UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4098
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALLEN PATTERSON,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00304-RDB-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 11, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Gary A. Ticknor, Elkridge, Maryland, for Appellant. Jonathan
Biran, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Allen Patterson
pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Consistent with
his plea agreement and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the
district court sentenced Patterson to 180 months of
imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum term. Patterson’s
counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court erred in
denying Patterson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
designating him an armed career criminal, and denying his motion
to suppress evidence. Patterson filed a pro se supplemental
brief questioning the validity of his guilty plea and asserting
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Government filed a
motion to dismiss as to sentence, asserting this court lacks
jurisdiction to review Patterson’s sentence.
We first address the Government’s motion to dismiss.
The statute governing our review of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3742
(2006), states that where a plea agreement includes a specific
sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C), 1 “a defendant may
1
Rule 11(e)(1)(C) was redesignated as Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in
the 2002 amendments to Rule 11, but a corresponding change was
not made in § 3742(c).
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not file a notice of appeal under paragraph (3) or (4) of
subsection (a) unless the sentence imposed is greater than the
sentence set forth in such agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1). 2
Thus, as the Tenth Circuit noted, “[a] defendant receiving a
sentence under a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement may appeal only
when his sentence was imposed in violation of law or was imposed
as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
[G]uidelines.” United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d 796, 797
(10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted); see United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 527-28
(9th Cir. 1997) (addressing parameters of § 3742(c)(1)).
Here, the district court imposed the negotiated
sentence in compliance with both the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement
and the statutorily mandated minimum sentence applicable to
Patterson. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). Additionally, the
sentence is not the result of an incorrect application of the
Guidelines. A sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
plea agreement is contractual in nature and not based on the
Guidelines. United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“A sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
2
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) and (4) allow appeal of a sentence
greater than the Guidelines range, or a sentence for an offense
that does not have a Guidelines range and is plainly
unreasonable.
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arises directly from the agreement itself, not from the
Guidelines.”).
Because § 3742(c) bars review of sentences imposed
pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and none of the
exceptions apply, we lack jurisdiction to review Patterson’s
sentence. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss as to the appeal of Patterson’s sentence.
Patterson’s counsel next contends that the district
court erred in denying Patterson’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. However, because Patterson withdrew that motion, the
district court never ruled on it, and the issue is not properly
before us on appeal.
Counsel also contends that the district court erred in
denying the motion to suppress. This issue is foreclosed by
Patterson’s guilty plea. “’When a defendant pleads guilty, he
waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings
conducted prior to the entry of the plea.’” United States v.
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 2004)). Therefore,
this claim entitles Patterson to no relief.
As to Patterson’s pro se claims, the record reveals
that he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and
according to the dictates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Rule 11 “does
not require a district court to inform a defendant that, by
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pleading guilty, he is waiving his right to appeal any
antecedent rulings or constitutional violations.” United
States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 299 n.6 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Patterson also argues that counsel was ineffective in
failing to inform him that his guilty plea foreclosed any
appellate challenge to the motion to suppress ruling. Claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable
on direct appeal unless the record conclusively establishes
counsel’s “objectively unreasonable performance” and resulting
prejudice. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir.
2008). To allow for adequate development of the record,
ineffective assistance claims should be pursued in a motion
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011). United
States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). The
record before us does not conclusively establish ineffective
assistance of Patterson’s trial counsel.
Accordingly, we affirm Patterson’s conviction and
dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court requires counsel
to inform Patterson in writing of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Patterson requests that counsel file a petition but counsel
believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may motion
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
5
motion must state that counsel served a copy of the motion on
Patterson. We dispense with oral argument because the materials
before the court adequately presented the facts and legal
contentions and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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