[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-10159 AUG 22, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20335-UU-9
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL MATHIS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 22, 2011)
Before HULL, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Mathis appeals his sentence of 10 years’ supervised release for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846. He argues that the excessive period of supervised release was procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not give sufficient justification for the
sentence. He also asserts that it was substantively unreasonable because the
sentence does not serve the purposes of the sentencing guidelines and is greater
than necessary to comply with and promote the purposes of the statutory
sentencing goals.
“[A] sentence may be reviewed for procedural or substantive
unreasonableness.” United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008).
We review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1273 n.25.
In reviewing whether a sentence is reasonable, we must ensure, first, that
the district court did not commit a significant procedural error, “such as failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines
as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). “[T]he
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own
legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230
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(11th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted). However, the district court need
not discuss or explicitly state on the record each § 3553(a) factor. United States v.
Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). “Rather, an acknowledgment by the
district judge that he or she has considered the § 3553(a) factors will suffice.”
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007). We must then
determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The sentencing court
shall impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with
the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2), namely, to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment
for the offense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from further criminal
conduct by the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed educational
training, vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence,
the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the
applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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“The review for substantive unreasonableness involves examining the
totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory
factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez,
550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence
bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of
both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431
F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a)
factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United
States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotations and alteration
omitted). We vacate a sentence only if “left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011) (quotation
omitted). The reasonableness of a sentence may be indicated when the sentence
imposed was well below the statutory maximum sentence. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
at 1324.
Mathis’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. It is
procedurally reasonable because the district court adequately explained its reasons
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for sentencing Mathis to 10 years’ supervised release by stating that it considered
the parties’ arguments and the statutory factors. The court explained that it was
imposing the 10 years of supervised release because it varied down to 120 months’
of imprisonment and wanted to hold him accountable if he broke the law in the
future. It is substantively reasonable because it is well below the statutory
maximum and helps deter future criminal conduct by him. Furthermore, based on
Mathis’s history and characteristics as a career offender, and the deterrence effect
that the extended supervised release will have on his future criminal conduct, the
sentence is not greater than necessary. Because the sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable, the district court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Mathis’s request for oral argument is denied.
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