees to the
defendants. In our prior decision, we summarized the allegations of his complaint
as follows:
Mr. Chapman’s lawsuit originated in an ongoing state-court paternity
and custody matter. His theory of the case was that a state judge, the
child’s mother, and two attorneys representing the mother conspired
to deprive him of custody, thus infringing upon his child’s and his
own civil and constitutional rights. He alleged violations of
numerous constitutional provisions and federal statutes, citing the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,
242, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 2000b, 2000b-2.
He also made various state-law claims, including negligence, fraud,
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
violations of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct.
Chapman v. Barcus, 372 F. App’x 899, 900 (10th Cir. 2010) (Chapman I).
In Chapman I, we determined that instead of dismissing, the district court
should have abstained from deciding the case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), until the state court had concluded its paternity/custody
proceedings. We therefore reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case
and remanded for further proceedings. Chapman I, 372 F. App’x at 903.
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On remand, the district court vacated the judgment of dismissal and the
attorney fee award and dismissed without prejudice all of Mr. Chapman’s claims
other than his federal damage claims. After the state court proceedings
concluded, the district court reinstated the portion of its earlier decision
dismissing the federal damage claims. The defendants then refiled their motions
for attorney’s fees. A magistrate judge recommended that the motions be granted.
The district court considered Mr. Chapman’s objections to this recommendation
and awarded defendants Jodi Johnson Baker and Kevin Gassaway fees in the
amount of $4,567.75, and defendant Rosemarie L. Damilao $1,260.
In civil rights actions, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Fees may be awarded under § 1988(b) against a
civil rights plaintiff if his suit was “vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or
embarrass the defendant.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983)
(citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). We
review the district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for an abuse of
discretion, considering de novo its application of the legal principles underlying
that decision and its factual findings for clear error. Browder v. City of Moab,
427 F.3d 717, 719 (10th Cir. 2005).
Mr. Chapman raises several issues for our consideration, asking whether:
(1) the magistrate judge improperly assisted the defendants’ attorneys in
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developing the record; (2) the case concerned a family or domestic matter rather
than civil rights claims, and was therefore inappropriate for a fee award under
§ 1988; (3) the magistrate judge improperly relied on “mere billing statements
and affidavits” in determining the fee, Aplt. Opening Br. at i; (4) the magistrate
judge should have required the defendants to present expert testimony concerning
the reasonableness of their fees and/or the rate typically charged for the services
they provided; and (5) the district court “abused its discretion by not requiring the
Defendants to elicit and to produce testimony from any damaged party and/or
additionally by not requiring [defendants] to produce any type of tangible
evidence, expert or lay witness testimony, any contracts, insurance policies, or
other real evidence or testimony,” id. at ii. Having considered these issues and
having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law in light of the
applicable standard of review, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for
substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s Opinion and Order of
December 15, 2010, and in the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation of
October 29, 2010.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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