REVISED - December 18, 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
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No. 98-30545
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BARNACLE MARINE MANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED; INGRAM BARGE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
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December 1, 2000
Before WOOD1, DAVIS and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Barnacle Marine Management, Inc. (“Barnacle”) and Ingram Barge
Company (“Ingram”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing the
United States from consolidated limitation proceedings under 46
U.S.C. § 183 of the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act of 1851
(“Limitation Act”). The district court held that 33 U.S.C. § 408
of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (“Rivers and Harbors Act”)
provides the United States with an in personam remedy against the
owner of a vessel that damages a public work. The district court
1
Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
also held that this remedy is not subject to the Limitation Act,
thus allowing the United States to proceed against Barnacle and
Ingram in separate litigation free from limitation. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse.
I.
In March 1997, the MISS TONI, a tow boat owned and operated by
Barnacle, was pushing a tow of four of Ingram’s barges on the
Ouachita River when it caused one of the barges to allide with the
Columbia Lock and Dam, a public work owned by the United States.
The tow then broke up and one of the barges broke away and struck
the trunnion arm of a Columbia Lock gate, causing damage to the
gate that cost $1,247,200 to repair.
In 1997, Barnacle and Ingram each filed separate complaints
under the Limitation Act2 seeking exoneration from and/or
limitation of liability for damages caused by the March 1997
allision. The district court issued separate orders that enjoined
all other pending actions against Barnacle and Ingram and
established deadlines for filing claims.
The United States timely filed claims against both Barnacle
and Ingram. These claims sought damages for negligence under the
general maritime law, and also sought damages under Sections 14 and
16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§
408 and 412). The district court then consolidated the two
limitation proceedings.
2
46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96.
2
The United States moved to dismiss its claims under 33 U.S.C.
§§ 408 and 412 from the consolidated limitation proceeding so that
it could proceed against Barnacle and Ingram to recover its full
damages. The district court granted this motion. In its
memorandum opinion, the district court held that 33 U.S.C. § 408 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act provides the United States with an in
personam remedy against the owner of a vessel that damages a public
work. The district court held that the United States’ in personam
claims under 33 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 412 are not subject to the
Limitation Act, and that it could proceed against the two vessel
owners for its full damages outside the consolidated limitation
proceeding. This appeal followed.
II.
The parties first disagree about whether 33 U.S.C. §§ 408 and
412 provide the United States with an in personam remedy against
Barnacle and Ingram for damage to its public works, in this case a
gate to a lock. The United States concedes that if the only remedy
this statute provides is an in rem one against the offending
vessel, then a determination of whether the Limitation Act applies
has no practical effect in this case. In either event, the United
States’ recovery would be limited to the value of the vessel. So
we turn to the critical issue in this appeal: whether 33 U.S.C. §§
408 and 412 create an implied in personam remedy for the United
States against the owner of a vessel that damages a public work.
Section 408 makes it unlawful for any person to damage or
otherwise interfere with a public work built by the United States
3
to aid navigation or prevent floods.3 The remedies Congress
expressly provided for violations of 33 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 409 are
found in 33 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 412, which are also part of the
Rivers and Harbors Act. Section 411 provides for criminal fines
and imprisonment for violations of § 408. Section 412 provides, in
pertinent part:
And any boat, vessel, scow, raft, or other craft used or
employed in violating any of the provisions of sections
407, 408, 409, 414, and 415 of this title shall be liable
. . . for the amount of damages done by said boat . . .,
and said boat . . . may be proceeded against summarily by
way of libel in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction thereof.
33 U.S.C. § 412 (emphasis added). By its express terms, therefore,
§ 412 provides only an in rem remedy against the vessel for
violations of § 408. All parties agree that § 412 does not
expressly provide an in personam remedy for violations of § 408.
The United States argues that a companion section of the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 409, along with judicial
decisions allowing the United States to maintain an in personam
action under § 409, should apply by analogy to this case. This
argument requires us to examine § 409 and the decisions under §
409. Section 409 makes it unlawful for a vessel owner, operator,
or lessor to sink or cause any vessel to be sunk in a navigable
3
Section 408 provides, in pertinent part, that: “[i]t shall
not be lawful for any person or persons to . . . injure, . . . or
in any manner whatever impair the usefulness of any . . . dike,
levee, . . . or other work built by the United States . . . for the
preservation and improvement of any of its navigable waters or to
prevent floods . . . .”
4
channel.4 The owner, operator, or lessor has a duty under § 409 to
immediately remove such a wreck. Criminal sanctions for violations
of § 409 are provided by § 411, including both fines and
imprisonment.5 Civil remedies for violations of § 409 (as well as
§ 408) are provided by § 412. As discussed above, this gives the
United States an in rem remedy against the offending vessel.
The United States, relying on Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), argues that we should imply an in
personam remedy in favor of the United States and against the
vessel owners in this case. In Wyandotte, the Supreme Court
interpreted § 409 to include an implied in personam remedy in favor
of the United States against the owner of a negligently6 sunk
4
Courts and commentators commonly refer to 33 U.S.C. § 409 as
part of the Wreck Act. Section 409 provides, in pertinent part,
that:
It shall not be lawful . . . to sink, or permit or cause
to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels
. . . . And whenever a vessel, raft, or other craft is
wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel . . . it shall be
the duty of the owner, lessee, or operator of such sunken
craft to commence the immediate removal of the same, and
prosecute such removal diligently, and failure to do so
shall be considered as an abandonment of such craft, and
subject the same to removal by the United States . . . .
5
Section 411 provides, in pertinent part, that:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or
that shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate
a violation of the provisions of sections 407, 408, 409,
414, and 415 of this title shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine of up to $25,000 per day, or by imprisonment
(in the case of a natural person) for not less than
thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such fine
and imprisonment . . . .
6
In 1986, nineteen years after Wyandotte, Congress changed §
409's standard for liability from negligence to strict liability.
5
vessel for expenses incurred in removing that vessel. The United
States argues that the Court’s reasoning in Wyandotte should lead
us to conclude that an in personam remedy also exists for
violations of § 408.
In Wyandotte, the Court considered two consolidated cases.7
In the first case, the United States sought a declaratory judgment,
declaring negligent parties who sank a vessel in an inland waterway
responsible for “removing the impediment to navigation thus
created.” Wyandotte, 389 U.S. at 193. In the other consolidated
case, the United States had itself removed a sunken vessel that it
claimed had been negligently sunk. It sought in personam
reimbursement for the costs of this removal under § 409.
The issue in Wyandotte was whether the United States could
obtain either a declaratory judgment or an in personam judgment
from a negligent shipowner which had sunk its vessel in violation
of § 409. The Court held that both remedies were available to the
United States:
The Government may, in our view, seek an order that a
negligent party is responsible for rectifying the wrong
done to maritime commerce by a § 15 [33 U.S.C. § 409]
The section was amended in 1986 by substituting the words “or to
sink” for “or to voluntarily or carelessly sink”. Also, in
addition to owners, the amendment made lessees and operators
potential defendants under § 409. Pub.L. 99-662, Title IX, §
939(a), 100 Stat. 4199.
7
United States v. Cargill, Inc., and United States v.
Wyandotte Transp. Co. were consolidated under the heading United
States v. Cargill, Inc. in both the district court (see 1964 A.M.C.
1742), and the appellate court (see 367 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1966)).
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case came under the Wyandotte
heading.
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violation. Denial of such a remedy to the United States
would permit the result, extraordinary in our
jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer shifting responsibility for
the consequences of his negligence onto his victim. It
might in some cases permit the negligent party to benefit
from commission of a criminal act. We do not believe
that Congress intended to withhold from the Government a
remedy that ensures the full effectiveness of the [Rivers
and Harbors] Act. We think we correctly divine the
congressional intent in inferring the availability of
that remedy from the prohibition of § 15. It is but a
small step from declaratory relief to a civil action for
the Government’s expenses incurred in removing a
negligently sunk vessel. Having properly chosen to
remove such a vessel, the United States should not lose
the right to place responsibility for removal upon those
who negligently sank the vessel. . . . [R]apid removal by
someone was essential. Wyandotte was unwilling to
effectuate removal itself. It would be surprising if
Congress intended that, in such a situation, the
Government’s commendable performance of Wyandotte’s duty
must be at Government expense.
Id. at 204-05 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted).
III.
The United States gives two reasons why Wyandotte, which
interpreted § 409, should control today’s case brought under § 408.
First, the United States argues that § 408 and § 409 are similar
provisions forming a part of the Rivers and Harbors Act, and that
therefore Wyandotte’s reasoning should apply to cases brought under
both § 408 and § 409. According to the United States, because
Wyandotte rejected the vessel owner’s claim that the exclusive
civil remedy for violations of § 409 was the in rem remedy
expressly provided in § 412, we should follow Wyandotte and imply
an in personam civil remedy for violations of § 408.
Second, the United States argues that Wyandotte requires us to
7
give § 408 an expansive interpretation. In Wyandotte, the Court
stated that “[d]espite some difficulties with the wording of the
[Rivers and Harbors] Act, we have consistently found its coverage
to be broad. And we have found that a principal beneficiary of the
Act, if not the principal beneficiary, is the Government itself.”
Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
Barnacle and Ingram argue that we should not go beyond the
plain language of the Rivers and Harbors Act to determine what
remedies are available for violations of 33 U.S.C. § 408. They
point out that § 411 provides criminal penalties for violations of
§ 408, and § 412 provides an in rem remedy for violations of § 408.
They argue that these remedies are the only remedies Congress
provided and we should not imply an in personam civil remedy.
Barnacle and Ingram also contend that Wyandotte does not
support the implication of an in personam remedy for claims brought
under § 408. Critically, Wyandotte was interpreting § 409 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act, not § 408, the provision at issue in this
case. They contend that § 408 and § 409 are very different
statutes that prohibit different types of conduct and impose
different duties on violators.
Section 409 imposes a duty on the owner, operator, or lessee
of a vessel sunk in a navigable channel to mark and remove the
vessel. Section 408 makes it illegal for any person to damage or
impair a public work used in aid of navigation, but it does not
impose a duty upon any person to repair the public work. From
these differences in the duty imposed on a shipowner under the two
8
statutes, Barnacle and Ingram argue that Congress intended
different remedies to flow to the United States under § 408 and §
409. More specifically, Barnacle and Ingram contend that the terms
of § 409 led the Wyandotte Court to conclude that the United States
could obtain a declaratory judgment declaring the vessel owner
responsible for removing the sunken vessel.8 Section 408 has no
similar language that would permit the United States to obtain a
declaratory order under § 408 declaring that the person who damaged
a public work is responsible for repairing that work.
We agree with Barnacle and Ingram that we should not imply an
in personam remedy in favor of the United States against the
offending shipowner. First, the plain language of § 408, § 411,
and § 412 does not give the United States a civil in personam
remedy against a violator of § 408.9 Second, Wyandotte does not
control this § 408 case because the Wyandotte Court expressly
relied on language peculiar to § 409 in implying an in personam
remedy in favor of the United States against the vessel owner. The
Court observed that § 409 created a duty on the owner of the sunken
8
“[I]t shall be the duty of the owner, lessee, or operator of
such sunken craft to commence the immediate removal of the same,
and prosecute such removal diligently . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 409.
9
“The starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). “When that language is plain we
must abide by it; we may depart from its meaning only to avoid a
result ‘so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.’”
Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc. v. Deltech Corp. 160 F.3d 238, 244 (5th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191, 111
S.Ct. 599, 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991) (quotation omitted)).
9
vessel to remove it. 389 U.S. at 206-07. This duty triggered the
right of the United States to a declaratory judgment directing the
vessel owner to remove the wreck. The Court stated that “[i]t is
but a small step from declaratory relief to a civil action for the
Government’s expenses incurred in removing a negligently sunk
vessel.” Wyandotte, 389 U.S. at 204 (citing United States v. Perma
Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2nd Cir. 1964)).
Because § 408 does not give the United States the right to a
declaratory order requiring the person responsible for damaging or
impairing a public work to repair the work, Wyandotte’s reasons for
implying an in personam remedy under § 409 do not apply in this §
408 case. Our decision is consistent with a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions holding that we should be reluctant to
imply a remedy broader than Congress expressly provided. See e.g.,
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479 (1979),
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 101 S.Ct. 1775 (1981),
Karahalios v. National Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 109
S.Ct. 1282 (1989).
We realize this decision declining to imply an in personam
remedy under § 408 puts us in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.
1977). In Hines, the Sixth Circuit, with very little analysis,
held that Wyandotte controlled. See id. at 720-23. For the
reasons stated above, we respectfully disagree.
IV.
For the above reasons, the orders of the district court
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dismissing the United States from Barnacle and Ingram’s limitation
proceedings are reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
11