IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60846
JOAN ANDERSON and JUDY LYNN ANDERSON, minors, by their mother and
next friend, Mrs. Bessie Anderson; JUANITA BENNETT, MARY LEE
BENNETT and ARCHIE LEE BENNETT, minors, by their father and next
friend, Mr. James Bennett; ET AL.
Plaintiffs-Appellants
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
THE CANTON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT; ET AL.
Defendants
SCHOOL BOARD OF MADISON COUNTY; ROBERT E. COX, Superintendent of
Education; HAROLD E. DACUS, Assistant Superintendent of Education;
M. L. DEWEES, JR., President; HAROLD H. WHITE, JR., Secretary; E.
L. HENDERSON; M.C. MANSELL; E. W. HILL
Defendants-Appellees
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(CA-3700)
- - - - - - - - - -
November 6, 2000
Before KING, Chief Judge, CUDAHY,* and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
*
Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
designation.
Private Plaintiffs-Appellants and Intervenor Plaintiff-
Appellant United States (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal the
district court’s approval of the location proposed by Defendant-
Appellee Madison County School District (“MCSD” or “the District”)
for a new high school in that district. Madison County was ordered
to desegregate its de jure dual school system in 1969. It has
since entered into a number of consent decrees, including one
earlier this year. This most recent consent decree has been
approved by all parties and by the district court and resolves all
disputed issues between the parties —— including, significantly,
student transportation —— save only that of the location of the new
high school. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in
approving the District’s construction plan for the new high school,
insisting that it would not meet the District’s obligation, as a
former de jure segregated district, to further desegregation. We
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the
District’s proposed site satisfies the obligations imposed by law,
including all applicable consent decree provisions.
I. Facts and Proceedings
The District is one of the many school districts in
Mississippi that were ordered to dismantle their race-based de jure
dual school systems.1 Since then, the District has been the
subject of a number of other desegregation orders and consent
1
See Anderson v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 423 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1969).
2
decrees. Among other things, the District is required to make all
decisions regarding the construction of school facilities in such
a way as to further desegregation.
The District is U-shaped and surrounds the county seat of
Canton, which is not a part of the District. The 1969
desegregation order divided the District into three Zones: Zone I
is a rural, sparsely populated area located in the northeast part
of the county; Zone II, in which 76% of the District’s students
reside, is in the southern part of the District and includes the
cities of Ridgeland and Madison; and Zone III, like Zone I, is a
rural, sparsely populated area but is located in the western part
of the county and includes the town of Flora. Zone I has its own
high school (Velma Jackson), and none of the parties have suggested
that it be considered or included in plans regarding the new high
school. Zones II and III are presently served by a single high
school, Madison Central High School (“Madison Central”).
The instant dispute is an outgrowth of the District’s
determined need to construct new schools, specifically a new high
school, because of the tremendous population growth, largely white,
over the last ten years. The District’s enrollment was
predominately black until the late 1980s, but since that time the
student population has grown dramatically and become increasingly
white as a result of the population boom in the vicinity of the
predominately white communities of Madison and Ridgeland. This is
evidenced by the fact that enrollment in these areas surged by 47%
3
between the 1991-92 and 1997-98 school years. This rapid growth
led to the overcrowding of Madison Central: It had a projected
capacity of 1,600 students, but its enrollment had reached 1,955
students by April 1, 2000. Population growth around the cities of
Madison and Ridgeland is predicted to continue for the foreseeable
future; in contrast, the rural areas of the District have
experienced, and likely will continue to experience, little or no
growth. Thus, the overcrowding problem at Madison Central will be
exacerbated in the near future while Velma Jackson High School in
Zone I will remain unaffected.
To remedy this situation and address a number of concomitant
problems, the District proposed to construct several new schools
and renovate other existing facilities, subject to the passage of
a bond issue for those purposes. In May of 1998, following
preclearance by the United States Attorney General, county voters
approved, by the requisite 60% supermajority, a $55 million bond
issue for the construction and renovation of school facilities.
The bond issue was validated by the Chancery Court of Madison
County in September of 1998. The bond proposal, as approved by the
voters, included a number of details, specifying in relevant part
that the new high school would be located in Ridgeland, a
predominately white area (“Ridgeland site”). This new high school
(“Ridgeland High” or “the new high school”) would have an initial
capacity of 700 students and a build-out capacity of 1200, and
would be built on land to be purchased by the District. Like
4
Madison Central, the new high school would serve students from
Zones II and III, and its initial enrollment would be taken from
among those students currently attending the overcrowded Madison
Central.
After passage and certification of the bond issue, the
District filed a motion in district court to modify the existing
desegregation plan, seeking approval to construct five new schools
(one high school, two middle schools, and two elementary schools),
renovate existing schools, and make related student reassignments.
Plaintiffs opposed MCSD’s plan, claiming that it violated the 1969
desegregation order, a number of consent judgments,2 and federal
law, because, inter alia, it failed to further desegregation and
imposed travel burdens inequitably between black and white
students. The parties subsequently entered into a consent decree
(the “2000 consent decree”) which the district court approved, that
settled their disagreement on all points of difference except the
location of the new high school. Among other things, the 2000
consent decree resolved the racially inequitable transportation
burdens borne by the black students of the District and generally
alleviated the excessive transportation burdens borne by other
students, both black and white.
Plaintiffs continued to advocate an alternative, more
centrally located site for the new high school, on a parcel of land
2
The District is subject to the requirements of four
consent decrees, entered into in 1988, 1989, 1990, and now, 2000.
5
already owned by the district at the intersection of Highways 463
and 22 (“Hwy. 463 site”). Plaintiffs contend that locating the new
high school on their preferred site would have reduced the travel
burdens on a number of students and ensured that the new school
would be less predominately white.
The district court, after a seven-day hearing, entered its
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the District’s motion and
approving the plan. It ruled that “the proposed [Ridgeland] site
will not negatively affect desegregation in the district, now or in
the future.” Despite finding MCSD’s “construction plan . . . in
some respects short-sighted, inexplicable, and ill-advised” and
recognizing that “[c]onstructing a high school half the size of the
existing Madison Central which leaves little actual growing room at
Madison Central does not seem particularly prudent,” the district
court reluctantly approved MCSD’s construction plan “because it
[did] not find ultimately that the District’s construction/
renovation plan either negatively affects desegregation in the
district, or that there exists at this time a reasonable prospect
for further desegregation.” Plaintiffs appealed and filed a motion
to stay the order, which was granted by the district court.
6
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision approving MCSD’s
proposed location of the new high school for clear error.3 We
review the district court’s findings of fact under that same
standard.4 Under the clearly erroneous standard, “[i]f the
district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of
the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”5 We
review errors of law de novo.6
3
Our most recent case law on this subject of district
courts approving the location of new schools in districts subject
to desegregation orders dictates that we review for clear error.
See Monteilh v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 631
(5th Cir. 1988). In supporting that proposition, that case cites
to two cases. One supports the proposition that we review for
clear error. See Copeland v. Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd., 598 F.2d
977, 981 (5th Cir. 1979). The other, however, holds that we
review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hendry
County Sch. Dist., 504 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1974). The
inconsistency does not matter here, though, as we affirm the
decision of the district court under the more stringent clearly
erroneous standard.
4
See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-
74 (1985).
5
Id.
6
See Morris v. Homco International, Inc., 853 F.2d 337,
343 (5th Cir. 1998).
7
B. Obligation of the District to Further Desegregation
The original desegregation order for Madison County, entered
in 1969 pursuant to our decision in Hinds County,7 required that
(1) the county be divided into the three attendance zones described
above, (2) transportation of students be performed on a “non-
segregated and non-discriminatory” basis, and (3) “[a]ll school
construction, school consolidation, and site selection (including
the location of temporary classrooms) in this system shall be done
in a manner which will prevent the recurrence of the dual school
structure once this desegregation plan is implemented.” In
considering proposals for the construction or renovation of schools
in a system still subject to a desegregation order, “[w]e cannot
tolerate resegregation of a former dual school system, and the
School Board of such a system must demonstrate that the new
construction will not tend to promote such a relapse. We must also
ensure that the burdens of desegregation are distributed equally
among all classes of citizens.”8
We must nevertheless remain at all times cognizant of the
deference that must be accorded to school boards in their decisions
such as the placement of schools; the “[l]ocation of a school comes
within the purview of the federal courts only to the extent that it
7
423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969).
8
United States v. Hendry County Sch. Dist., 504 F.2d 550,
554 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 93 S.Ct. 2686 (1973); United States v. Board of Public
Instruction, 395 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1968)).
8
has an impact on desegregation.”9 This is because we “lack the
expertise and competence needed to dictate to school boards the
location of new schools and the drawing of attendance zones.”10 It
is not our place to decide whether the school board’s proposed site
for the new high school is the best choice or even a wise choice;
we must decide only whether the choice of that site violates the
Constitution or federal law. To make that determination, federal
courts ask only whether the proposed location fails to further
desegregation or places an inequitable transportation burden on
black students. So long as neither answer is in the affirmative,
we must defer to the expertise of school boards in decisions of
this nature.
1. Racially Inequitable Transportation Burden
Until recently, the transportation burden was clearly
distributed inequitably between the white and black students in the
District. A number of students, most of whom were black, endured
onerous bus rides every school day. In fact, some students who
reside in the predominately black Flora area traveled as long as 2½
hours each way on a daily basis. After the filing of this appeal,
however, the parties entered into the 2000 consent decree which
resolves the transportation issue and thus renders moot the second
ground for Plaintiffs’ objection to the planned site for the new
9
Monteilh, 848 F.2d at 632 (quoting United States v. Perry
County Board of Education, 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1978)).
10
Id.
9
high school. That decree specifies that “the District shall insure
that transportation to school is provided on a non-discriminatory
basis and that no regular bus route will exceed one-and-one half
hours each way for any student.” As for the students in the
predominately black Flora area, the 2000 consent decree specifies
that “the District shall use its best efforts and shall add
additional bus routes as appropriate to ensure that no high school
student in the Flora attendance zone will ride more than 45 minutes
one way.” In the event that this should not prove possible for all
Flora students, “[t]he District shall provide in its reports to
the Court an explanation for the additional time of the bus ride”
regarding those students whose travel time exceeds 45 minutes. As
enforcement of these provisions is expected to resolve all concerns
regarding inequitable transportation burdens that may otherwise
result from construction of the new high school at the site
selected by the District, this issue has been removed from our
purview in the instant appeal. Should the provisions of the
consent decree be violated or fail to resolve existing or future
transportation burdens, or should the transportation burdens borne
by students become racially inequitable, redress must be fashioned
by the district court or by this Court on subsequent appeal —— but
not prospectively and speculatively in this appeal.
2. The Proposed New High School Furthers Desegregation
The sole remaining issue then is whether the district court
clearly erred in approving the District’s proposed site for the new
10
high school on finding that it furthers desegregation. Plaintiffs
insist that constructing the new high school in the predominately
white Ridgeland area will not further desegregation in the short
term and will lead to resegregation in the future. As of April 10,
2000, the District’s student population was 61.4% white, 36.7%
black, and 1.9% other, of which overall high school student
enrollment —— including largely black Velma Jackson High School in
Zone I —— was 60.1% white, 38.1% black, and 1.7% other. The
enrollment of Madison Central —— from which the students of
Ridgeland High will be drawn exclusively —— was 71.8% white, 26.1%
black, and 2.1% other.
The District asserts that the initial enrollment at new
Ridgeland High will be 71.4% white, 24.3% black, and 4.3% other;
and that after transfer of those Madison Central students who would
attend Ridgeland High, Madison Central’s student population would
be 72.2% white, 26.7% black, and 1.1% other. Plaintiffs
nevertheless oppose building the new school at the Ridgeland site,
arguing that the interests of desegregation would be better served
by a more centrally located high school, specifically their
suggested Hwy. 463 site. Plaintiffs’ proposal calls for the
construction of a high school that would initially serve
approximately 900 students, of whom 67% would be white and 33%
11
black, leaving Madison Central with roughly 1,300 students, of whom
78% would be white and 22% black.11
The District is not required, however, to select school sites
that best or even better serve desegregation; only sites that serve
desegregation and do not foster resegregation. “The constitution
does not require school districts to achieve maximum desegregation;
that the plan does not result in the most desegregation possible
does not mean that the plan is flawed constitutionally.”12
Admittedly, the District’s plan may not maximize desegregation or
even be the plan among all those available that is best suited for
that purpose. With this in mind, we cannot say that the district
court committed clear error in finding that locating the new high
school in the Ridgeland area would assist in the District’s
continuing effort to desegregate its schools, much less negatively
affect desegregation.
Plaintiffs also argue that constructing the new high school at
the Ridgeland location will negatively affect desegregation in the
future in light of population trends in the County. Specifically,
they allege that the City of Ridgeland and the surrounding area
will become “more white,” while the predominately black Flora area
—— which, they contend, will grow substantially —— becomes “more
11
These numbers are based on the projected student
populations by Plaintiffs. We note that this plan would increase
the percentages of white students at Madison Central by over 6%
and decrease the number of black students by over 4%.
12
Monteilh, 848 F.2d at 632.
12
black.” As such, insist the Plaintiffs, the student population of
Madison Central would become “more black” while that of Ridgeland
High would become “more white.” The District contests these
population projections, asserting that the Flora area will see
little growth, either long or short range, as evidenced by the fact
that its student population has decreased by some 10% in the last
decade. Rather, contends the District, growth will continue to
occur in and around the cities of Madison and Ridgeland, both of
which are located to the east of I-55; as such, the new high school
can best serve the District’s needs if located at the site proposed
by the District.
We recognize yet again that courts are poorly equipped to
weigh such population trend projections; fortunately, though, we
are not required to do that today. As the claims of both parties
appear to be reasonable and rest on legitimate bases, we cannot say
that the district court committed clear error in adopting the
District’s projections over the Plaintiffs’ or in finding that
construction of the new high school at the Ridgeland site would
serve to foster the District’s continuing efforts to desegregate
the schools of Madison County without negatively affecting
desegregation in the future.
III. Conclusion
Decisions about construction, renovation, and administration
of school facilities are the province of the local school boards as
long as such decisions do not violate the Constitution or federal
13
law. The Madison County School District is free to construct its
schools at locations of its choice and in such a manner as it sees
fit —— even at a site or in a manner that we might consider unwise
or downright foolish —— as long as, in the process, it does not
retard desegregation or affect its students in a racially
inequitable manner. Based on our review of the record on appeal,
we discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that
locating the new high school at the Ridgeland site does not violate
these requirements. Therefore, the judgment of that court is, in
all respects,
AFFIRMED.
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