UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5141
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER O’NEAL PATTERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00054-TDS-1)
Submitted: August 17, 2011 Decided: August 19, 2011
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
James E. Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher O’Neal Patterson appeals his 744-month
sentence and convictions, following his guilty plea, of (1) one
count of interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2006); (2) one count of carry and use
of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C)(i)
(2006); (3) one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a) (2006); and (4) one count of carry and use
of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
causing death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
924(c)(1)(a)(iii), (c)(1)(C)(i), 924(j)(1). On appeal,
Patterson’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Patterson was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but
has not done so. The Government has filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal on the basis of the appellate waiver provision in
Patterson’s plea agreement.
A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the
right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v.
Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). We review the
validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and we will uphold a
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waiver of appellate rights if the waiver is valid and the issue
being appealed is covered by the waiver. United States v.
Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). An appellate waiver
is valid if the defendant’s agreement to the waiver was knowing
and intelligent. Id. at 169. To determine whether a waiver is
knowing and intelligent, we examine “the totality of the
circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the
accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and
familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” United
States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, if a district
court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of
appellate rights during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, and
the record indicates that the defendant understood the full
significance of the waiver and was not denied effective
assistance of counsel, the waiver is valid. United States v.
Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005).
A review of the Rule 11 hearing transcript confirms
that Patterson knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
appeal. In his plea agreement, Patterson explicitly waived the
right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the
right to appeal based upon grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, a sentence in excess of the
statutory maximum, and a sentence based on an unconstitutional
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factor. Patterson confirmed at his Rule 11 hearing that he read
and understood the plea agreement. The district court conducted
the colloquy required under Rule 11, ensuring that Patterson
understood the charges and potential penalties, and that
Patterson was competent to enter the plea. We therefore
conclude that Patterson knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to appeal his sentence. Because Patterson explicitly
challenges only his sentence on appeal, and we further conclude
that Patterson’s appeal falls squarely within the scope of the
waiver provision of Patterson’s plea agreement, we grant the
motion to dismiss as to Patterson’s sentence.
The waiver provision, however, did not waive
Patterson’s right to appeal his convictions. Defense counsel
does not assert any errors related to Patterson’s guilty plea or
convictions, but the waiver provision does not preclude our
review of his convictions pursuant to Anders. In accordance
with Anders, we have thoroughly examined the entire record for
any potentially meritorious issues not covered by the waiver and
have found none. Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion
to dismiss as to Patterson’s convictions, and we affirm those
convictions.
In sum, the Government’s motion to dismiss is granted
in part and denied in part, Patterson’s appeal of his sentence
is dismissed, and his convictions are affirmed. This court
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requires that counsel inform Patterson, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Patterson requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Patterson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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