Case: 11-15008 Date Filed: 10/16/2012 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15008
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00032-RH-WCS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMEY ALEXANDER MURPHY, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(October 16, 2012)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jamey Alexander Murphy appeals his total 270-month sentence, imposed
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after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846 (“Count 1”); possession with intent to distribute more than
500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Count
2”); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count 3”). Murphy attacks his sentence
as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. First, he argues that the district
court did not make an individualized finding regarding the drug quantity reasonably
foreseeable to him. Second, he argues that the length of the sentence is
unreasonable, and that the court unfairly emphasized his criminal history over the
other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586,
591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The party challenging the sentence has the burden
of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including
the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
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provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the
public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider, among other factors,
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, and the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. See generally id. §
3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
We must first “ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct at
597. Once we determine that a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we examine
whether the sentence is substantively reasonable, taking into account the totality of
the circumstances. Id.; United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1091 (11th Cir.
2008).
A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if the district court arbitrarily
selects the sentence, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, or fails to consider
pertinent § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191-92 (11th
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Cir. 2008). We ordinarily expect a sentence falling within the guidelines range to
be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A
sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of
a reasonable sentence. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
2008). We will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (quotation omitted).
Murphy fails to demonstrate that his sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. The court calculated the drug quantity from Murphy’s own
statements regarding his cocaine purchases over 18 months. Along with his prior
convictions, the court considered his positive characteristics and the nature and
circumstances of the offense. Further, Murphy’s 210-month sentence on Counts 1
and 2 was the lowest choice in the applicable guideline range of 210 to 262 months’
imprisonment, and well below the statutory maximum terms of imprisonment, life or
40 years, respectively.
Upon review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the
parties’ appellate briefs, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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