UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5232
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JULIOUS JEROME BULLOCK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00174-BO-1)
Submitted: June 23, 2011 Decided: August 16, 2011
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Kimberly A. Moore, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Julious Jerome Bullock appeals his 120-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924
(2006). On appeal, Bullock contends that the district court
imposed a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Although Bullock requested that the district court
consider the fact that he accepted responsibility for his crime,
he did not request any particular sentence or object to the
adequacy of the district court’s explanation for his sentence.
We therefore review the sentence for plain error. See United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-80 (4th Cir. 2010). To
establish plain error, Bullock “must show: (1) an error was
made; (2) the error is plain; and (3) the error affects
substantial rights.” United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337,
342-43 (4th Cir. 2009).
We begin by reviewing the sentence for significant
procedural error, including such errors as “failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence – including an explanation for any deviation from the
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Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). If there are no procedural errors, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511
F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Accordingly, a
sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “state in open court”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id.
The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; it must be
“sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that [the district
court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
When, as here, the district court imposes a within-
Guidelines sentence, the district court may “provide a less
extensive, while still individualized, explanation.” United
States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2128 (2010). That explanation, however, must
be sufficient to allow for “meaningful appellate review” such
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that the appellate court need “not guess at the district court’s
rationale.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329-30 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We recently held that a district court’s sparse
explanation of its chosen sentence was legally sufficient where
the court (1) determined that the defendant had no objections to
the findings and calculations set forth in the presentence
report (“PSR”); (2) explicitly adopted the PSR’s findings and
calculations; (3) heard argument from counsel; (4) gave the
defendant an opportunity to allocute; (5) stated that it
considered the § 3553(a) factors; (6) concluded that a
Guidelines sentence accomplished the purposes of § 3553(a); and
(7) imposed the sentence requested by the defendant. United
States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2010).
Based on our review of the record and the sentencing
transcript, we conclude that the district court committed
procedural error by failing to provide an individualized
rationale to support Bullock’s 120-month sentence. See Gall,
552 U.S. at 51; Carter, 564 F.3d at 328. In contrast to the
court in Hernandez, the district court failed to expressly refer
to any of the § 3553(a) factors or find that a Guidelines
sentence accomplished the purposes of § 3553(a). We further
find that the court’s error was plain. See Lynn, 592 F.3d at
577 (plain errors are those that are “clear or obvious”);
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United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the reasons for a particular sentence are to be
“matched to a factor appropriate for consideration” under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and “clearly tied to [the defendant’s]
particular situation”).
Bullock, however, fails to establish that a different
sentence might have been imposed if the district court had
provided a more lengthy explanation. The district court
sentenced Bullock to 120 months of imprisonment, which was both
the Guidelines range and the statutory maximum sentence, and
there is nothing to suggest that further discussion by the
district court would have resulted in a different sentence.
Accordingly, we find that Bullock cannot demonstrate that the
district court’s explanation constituted plain error that
affected his substantial rights. See Hernandez, 603 F.3d at
273; accord Lynn, 592 F.3d at 580.
Finally, Bullock’s within-Guidelines sentence is
presumptively reasonable on appeal, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 346-
56; United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008), and
he has failed to rebut that presumption. See United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating
presumption may be rebutted by showing sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the § 3553(a) factors). Therefore, we
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conclude that the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Go,
517 F.3d at 220.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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