In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2290
P AULA JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INDIAN P RAIRIE S CHOOL D ISTRICT 204, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:08-CV-04312—Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 11, 2011—D ECIDED A UGUST 11, 2011
Before B AUER, P OSNER, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Paula Jackson is a special
education support teacher for the Indian Prairie School
District, where she is responsible for helping the
general population teachers educate certain disabled
students. One of the students assigned to Jackson
was W.K., who had been diagnosed with autism. W.K.
had a long history of verbal and physical outbursts,
including hitting and scratching himself, other students,
2 No. 10-2290
and teachers. He would also swing or throw objects,
including chairs. Multiple teachers and administrators
recommended that W.K. be transferred to a therapeutic
day school that was better suited to address his unique
needs, but the district let W.K. stay at his regularly as-
signed general education public school.
W.K. had another one of his frequent outbursts during
the spring of his fourth grade year. The principal of the
school went to W.K.’s “classroom,” which, at that point,
was a solitary room with one teacher where W.K. was
the only student. The principal left the room after con-
cluding that W.K. had calmed down. Shortly after the
principal left the room he saw Jackson. He told her about
W.K.’s outburst and said that he wanted her to “go up-
stairs . . . and talk it over with [W.K.].” Jackson went to
W.K.’s room and found that he was again in an agitated
state. W.K. tried to throw a chair, Jackson tried to stop
him, and W.K. injured Jackson as a result.
Jackson filed a complaint against the school district
and four of its administrators, asserting that her constitu-
tional rights were violated because she was ordered to
W.K.’s room even though he was known to be violent,
and because W.K. should have been previously trans-
ferred to an alternative school. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, and the district court granted
the defendants’ motion. Because we conclude that the
district’s actions were flawed and short-sighted, but
do not “shock the conscience” as is required to main-
tain Jackson’s substantive due process claim, we affirm
the decision of the district court.
No. 10-2290 3
I. BACKGROUND
Paula Jackson became a special education support
teacher for Indian Prairie School District 204 in 2002.
The district operates 33 schools, serves approximately
28,700 students, and employs approximately 3,100 em-
ployees. White Eagle Elementary is one of the district’s
schools. In 2005 the district assigned Jackson to White
Eagle. In her role as a special education support
teacher, Jackson was tasked with aiding the general
education teachers by providing enhanced support for
students who qualified for special programming due
to a mental or physical disability. Jackson, who had
assumed tenured status by the time she brought this
case, had been previously assigned to two different
schools within the district and had taught over 100 stu-
dents.
At the time Jackson was assigned to White Eagle, W.K.
was a second-grade student, and had been enrolled since
kindergarten. Jackson “immediately saw that W.K. was
extremely troubled and prone to erratic and violent
behavior.” On the first day of the 2005-2006 school year,
when W.K. was seven years old, his mother dropped
him off in front of the school. W.K. chased after his
mother’s car as she tried to drive away. Jackson wanted
to stop him from running into the street so she tried to
physically move him back to the school grounds. As
she was doing so, W.K. began to kick, punch, and bite
her. He stopped only when White Eagle’s principal,
Ronald Zeman, pulled him away. Principal Zeman
brought W.K. into a private room at the school and
4 No. 10-2290
thought that he had successfully calmed him down. But
then, “out of the blue [W.K.] just started flailing at [Princi-
pal Zeman] . . . trying to hit me with any part of his body
or object he could get his hands on. . . . He was trying
to hit, punch, kick.” He also tried to headbutt Principal
Zeman. Although Principal Zeman was able to restrain
him, he later noted that “[W.K.] is a strong kid.” W.K. was
suspended after this incident, but he was not expelled
from White Eagle.
On April 12, 2006, district administrators held an Indi-
vidual Education Plan (IEP) meeting regarding W.K.
W.K.’s parents requested the meeting because of “on-
going behavioral concerns. . . . [W.K.] has difficulty with
impulse control and . . . difficulty handling frustration.”
Thirteen people were present at the meeting, including
Jackson, Principal Zeman, W.K.’s parents, a social worker,
the school nurse, and the student services coordinator.
A report was created in preparation for the meeting
that detailed W.K.’s eight incidents of aggression
towards staff and seven incidents towards other stu-
dents. Among other acts he had “pushed student,
refused time out,” “stabbed student in back with pencil,”
and “threw paper/pushed papers at teacher; called
teacher idiot.” It was noted that “[W.K.] struggles at
times with impulsive reactions to situations he finds
frustrating, unexpected, or unchosen,” and that “when
[W.K.] has an explosive incident, it is often impulsive
and unexpected.” During the meeting the participants
discussed various educational programs and placement
options for W.K. “Alternative Education Program” was
rejected as “not applicable.” “Supported Placement in
No. 10-2290 5
General Education Classroom” was selected because it
“best meets needs.” Jackson was assigned as W.K.’s
special education support teacher and became respon-
sible for assisting W.K’s general education teacher. The
district held another IEP conference regarding W.K. on
June 1, 2006, where it was noted that W.K. was presently
in supported education and that the evaluation team
would meet again in the fall to review an outside evalua-
tion.
W.K. returned to White Eagle for the third grade, the
2006-2007 school year. The district held an IEP conference
for him on September 6, 2006. The report noted that W.K.
was eligible for special education services under the
“autism” disability category, based on his diagnosis
of Asperger’s Syndrome. It was decided that W.K.’s
appropriate educational placement was in supported
general education, and Jackson was again assigned as
his support teacher. The report noted that “[W.K.’s]
disability affects his ability to self-regulate.” Additional
IEP conferences regarding W.K. were held on November
16, 2006 and February 9, 2007. Throughout this time
Jackson expressed frustration at W.K.’s disruptive and
belligerent behavior, such as his hitting and scratching
himself, and hitting, scratching, kicking, and throwing
objects at other students and teachers, including her.
Jackson stated that “at some point, [W.K.’s] violent out-
bursts became so common that his teachers stopped
documenting each such occurrence.” But there were
numerous times that W.K.’s violent outbursts were docu-
mented, such as a February 22, 2007 incident where W.K.
was suspended after he hit a social worker in the eye,
6 No. 10-2290
knocking her contact lens out. And at some point during
W.K.’s third-grade year Principal Zeman received an
anonymous letter. The letter stated that it was from
parents of students who had to attend class with W.K.
The letter stated that W.K. was a danger and that if he
was not removed from the school they would seek legal
counsel. Principal Zeman discussed the letter with the
then-superintendent of the school (who is a defendant
in this case). The superintendent did not act in response
to the letter.
In March of 2007 Jackson went to Principal Zeman’s
office and asked that a different support teacher be as-
signed to W.K. She stated that “I couldn’t handle it any-
more . . . [W.K.] needs to be off my case load.” Principal
Zeman did not want to transfer W.K. because of the time
it would take for W.K. to adjust to a new special educa-
tion support teacher. Jackson “was very upset” and
said “it’s not fair,” but W.K. was not reassigned.
The district held another IEP conference for W.K. on
May 23, 2007. There were fourteen people present at the
conference, including Jackson, Principal Zeman, W.K.’s
parents, and W.K.’s parents’ attorney. During the
meeting W.K.’s violent episodes were noted and docu-
mented. For example, in the time period between April 5,
2007 and May 18, 2007, W.K. had 34 verbal outbursts
and 36 physical outbursts. He was also averaging 2.6
“incidents” (defined as “any act of verbal or physical
aggression toward person, property, or self”) a day.
Under the “Recommended Educational Services” sec-
tion of the IEP report, the option for “Supported Place-
No. 10-2290 7
ment in General Education Classroom” was selected for
the time period of June 8, 2007 to June 8, 2008 because
it “best meets need [for] high level of support and
structure in least restrictive environment.” However,
the conference participants also discussed the option
of placing W.K. in an alternative school, and every
person present, with the exception of W.K.’s parents
and their attorney, recommended that W.K. be trans-
ferred to a therapeutic day school. The school “staff
expressed concern about the lack of progress on skills
and goals as well as the emotional needs observed on
a daily basis. [Jackson] expressed concern regarding
[W.K.’s] ability to cope and develop.” But W.K.’s parents
“expressed concern about the impact of [W.K.] being
away from his peers and home school. They see him
interacting with friends in the neighborhood.”
The May 23 meeting was ultimately suspended be-
fore a placement decision for W.K. could be finalized,
although the parties dispute why. Jackson contends
that the parents’ attorney asked that the conference
be paused so he could have time to convince the parents
to transfer W.K. to an alternative school. The defendants
contend that W.K.’s father and the attorney asked that
the meeting be postponed because W.K.’s mother had
to leave the meeting early, and they wanted her present
for any discussion regarding W.K.’s educational place-
ment. They also note that W.K.’s parents wanted time
to obtain recommendations from an outside consultant,
and visit a therapeutic day school. In any event, the
decision was made to suspend the IEP conference for
approximately two weeks to June 8, 2007.
8 No. 10-2290
Shortly after the May 23 conference was discontinued,
Principal Zeman met with the Assistant Superintendent
of Student Services and a Student Services Supervisor
for the district (both are defendants in this case). They
advised Principal Zeman not to follow the recommenda-
tion of the IEP team to transfer W.K. to an alterna-
tive school. They had “compiled . . . multiple data points
ranging from incidences of verbal aggression, physical
aggression, which were our two main concerns . . . [and]
the data showed a line of improvement and that it
would not make for a good case for putting this child in
an alternative educational placement.” Principal Zeman
did not agree with their position because compared to
other children at White Eagle, W.K.’s behavior was “off
the charts,” and he “was not positive” that keeping W.K.
at White Eagle “was a good idea” because “we did not
have the ability to meet his needs.”
W.K.’s IEP conference reconvened on June 8, and the
participants discussed the option of placing W.K. in an
alternative school. W.K.’s mother stated that she had
visited the therapeutic school and “felt depressed going
in, small classrooms with desks close together.” The
staff discussed W.K.’s problems at White Eagle, in-
cluding his “disrespect to his teaching assistants—it
had tended to escalate when ignored.” At some point
during the conference a school official stated that
W.K. would be allowed to return to White Eagle for
the following school year, and Jackson was “incensed.”
She was “mad that . . . they had already made that recom-
mendation without the team’s input.” The meeting con-
tinued as various participants suggested strategies
No. 10-2290 9
for W.K.’s next school year, including modifying the
programming and transition activities in his behavioral
support plan.
W.K. returned to White Eagle for the 2007-2008 school
year. He was nine years old and in the fourth grade.
Jackson was again named as his special education support
teacher. Changes to W.K.’s behavioral support plan
included designating a solitary room that the school
referred to as his “office.” Based on what was appro-
priate at the time, Jackson or a social worker would place
W.K. either in his general education class or his self-
contained office. The school held an IEP conference
for W.K. on October 25, 2007. During this meeting “sig-
nificant points/trends were discussed—total incidents
are down . . . and have shifted to more verbal than physi-
cal.” Commentary for W.K.’s “comprehensive data”
chart, which tallied W.K.’s acts of aggression, noted
that “physical [incidents] greatly reduced 1.3 to .5. Per-
centages indicate more verbal outbursts than physical
now.” But there were still numerous documented
examples of W.K. being abusive towards himself (such
as purposefully bumping into walls) and acting aggres-
sively towards others. For example, on January 30, 2008,
after a teaching assistant told W.K. that he had to wait
for physical education class, W.K. punched the assistant
in the arm, threw a chair at her, and kicked her in the
shin. On February 6, 2008, W.K. kicked Jackson in the
hand, leading Jackson to seek treatment from the school
nurse. And on February 27, 2008, W.K. threw papers,
blocks, and a laptop, and kicked his teaching assistant.
10 No. 10-2290
The district held another IEP conference for W.K. on
March 4, 2008. The corresponding report detailed W.K.’s
outbursts during the 2007-2008 school year: the staff
had reported 11 incidents of physical assaults against
them, filed four injury incident reports, and W.K. had
61 “office interventions.” Principal Zeman noted that
W.K. “appears to hold onto anger,” and that the “team
feels we are not meeting [W.K.’s] needs.” The staff “re-
ported that [W.K.] needs a lot,” and that they had “seen
improvements, but still has concerns.” Jackson voiced
her opinion that W.K. should be immediately trans-
ferred to a therapeutic day school. The district did not
transfer W.K.
A little more than a week after the March 4 IEP confer-
ence, on March 13, 2008, W.K. had another outburst. He
was in his office doing work when he became frustrated.
He began throwing objects around the room and at
his teaching assistant. The assistant called Principal
Zeman to the room. Principal Zeman spoke with W.K.,
and then left the room after he felt that W.K. had calmed
down. Shortly after leaving the room he saw Jackson,
told her about W.K.’s outburst, and said “I want you to
go upstairs, and . . . talk it over with [W.K.].” Jackson went
to the room and saw that W.K.’s emotional state had
escalated, and he was again agitated. At some point he
picked up a chair and swung it at Jackson, who raised
her hands to protect herself. She grabbed the legs of the
chair, a struggle ensued, and Jackson fell backward. She
hit her head on the white board and her neck on the
chalk ledge of the board. Principal Zeman came back
to the room and drove Jackson to a medical facility.
No. 10-2290 11
Jackson later filed a worker’s compensation claim, and
has received payments for her medical expenses under
that claim.
W.K. was suspended because of the March 13 incident.
During the suspension White Eagle gave notice to
W.K.’s parents that a recommendation was being
made to transfer W.K. to an alternative school. The recom-
mendation was “based on the serious bodily injury in-
curred by a White Eagle staff member as a result of the
[March 13] event.” Another IEP conference was scheduled
for March 26, and W.K. was not allowed to return to
White Eagle until after the conference. Fifteen people were
present at the March 26 conference, including Jackson,
Principal Zeman, W.K.’s parents, W.K.’s parents’ lawyer,
and a lawyer for the school district. On the educational
placement selection form, “Requires a placement in an
alternative education setting” was selected. W.K. was
placed in an alternative school for the remainder of
the year, and his parents did not attempt to re-enroll
him at White Eagle for the following year. Jackson
stayed at White Eagle, and remains employed by the
district as a full-time, tenured, special education sup-
port teacher.
Jackson brought suit against the school district and
four of its administrators, not including Principal Zeman,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges viola-
tions of Jackson’s constitutional right to substantive
due process. The defendants eventually moved for sum-
mary judgment, which the court granted, finding that
there was no basis in the record that the defendants’
12 No. 10-2290
actions satisfied the standard for finding a constitutional
violation. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Jackson’s complaint pursuant to § 1983 alleged that the
state-actor defendants deprived her of her constitutional
rights by knowingly creating and increasing a danger
to her. See London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742, 745-46
(7th Cir. 2010) (in order to state a § 1983 claim, a plain-
tiff must sufficiently allege that: (1) a person acting
under color of state law (2) deprived her of a right, privi-
lege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitu-
tion or laws). After discovery the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding
that their conduct did not “shock the conscience” as is
required to sustain a claim for a violation of substan-
tive due process under a state-created danger theory.
We agree that the defendants’ conduct does not satisfy
the high standard for finding a violation of substantive
due process, and affirm the decision of the district court.
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 976
(7th Cir. 2008). We construe all facts and reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Marion v.
City of Corydon, Indiana, 559 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2009).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
discovery, disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Estate of Suskovich v.
No. 10-2290 13
Anthem Health Plans of Virginia, Inc., 553 F.3d 559, 563
(7th Cir. 2009). In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof regarding the claimed constitutional
violation, and must present sufficient evidence to
create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary
judgment. Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, et al., 636 F.3d 293,
300 (7th Cir. 2011).
Jackson faces a difficult road in meeting her burden
of showing that the facts of her case suffice to constitute
a constitutional deprivation. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment “generally does not im-
pose upon the state a duty to protect individuals from
harm by private actors.” Buchanan-Moore v. County of
Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009). However,
there are two exceptions to this general rule. The first
arises when a state has custody over a person. In that
instance, the state is obligated to offer protection
because no alternative avenues of aid exist. Id. The
second exception comes into play “when the state af-
firmatively places a particular individual in a position
of danger the individual would not otherwise have
faced.” Id. This second exception is known as the state-
created danger doctrine, and it is the basis on which
Jackson advances her claim.
To establish a substantive due process claim under a
state-created danger theory, Jackson must demonstrate
that: (1) the district, by its affirmative acts, created or
increased a danger that Jackson faced; (2) the district’s
failure to protect her from danger was the proximate
cause of her injuries; and (3) the district’s failure to
14 No. 10-2290
protect her “shocks the conscience.” King ex rel. King v.
East St. Louis School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817-18 (7th
Cir. 2007). The defendants contend that Jackson’s claim
fails under all three prongs of this test. They argue that
Jackson voluntarily chose to teach disabled children,
including those with autism, and that the district’s
actions do not shock the conscience. They note the
district’s legal obligations under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which mandates that
school districts ensure “access to the general education
curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum
extent possible.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A); Hunt v. Sycamore
Community School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 544-
45 (6th Cir. 2008) (even if district failed to protect
teacher from special education student with a history
of violent assaults, injured teacher’s § 1983 claim fails
because teacher voluntarily undertook hazardous em-
ployment and district had duty under IDEA to educate
child). Here, although we question whether Jackson can
satisfy the first prong of the test, see Sandage v. Board of
Comm’rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595, 599 (7th
Cir. 2008) (noting the “essential distinction between
endangering and failing to protect”), we will address
whether the defendants’ actions “shock the conscience”
only, since Jackson’s claim falls short under this disposi-
tive prong.
The Supreme Court has held that state action that
shocks the conscience is conduct which may be deemed
“arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citation
omitted). Only “the most egregious official conduct” will
No. 10-2290 15
satisfy this stringent inquiry. Id. Making a bad decision,
or even acting negligently, does not suffice to establish
the type of conscience-shocking behavior that results in
a constitutional violation. See id. at 849 (“conduct
intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest is the sort of official action most
likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.”). We
have previously noted that while the “shocks the con-
science” standard lacks precise measurement, only
conduct falling towards the more culpable end of the
tort law spectrum of liability will be found to shock the
conscience. King ex rel. King, 496 F.3d at 818-19; see also
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489
U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (not every tort committed by a state
actor is a constitutional violation). Where, as here, public
officials have time for reasoned deliberation in their
decisions, the officials’ conduct will only be deemed
conscious shocking when it “evinces a deliberate indif-
ference to the rights of the individual.” King ex rel. King,
496 F.3d at 819. And because the state actor’s conduct is
evaluated along a spectrum of culpability, any analysis
of potentially conscious-shocking behavior is necessarily
fact-driven. Id. at 818. In this case, although this is a
close question, we ultimately conclude that the facts
present do not allow a finding that the defendants’
conduct shocks the conscience.
The factors falling in favor of finding that the defen-
dants’ actions shock the conscience are the fol-
lowing: W.K.’s outbursts were frequent—the record is
replete with noted occurrences of W.K. hitting, kicking,
scratching, and throwing objects. The district was
16 No. 10-2290
certainly aware that W.K. was prone to acts of violence,
and was fully aware that W.K. had harmed teachers in
the past. W.K.’s bouts of physical aggression were
often unexpected, unpredictable, and “out of the blue.” No
one could be sure exactly when W.K. would have an
outburst, or what would trigger it, creating a precarious
environment for all who were around him. Even
though W.K. was a child, Principal Zeman and Jackson
considered him to be strong. And Principal Zeman said
that he wanted Jackson to go to W.K.’s room even
though he knew W.K. was either in the midst of a violent
outburst, or had recently de-escalated from one. Jackson
asserts that these factors, combined with the district’s
decision not to transfer W.K. from White Eagle, suffice
to allow her § 1983 claim to survive summary judgment.
See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385-86 (7th Cir.
1979) (district court’s dismissal of complaint alleging
§ 1983 violation reversed where police officers left
children alone in a car on a cold night after arresting
the car’s driver, resulting in mental and physical
damage to the children); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122,
1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993) (district court’s dismissal of com-
plaint alleging § 1983 violation reversed where police
officers arrested original driver of a car, leaving a drunk
passenger behind who later caused a head-on collision);
Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 520 (7th Cir. 1998) (evidence
before jury was sufficient to find constitutional violation
where officers released identifiable voice recording of
informant who was later murdered).
However, the factors falling in favor of finding that
the defendants’ actions do not shock the conscience are
No. 10-2290 17
the following: the record shows that many of W.K.’s acts
of violence were not against other people, but were
against himself, by, for example, intentionally running
into walls. The IEP evaluation reports describe the staff
members as expressing concern that they were not
meeting W.K.’s needs, that he was incredibly needy and
disrespectful, and that he was failing to advance, but not
that they were in fear of his harming them. The district
held regular evaluations of W.K. where it was noted that
his total incidents were down, and that he was showing
a trend towards verbal, rather than physical, outbursts.
Principal Zeman went to W.K.’s room before he asked
Jackson to talk to W.K. about his outburst, and Principal
Zeman did not leave the room until after he felt that
W.K. had calmed down. And every IEP evaluation re-
port, except for the report created after the March 13
incident where W.K. injured Jackson, recommended that
the educational setting that best met W.K.’s needs was
supported education in a general educational class-
room. Without these critical factors, the district’s decision
not to transfer W.K. could be seen as an implicit ac-
ceptance of, and a deliberate indifference to, violence
towards its teachers and staff, which could satisfy the
standard for finding a constitutional violation. King ex rel.
King, 496 F.3d at 819. But see Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d
507, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1986) (due process clause does not
assure safe working conditions for public employees).
As the unique facts of this case stand, although the de-
fendants’ actions may well have been short-sighted,
flawed, negligent, and tortious, they do not satisfy the
standard for finding a constitutional violation. County of
18 No. 10-2290
Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 848; Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992) (the due process
clause is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised
personnel decisions by state actors).
We do not lightly reach the conclusion that the defen-
dants’ conduct does not shock the conscience. We are
cognizant of the school district’s stated policy require-
ment to “at all times take necessary measures to protect
all employees from physical or psychological harm.” And
education professionals who take on the extraordinary
task of teaching children in public schools, including
those who choose to teach children with disabilities,
should not also be expected to endure frequent and
unpredictable acts of violence. We emphasize that at
no time is it necessary for a student to inflict serious
bodily harm on a teacher before a school is justified in
deciding that a general education classroom is not the
appropriate forum for a certain disabled student. But a
“shocks the conscience” analysis is necessarily a fact-
driven one, and here, we cannot say that the decision of
the district not to transfer W.K. before the March 13
incident was the type of egregious act that constituted
a constitutional violation of Jackson’s rights.
Because we conclude that Jackson’s constitutional
rights were not violated we will not address the addi-
tional issues she briefed on appeal, specifically, that
Principal Zeman’s directive was attributable to a school
board policy; that the district’s failure to train was a
cause of Jackson’s injuries; that the non-district de-
fendants are not entitled to qualified immunity; and
No. 10-2290 19
that the defendants’ policies and practices proximately
caused Jackson’s injuries.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is A FFIRMED.
8-11-11