UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4125
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHANNON BEARFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-4127
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHANNON ALLEN BEARFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:05-cr-00166-HEH-1; 3:10-cr-00219-HEH-1)
Submitted: August 3, 2011 Decided: August 22, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul Gill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Appellate
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Roderick Charles
Young, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Shannon Allen Bearfield pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to one count of possession with intent
to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced
Bearfield to 276 months’ imprisonment. Because Bearfield was on
supervised release when he committed the aforementioned offense,
the district court also revoked his supervised release and
sentenced him to an additional fifty-four months’ imprisonment.
Through counsel, Bearfield now appeals the drug conviction and
sentence in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), presenting no meritorious grounds and raising no
specific questions for our review (No. 11-4127). Bearfield also
appeals his revocation sentence (No. 11-4125), questioning
whether it was reasonable but stating there are no meritorious
issues for review. Bearfield was advised of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but has not exercised it. The
Government moves to dismiss the appeal of Bearfield’s drug
conviction on the basis of a waiver of appeal rights provision
in Bearfield’s plea agreement.
A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the
right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v.
Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This Court reviews
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the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and will enforce the
waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope
thereof. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Bearfield
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his drug
conviction and sentence. We note that the language and meaning
of the appeal waiver in this case is clear and unmistakable, and
both Bearfield and his attorney signed the agreement, indicating
that Bearfield had been fully advised about and understood the
terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver.
Further, he was fully questioned about the appeal waiver at the
properly conducted Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. Accordingly,
the waiver is valid. Finally, although Bearfield does not
allege any specific error as to his drug conviction, we have
reviewed the record and conclude any potentially meritorious
issues would fall within the broad appeal waiver. Hence, we
grant the Government’s motion to dismiss appeal number 11-4127.
With respect to Bearfield’s revocation sentence, our
review of the record, including the transcript of the revocation
hearing, convinces us that the district court imposed a
reasonable sentence. The district court has broad discretion to
impose a sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised
release. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir.
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2010). Thus, we will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation
of supervised release if it is within the governing statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). Before determining
whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable” the court must
decide whether it is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In doing so,
the court “follow[s] generally the procedural and substantive
considerations” used in reviewing original sentences. Id.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter
7 of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, id. at 440, and has adequately explained the
sentence chosen, although it need not explain a revocation
sentence in as much detail as when imposing the original
sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper
basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, after considering the
above, the appeals court decides that the revocation sentence is
not unreasonable, it should affirm. Id. at 439. In this
initial inquiry, this court takes a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than it
does applying the reasonableness review to post-conviction
Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
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656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this court finds the revocation
sentence unreasonable must the court decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
Our review of the record confirms that the revocation
sentence is not unreasonable, let alone plainly so. Further, in
accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment in appeal number 11-4125 is affirmed.
This court requires that counsel inform Bearfield, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Bearfield requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such petition would
be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Bearfield. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
11-4125 - AFFIRMED
11-4127 - DISMISSED
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