Anderson v. Canton Municipal Separate School District

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-60846

JOAN ANDERSON and JUDY LYNN ANDERSON, minors, by their mother and
next friend, Mrs. Bessie Anderson; JUANITA BENNETT, MARY LEE
BENNETT and ARCHIE LEE BENNETT, minors, by their father and next
friend, Mr. James Bennett; ET AL.

Plaintiffs-Appellants
and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

THE CANTON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT; ET AL.

Defendants

SCHOOL BOARD OF MADISON COUNTY; ROBERT E. COX, Superintendent of
Education; HAROLD E. DACUS, Assistant Superintendent of Education;
M. L. DEWEES, JR., President; HAROLD H. WHITE, JR., Secretary; E.
L. HENDERSON; M.C. MANSELL; E. W. HILL

Defendants-Appellees

- - - - - - - - - -
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(CA-3700)
- - - - - - - - - -
November 6, 2000

Before KING, Chief Judge, CUDAHY,* and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

*
Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
designation.
 Private Plaintiffs-Appellants and Intervenor Plaintiff-

Appellant United States (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal the

district court’s approval of the location proposed by Defendant-

Appellee Madison County School District (“MCSD” or “the District”)

for a new high school in that district. Madison County was ordered

to desegregate its de jure dual school system in 1969. It has

since entered into a number of consent decrees, including one

earlier this year. This most recent consent decree has been

approved by all parties and by the district court and resolves all

disputed issues between the parties —— including, significantly,

student transportation —— save only that of the location of the new

high school. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in

approving the District’s construction plan for the new high school,

insisting that it would not meet the District’s obligation, as a

former de jure segregated district, to further desegregation. We

conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the

District’s proposed site satisfies the obligations imposed by law,

including all applicable consent decree provisions.

I. Facts and Proceedings

The District is one of the many school districts in

Mississippi that were ordered to dismantle their race-based de jure

dual school systems.1 Since then, the District has been the

subject of a number of other desegregation orders and consent

1
See Anderson v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 423 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1969).

2
decrees. Among other things, the District is required to make all

decisions regarding the construction of school facilities in such

a way as to further desegregation.

The District is U-shaped and surrounds the county seat of

Canton, which is not a part of the District. The 1969

desegregation order divided the District into three Zones: Zone I

is a rural, sparsely populated area located in the northeast part

of the county; Zone II, in which 76% of the District’s students

reside, is in the southern part of the District and includes the

cities of Ridgeland and Madison; and Zone III, like Zone I, is a

rural, sparsely populated area but is located in the western part

of the county and includes the town of Flora. Zone I has its own

high school (Velma Jackson), and none of the parties have suggested

that it be considered or included in plans regarding the new high

school. Zones II and III are presently served by a single high

school, Madison Central High School (“Madison Central”).

The instant dispute is an outgrowth of the District’s

determined need to construct new schools, specifically a new high

school, because of the tremendous population growth, largely white,

over the last ten years. The District’s enrollment was

predominately black until the late 1980s, but since that time the

student population has grown dramatically and become increasingly

white as a result of the population boom in the vicinity of the

predominately white communities of Madison and Ridgeland. This is

evidenced by the fact that enrollment in these areas surged by 47%

3
between the 1991-92 and 1997-98 school years. This rapid growth

led to the overcrowding of Madison Central: It had a projected

capacity of 1,600 students, but its enrollment had reached 1,955

students by April 1, 2000. Population growth around the cities of

Madison and Ridgeland is predicted to continue for the foreseeable

future; in contrast, the rural areas of the District have

experienced, and likely will continue to experience, little or no

growth. Thus, the overcrowding problem at Madison Central will be

exacerbated in the near future while Velma Jackson High School in

Zone I will remain unaffected.

To remedy this situation and address a number of concomitant

problems, the District proposed to construct several new schools

and renovate other existing facilities, subject to the passage of

a bond issue for those purposes. In May of 1998, following

preclearance by the United States Attorney General, county voters

approved, by the requisite 60% supermajority, a $55 million bond

issue for the construction and renovation of school facilities.

The bond issue was validated by the Chancery Court of Madison

County in September of 1998. The bond proposal, as approved by the

voters, included a number of details, specifying in relevant part

that the new high school would be located in Ridgeland, a

predominately white area (“Ridgeland site”). This new high school

(“Ridgeland High” or “the new high school”) would have an initial

capacity of 700 students and a build-out capacity of 1200, and

would be built on land to be purchased by the District. Like

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Madison Central, the new high school would serve students from

Zones II and III, and its initial enrollment would be taken from

among those students currently attending the overcrowded Madison

Central.

After passage and certification of the bond issue, the

District filed a motion in district court to modify the existing

desegregation plan, seeking approval to construct five new schools

(one high school, two middle schools, and two elementary schools),

renovate existing schools, and make related student reassignments.

Plaintiffs opposed MCSD’s plan, claiming that it violated the 1969

desegregation order, a number of consent judgments,2 and federal

law, because, inter alia, it failed to further desegregation and

imposed travel burdens inequitably between black and white

students. The parties subsequently entered into a consent decree

(the “2000 consent decree”) which the district court approved, that

settled their disagreement on all points of difference except the

location of the new high school. Among other things, the 2000

consent decree resolved the racially inequitable transportation

burdens borne by the black students of the District and generally

alleviated the excessive transportation burdens borne by other

students, both black and white.

Plaintiffs continued to advocate an alternative, more

centrally located site for the new high school, on a parcel of land

2
The District is subject to the requirements of four
consent decrees, entered into in 1988, 1989, 1990, and now, 2000.

5
already owned by the district at the intersection of Highways 463

and 22 (“Hwy. 463 site”). Plaintiffs contend that locating the new

high school on their preferred site would have reduced the travel

burdens on a number of students and ensured that the new school

would be less predominately white.

The district court, after a seven-day hearing, entered its

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the District’s motion and

approving the plan. It ruled that “the proposed [Ridgeland] site

will not negatively affect desegregation in the district, now or in

the future.” Despite finding MCSD’s “construction plan . . . in

some respects short-sighted, inexplicable, and ill-advised” and

recognizing that “[c]onstructing a high school half the size of the

existing Madison Central which leaves little actual growing room at

Madison Central does not seem particularly prudent,” the district

court reluctantly approved MCSD’s construction plan “because it

[did] not find ultimately that the District’s construction/

renovation plan either negatively affects desegregation in the

district, or that there exists at this time a reasonable prospect

for further desegregation.” Plaintiffs appealed and filed a motion

to stay the order, which was granted by the district court.

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 II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s decision approving MCSD’s

proposed location of the new high school for clear error.3 We

review the district court’s findings of fact under that same

standard.4 Under the clearly erroneous standard, “[i]f the

district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of

the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not

reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the

trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”5 We

review errors of law de novo.6

3
Our most recent case law on this subject of district
courts approving the location of new schools in districts subject
to desegregation orders dictates that we review for clear error.
See Monteilh v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 631
(5th Cir. 1988). In supporting that proposition, that case cites
to two cases. One supports the proposition that we review for
clear error. See Copeland v. Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd., 598 F.2d
977, 981 (5th Cir. 1979). The other, however, holds that we
review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hendry
County Sch. Dist., 504 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1974). The
inconsistency does not matter here, though, as we affirm the
decision of the district court under the more stringent clearly
erroneous standard.
4
See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-
74 (1985).
5
Id.
6
See Morris v. Homco International, Inc., 853 F.2d 337,
343 (5th Cir. 1998).

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B. Obligation of the District to Further Desegregation

The original desegregation order for Madison County, entered

in 1969 pursuant to our decision in Hinds County,7 required that

(1) the county be divided into the three attendance zones described

above, (2) transportation of students be performed on a “non-

segregated and non-discriminatory” basis, and (3) “[a]ll school

construction, school consolidation, and site selection (including

the location of temporary classrooms) in this system shall be done

in a manner which will prevent the recurrence of the dual school

structure once this desegregation plan is implemented.” In

considering proposals for the construction or renovation of schools

in a system still subject to a desegregation order, “[w]e cannot

tolerate resegregation of a former dual school system, and the

School Board of such a system must demonstrate that the new

construction will not tend to promote such a relapse. We must also

ensure that the burdens of desegregation are distributed equally

among all classes of citizens.”8

We must nevertheless remain at all times cognizant of the

deference that must be accorded to school boards in their decisions

such as the placement of schools; the “[l]ocation of a school comes

within the purview of the federal courts only to the extent that it

7
423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969).
8
United States v. Hendry County Sch. Dist., 504 F.2d 550,
554 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 93 S.Ct. 2686 (1973); United States v. Board of Public
Instruction, 395 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1968)).

8
has an impact on desegregation.”9 This is because we “lack the

expertise and competence needed to dictate to school boards the

location of new schools and the drawing of attendance zones.”10 It

is not our place to decide whether the school board’s proposed site

for the new high school is the best choice or even a wise choice;

we must decide only whether the choice of that site violates the

Constitution or federal law. To make that determination, federal

courts ask only whether the proposed location fails to further

desegregation or places an inequitable transportation burden on

black students. So long as neither answer is in the affirmative,

we must defer to the expertise of school boards in decisions of

this nature.

1. Racially Inequitable Transportation Burden

Until recently, the transportation burden was clearly

distributed inequitably between the white and black students in the

District. A number of students, most of whom were black, endured

onerous bus rides every school day. In fact, some students who

reside in the predominately black Flora area traveled as long as 2½

hours each way on a daily basis. After the filing of this appeal,

however, the parties entered into the 2000 consent decree which

resolves the transportation issue and thus renders moot the second

ground for Plaintiffs’ objection to the planned site for the new

9
Monteilh, 848 F.2d at 632 (quoting United States v. Perry
County Board of Education, 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1978)).
10
Id.

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high school. That decree specifies that “the District shall insure

that transportation to school is provided on a non-discriminatory

basis and that no regular bus route will exceed one-and-one half

hours each way for any student.” As for the students in the

predominately black Flora area, the 2000 consent decree specifies

that “the District shall use its best efforts and shall add

additional bus routes as appropriate to ensure that no high school

student in the Flora attendance zone will ride more than 45 minutes

one way.” In the event that this should not prove possible for all

Flora students, “[t]he District shall provide in its reports to

the Court an explanation for the additional time of the bus ride”

regarding those students whose travel time exceeds 45 minutes. As

enforcement of these provisions is expected to resolve all concerns

regarding inequitable transportation burdens that may otherwise

result from construction of the new high school at the site

selected by the District, this issue has been removed from our

purview in the instant appeal. Should the provisions of the

consent decree be violated or fail to resolve existing or future

transportation burdens, or should the transportation burdens borne

by students become racially inequitable, redress must be fashioned

by the district court or by this Court on subsequent appeal —— but

not prospectively and speculatively in this appeal.

2. The Proposed New High School Furthers Desegregation

The sole remaining issue then is whether the district court

clearly erred in approving the District’s proposed site for the new

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high school on finding that it furthers desegregation. Plaintiffs

insist that constructing the new high school in the predominately

white Ridgeland area will not further desegregation in the short

term and will lead to resegregation in the future. As of April 10,

2000, the District’s student population was 61.4% white, 36.7%

black, and 1.9% other, of which overall high school student

enrollment —— including largely black Velma Jackson High School in

Zone I —— was 60.1% white, 38.1% black, and 1.7% other. The

enrollment of Madison Central —— from which the students of

Ridgeland High will be drawn exclusively —— was 71.8% white, 26.1%

black, and 2.1% other.

The District asserts that the initial enrollment at new

Ridgeland High will be 71.4% white, 24.3% black, and 4.3% other;

and that after transfer of those Madison Central students who would

attend Ridgeland High, Madison Central’s student population would

be 72.2% white, 26.7% black, and 1.1% other. Plaintiffs

nevertheless oppose building the new school at the Ridgeland site,

arguing that the interests of desegregation would be better served

by a more centrally located high school, specifically their

suggested Hwy. 463 site. Plaintiffs’ proposal calls for the

construction of a high school that would initially serve

approximately 900 students, of whom 67% would be white and 33%

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black, leaving Madison Central with roughly 1,300 students, of whom

78% would be white and 22% black.11

The District is not required, however, to select school sites

that best or even better serve desegregation; only sites that serve

desegregation and do not foster resegregation. “The constitution

does not require school districts to achieve maximum desegregation;

that the plan does not result in the most desegregation possible

does not mean that the plan is flawed constitutionally.”12

Admittedly, the District’s plan may not maximize desegregation or

even be the plan among all those available that is best suited for

that purpose. With this in mind, we cannot say that the district

court committed clear error in finding that locating the new high

school in the Ridgeland area would assist in the District’s

continuing effort to desegregate its schools, much less negatively

affect desegregation.

Plaintiffs also argue that constructing the new high school at

the Ridgeland location will negatively affect desegregation in the

future in light of population trends in the County. Specifically,

they allege that the City of Ridgeland and the surrounding area

will become “more white,” while the predominately black Flora area

—— which, they contend, will grow substantially —— becomes “more

11
These numbers are based on the projected student
populations by Plaintiffs. We note that this plan would increase
the percentages of white students at Madison Central by over 6%
and decrease the number of black students by over 4%.
12
Monteilh, 848 F.2d at 632.

12
black.” As such, insist the Plaintiffs, the student population of

Madison Central would become “more black” while that of Ridgeland

High would become “more white.” The District contests these

population projections, asserting that the Flora area will see

little growth, either long or short range, as evidenced by the fact

that its student population has decreased by some 10% in the last

decade. Rather, contends the District, growth will continue to

occur in and around the cities of Madison and Ridgeland, both of

which are located to the east of I-55; as such, the new high school

can best serve the District’s needs if located at the site proposed

by the District.

We recognize yet again that courts are poorly equipped to

weigh such population trend projections; fortunately, though, we

are not required to do that today. As the claims of both parties

appear to be reasonable and rest on legitimate bases, we cannot say

that the district court committed clear error in adopting the

District’s projections over the Plaintiffs’ or in finding that

construction of the new high school at the Ridgeland site would

serve to foster the District’s continuing efforts to desegregate

the schools of Madison County without negatively affecting

desegregation in the future.

III. Conclusion

Decisions about construction, renovation, and administration

of school facilities are the province of the local school boards as

long as such decisions do not violate the Constitution or federal

13
law. The Madison County School District is free to construct its

schools at locations of its choice and in such a manner as it sees

fit —— even at a site or in a manner that we might consider unwise

or downright foolish —— as long as, in the process, it does not

retard desegregation or affect its students in a racially

inequitable manner. Based on our review of the record on appeal,

we discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that

locating the new high school at the Ridgeland site does not violate

these requirements. Therefore, the judgment of that court is, in

all respects,

AFFIRMED.

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