IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m. 99-40780
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MATTHEW THOMAS CLARKE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
GARY L. JOHNSON,
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(4:97-CV-231)
_________________________
October 4, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, tition for writ of habeas corpus. Finding no
Circuit Judges. error, we affirm.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* I.
Clarke was twice convicted of sexual as-
Matthew Clarke appeals the denial of a pe- sault. See Clarke v. State, 813 S.W.2d 654
(Tex. App.SSFort Worth 1991), aff’d, 839
S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. de-
*
nied, 507 U.S. 996 (1993). In two state
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
habeas petitions stemming from those
determined that this opinion should not be
convictions, he alleges that his first counsel,
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. Robert Scofield (who did not ultimately
47.5.4. represent him at trial), failed to inform him of
a plea bargain offer, which he would have evidentiary hearing if there were no findings to
accepted. Clarke introduced a disciplinary which that presumption could attach, but here,
petition from the State Bar of Texas finding the finding, by one of the state habeas courts,
Scofield guilty of numerous violations in five that no plea offer was made suffices to invoke
different cases, including Clarke’s. Scofield the presumption of correctness. The district
was disbarred, and the judgment reflected that court granted a COA on whether a plea offer
he was guilty of each allegation contained in was made that Clarke’s attorney did not
the disciplinary petition, even though the convey to him.
particular violation in Clarke’s case was not
specifically addressed. II.
We consider three issues on appeal:
The state habeas court, after reviewing the (1) whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel
first application and considering affidavits from barred the state habeas court from conducting
Clark’s mother and aunt and from the the evidentiary hearing; (2) whether a federal
prosecutors, concluded that no plea offer was court should apply a deferential standard of
made and denied Clarke’s application based on review to a state court’s factfinding in a state
these findings. The state habeas court re- habeas court proceeding that challenges a con-
viewing the second petition did not address viction different from the conviction
this issue. The Texas Court of Criminal Ap- challenged in the federal proceeding; and
peals denied both petitions without written (3) whether, if the state findings are entitled to
order. a presumption of correctness, the defendant
may appeal those findings, even though they
Clarke sought relief in federal district court were already appealed in the first proceeding.
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That court denied Because an ineffectiveness of counsel claim is
relief on the basis of the recommendation of a mixed question of fact and law, we review
the magistrate judge, who reasoned as follows: the federal district court’s decision de novo,
but findings of fact meeting the statutory cri-
[T]he state court found that no offer had teria are entitled to a presumption of
ever been made based upon the correctness. See Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d
affidavits of the prosecutor[s] involved. 309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 369
Petitioner has no direct evidence that a (1999).
plea offer was ever made. The closest III.
petitioner comes is a purported letter Clarke argues that the federal district court
from an attorney who was not trial erred in considering the findings of the Court
counsel that states a plea may be of Criminal Appeals, because the decision of
possible although no firm offer has been the trial court that disbarred Scofield
made. This claim is properly denied on collaterally estopped the court from revisiting
the findings of the trial court. the issue of whether the state had offered a
plea bargain. Because the decision to apply
Findings of the state habeas court are gen- collateral estoppel is an issue of law, we
erally entitled to a presumption of correctness. review it de novo. “Collateral estoppel
The district court determined that the plea bar- provides that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact
gain issue might ordinarily require an has once been determined by a valid and final
2
judgment, the issue cannot again be litigated this issue.
between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.’” Neal v. Cain, 141 F.3d 207, 210 First, the issue must be fully and fairly lit-
(5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 igated. As a matter of Texas law, if the court
U.S. 436, 443 (1970)). “enters a default judgment after conducting a
hearing or trial at which the plaintiff meets his
We apply the Texas law of issue preclusion evidentiary burden,” an issue is considered ful-
so that we properly may give the state court ly and fairly litigated. Pancake v. Reliance
judgment the full faith and credit to which it is Ins. Co. (In re Pancake), 106 F.3d 1242, 1244
entitled by statute. See Gober v. Terra + (5th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Garner, 56 F.3d
Corp., 100 F.3d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1996). 677 (5th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
Under Texas law, to assert collateral estoppel grounds, Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,
a party must establish that “(1) the facts 61-62 (1998)). In Pancake, the court found
sought to be litigated in the second action that the presentation of “the evidence and ar-
were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; guments of counsel” was not enough to prove
(2) those facts were essential to the judgment that the issue in question had been fully and
in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast fairly presented. Id.
as adversaries in the first action” or “the party
against whom the doctrine is asserted was a Unlike the situation in Garner, where the
party or in privity with a party in the first defendant answered the complaint, then
action.” Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, disappeared during a trial in which the plaintiff
890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994). carried his burden of proof, the record in
Pancake did not conclusively indicate that a
Clarke correctly states that a finding of fact hearing had been conducted on a summary
in an administrative or civil proceeding may be judgment motion, despite the statement in the
used collaterally to estop relitigation of that final judgment that the court had “heard” the
fact in a criminal proceeding. See State v. arguments. See Pancake, 106 F.3d at 1244.
Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. Crim. The disbarment court similarly stated that it
App. 1997).1 Clarke, however, has failed to had “heard the arguments on behalf of each
demonstrate that the trial court’s disbarment party” but that “[r]espondent had filed no
proceedings meet the above criteria. Thus, the response to the Motion for Summary
federal habeas court did not err in revisiting Judgment.” Thus, the question of whether the
issue was fully and fairly litigated is somewhat
1
ambiguous.
Aguilar presents a slightly different test for a
fact finding in an administrative proceeding to be We need not reach this issue, however,
used collaterally to estop the relitigation of an issue
because the allegation that Scofield failed to
in a criminal proceeding. Aguilar holds that (1) the
fact must be fully and fairly litigated; (2) the fact
convey a plea offer to Clarke was not
issue must be the same; and (3) the fact finder must necessary to the judgment. The disbarment
act in a judicial capacity. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d at court found Scofield guilty of ethical violations
259. Here, the state bar proceeding might be in five different cases, including Clarke’s, but
arguably administrative, but the fact that a trial that court did not specifically discuss the issue
court actually decided the issue makes the Sysco of Clarke’s plea offer. Consequently, the al-
test the appropriate one.
3
legations in the other four cases could have de- made by a State court shall be presumed to be
termined the outcome. correct,” and “[t]he applicant shall have the
burden of rebutting the presumption of
Finally, the parties in the two actions are correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”
neither the same nor in privity. The state bar 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
association in the disbarment suit and the di-
rector of the prison system in Clarke’s habeas Clarke contends that the district court erred
petition both represent the state, but the state in granting the presumption of correctness to
is not a monolith. See, e.g., Public Util. state court factfindings made in a separate
Comm’n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. habeas petition. He claims that this reliance
1988). Thus, the state bar and the prison sys- eviscerates the statutorily required check on
tem are not the same party merely because the reasonableness of the state court’s
both are state agencies. findings.
In addition, the parties are not in privity. For the deferential review to apply, the
“[P]rivity is not established by the mere fact state court must adjudicate the petitioner’s
that persons may happen to be interested in the claims on the merits, which means that the
same question or in proving the same set of court must dispose of the case on substantive
facts.” Benson v. Wanda Petroleum, 468 rather than procedural grounds. See Miller v.
S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971). For privity to Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000),
exist, one party must “derive its claims through cert. denied, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5513 (Oct. 2,
a party to the other action.” State Farm Fire 2000) (No. 99-9891); Nobles v. Johnson, 127
& Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 377 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1997). The state court
(5th Cir. 1997). Here, the prison derived none record on the habeas petition in which the
of its claims or defenses through the state bar court conducted an evidentiary hearing was
association. Therefore, the factual findings in adjudicated on the merits, but the second ha-
the disbarment proceedings against Scofield beas court proceeding apparently used the re-
did not collaterally estop the state court from sults of the first proceeding as a basis for de-
revisiting the existence of a plea offer when it nying the writ. The magistrate judge who rec-
reviewed Clarke’s habeas petitions. ommended that this second petition be denied
made specific reference to the factual finding
IV. that the state had never offered Clarke a plea
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen- bargain, thus incorporating the findings of the
alty Act (“AEDPA”) prevents a prisoner from first proceeding to the second by reference.
obtaining relief with respect to any claim ad-
judicated on the merits in state court unless the The state court almost certainly applied the
claim (1) resulted in a decision contrary to findings from one proceeding to resolve the
clearly established federal law, as determined other, because the court’s reference
by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a de- demonstrated that it knew of the other petition
cision based on an unreasonable determination and proceeding, and the Court of Criminal
of the facts in light of the evidence presented Appeals denied both habeas petitions on the
in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. same day, in orders signed by the same judge.
§ 2254(d). A “determination of a factual issue The district court concluded that the statutory
4
deference to state court factual findings number of times he can raise it.
applied to both petitions. We agree.
Moreover, habeas courts “need give no
In the interest of judicial efficiency, courts more than summary consideration to repetitive
often consolidate hearings on successive pe- petitions.” Id. (citing Salinger, 265 U.S. at
titions and encourage prisoners to consolidate 231-32). Although the petition in question is
their issues into a single petition. See, e.g., not technically repetitive (because it challenges
Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. incarceration from a different conviction), the
1996); Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061 factual issue providing the basis for the
(8th Cir. 1989). By allowing the same state petition is not only repetitive but identical.
habeas court factfinding to support the denial
of two habeas petitions based on the same Thus, a consolidation of the evidentiary
factual issue, the federal district court process for both is consistent with this rule.
essentially treated the two petitions as though Perhaps a more explicit consolidation would
they had been consolidated. If the trier of fact have aided the reviewing court in
properly conducted the hearing, an additional understanding the record, but the district court
hearing with the same facts and witnesses to did not err in ruling in essence that the habeas
review the issue for the second petition will court could consolidate the two petitions in
neither yield new information nor change the the interest of efficiency.
result. Cf. Wong Doo v. United States, 265
U.S. 239 (1924). V.
Clarke claims that even if the district court
This situation is distinct from the general may attach a presumption of correctness to the
bar against res judicata in the habeas context. findings made in a state habeas proceeding in
Even though res judicata cannot prevent an conjunction with another habeas petition, it
issue from being raised on habeas even when was inappropriate to do so here, because the
a previous habeas petition decided the issue, state habeas court did not hold a live hearing
see, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, on the issue or otherwise give him an
479 (1991); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, opportunity to present his case. Thus, he
230-31 (1924), the policy behind that rule argues, these findings are not entitled to a
does not apply here. The traditional bar presumption of correctness under §
against res judicata developed so that the 2254(e)(1).2 “When there is a factual dispute,
determination of an issue at trial would not that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor,
preclude the prisoner from challenging that would entitle him to relief and the state has not
issue on habeas. As this doctrine developed, afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing, a
the Court also affirmed that res judicata and federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to
collateral estoppel should not be used to limit discovery and an evidentiary hearing.” Perillo
the number of times a prisoner might attempt
to obtain habeas relief. See Hardwick v.
Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1977). 2
Clarke also challenges the factual accuracy of
Here, allowing the habeas court to consolidate the findings, but credibility choices made by state
two simultaneous petitions neither prevents trial courts may not be reweighed by the federal
Clarke from raising an issue nor affects the court. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422
(1983).
5
v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1996)
(internal citations omitted). But, “[a] full and
fair hearing does not necessarily mean a live
hearing. In the proper circumstances, we have
afforded the presumption of correctness to
‘paper hearings.’” Id. at 446.
In the paper hearing, the state court
reviewed affidavits of Clarke’s mother and
aunt and of the prosecutors. For a paper
hearing to be sufficient, the petitioner must be
afforded a full opportunity to present the
relevant facts. See Brown v. Johnson, 224
F.3d ___, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21073,
at *21 (5th Cir. 2000). Clarke contends he
had no opportunity to rebut the prosecution’s
affidavits that the state had never made a plea
offer.
Consistently, however, we have upheld the
validity of paper hearings and have granted
them the presumption of correctness. See
Sawyers v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1493, 1504
& n.19 (5th Cir. 1993); Baldree v. Johnson,
99 F.3d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1996). These hear-
ings must give the petitioner an opportunity to
present his side, but the court need not hear a
rebuttal per se if the facts are adequately de-
veloped in the record and affidavits. See Car-
ter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir.
1997); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481,
489 (5th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed
(Aug. 28, 2000) (No. 00-5947). Thus, the dis-
trict court did not err in giving the fact findings
of the state habeas court the presumption of
correctness under § 2254(d).
AFFIRMED.
6