UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-40133
DEBORAH ANN GLENN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF TYLER; KYLE RHODES, Tyler Police Officer in his
individual capacity; BRIAN TOMLIN, Tyler Police Officer in his
individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
February 22, 2001
Before JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and BARZILAY*, District
Judge.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Deborah Ann Glenn (“Glenn”) sued the city of Tyler, Texas
(“the city”) and two police officers, Kyle Rhodes (“Rhodes”) and
Brian Tomlin (“Tomlin”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq.,
and for state law claims. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the issue of the officers’ qualified immunity. The
*
Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
1
district court granted summary judgment on the ADA claim but not on
the other claims. The officers and the city timely filed a notice
of interlocutory appeal. As to the officers, this court reverses
and remands.1
I. BACKGROUND
Glenn’s lawsuit is based on the activities surrounding
her arrest for family violence assault. Glenn alleges that: (1)
Officers Rhodes and Tomlin unlawfully arrested her without probable
cause for allegedly assaulting her daughter; (2) she was subjected
to an unlawful search and seizure; (3) Officer Rhodes used
excessive force by intentionally handcuffing her hands too tightly;
and (4) Officers Rhodes and Tomlin violated the ADA. Glenn also
presents state law claims of negligent use of tangible objects and
malicious prosecution.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and that the city
is thus entitled to summary judgment.2 Glenn retorted that genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.
The district court granted the defendants’ summary
judgment motion in part and denied it in part. The court found
that there were fact issues as to: (1) whether the officers’
1
We have no jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory order against
the city, which cannot claim qualified immunity.
2
This court need not discuss the city’s claim because a municipality
does not enjoy immunity from suit under section 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993).
2
actions in arresting Glenn were objectively reasonable; (2) the
circumstances surrounding Glenn’s “seizure”; and (3) the excessive
force claim. However, the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the officers for the ADA claim. The district court did
not address the defendants’ claims of immunity for the state law
claims. The court subsequently denied the defendants’ motion to
alter, amend, or rehear the court’s order denying its summary
judgment motion. The individual defendants and the city filed a
timely notice of appeal.
The district court found that there was no dispute over
the following facts. On the day before the incident, Glenn went to
her daughter Jennifer Clark’s (“Clark”) apartment after several
unsuccessful attempts to contact her. They got into an argument
and the police were called. On the following day, September 29,
1998, Clark went to her mother’s home to retrieve some of her
clothes. Clark and Glenn again began fighting and Clark called the
police. Both the officers and an ambulance were dispatched to
Glenn’s home. As the officers approached the house, they
encountered Glenn, Clark and a family friend, Mr. Rodriguez.
Officer Tomlin spoke with Clark and Rodriguez while Officer Rhodes
went inside the house to speak to Glenn.
Glenn was upset and crying. She told Officer Rhodes that
she did not want her daughter to be arrested. At some point,
Officer Rhodes was told that Glenn has multiple sclerosis. After
3
speaking to Glenn, the two officers conferred. Shortly thereafter,
Glenn was placed under arrest for “assault family violence,”
handcuffed and taken to the police station. Glenn was charged with
assault, although the charges were later dismissed.
The plaintiff’s own summary judgment evidence establishes
at least the following facts. On the previous day, when Glenn went
to her daughter’s house, it was a security guard who called the
police. After the police arrived, they told Clark not to contact
Glenn but to call them the next day so that they could escort Clark
to pick up her clothes at Glenn’s house. The next day, Clark
called the police from her apartment but they did not come. Then,
she went to her mother’s apartment and “got into an argument that
resulted in some physical contact.” Clark called the police and
told the dispatcher “something to the effect that that [sic] my
mother and I had just gotten into a big fight and that we had
beaten the shit out of each other.” The police dispatcher asked if
they needed an ambulance and Clark said “yes.”
When questioned about marks on her body, Clark told the
police that the red splotches on her neck were “hickeys” and not
bruises or bite marks caused by Glenn. In her initial affidavit,
she states that she told the police that her mother pushed her and
pulled her earring out. In a supplemental affidavit, Clark later
averred that she never told the officers that Glenn had bitten her,
assaulted her, or “intentionally” pulled her earring out of her
4
ear, but that she had “said that it was an accident.” She states
that she was “trying to explain to the officers that my earrings
got pulled out while my mother was holding my face in her hands
trying to get me to look at her while I was jerking my head back
and forth.”
Glenn confirms that the two had a “heated argument.”
During her deposition, she stated that her daughter pushed shelves
“over on me” while the two were on the ground. When Officer Rhodes
came into the house to speak with her, she was “hysterically
crying.” Officer Tomlin was outside with Clark and Rodriguez.
Glenn stated that she told Officer Rhodes the “entire story,”
including the fact that another police officer previously told them
to call the police before Clark went to Glenn’s house to pick up
her things. Officer Rhodes informed Glenn that Clark had said that
she had blood on her shirt. When Officer Rhodes asked Glenn if she
had torn Clark’s earring out, she “told him that whenever I put my
hand on [Clark’s] face and she was fighting me that an earring fell
out and it made her ear bleed.”
In response to a question from Officer Rhodes about
whether Glenn had any blood on her, Glenn told him: “I don’t see
any. I’ve got this scratch.” Glenn also acknowledged that she
informed Officer Rhodes that she and Clark had “got[ten] into it.”
However, she denied telling Officer Rhodes that she had grabbed
Clark by the hair.
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Glenn also contends that, once arrested, she was
mistreated. In support of her excessive force claim, Glenn asserts
that Officer Rhodes handcuffed her so tightly that her right hand
became swollen. She claims that she complained that the
handcuffs were too tight. She also asserts that she was left in an
unventilated vehicle which was placed in the “baking sun” for
almost an hour before she was taken to jail, despite her pleas that
she could not take the heat because of her multiple sclerosis.
This, she contends, was an unreasonable search and seizure. The
affidavit of Nancy Francis, a friend who saw Glenn in the police
car, states that the police car windows were closed, the engine and
air conditioner were off, the doors were shut and that the car was
in the sun and it was extremely hot. She also states that both
policemen were “consoling” Clark but not paying attention to Glenn.
Francis opened the door of the police car and saw that
Glenn was crying softly. Glenn allegedly told her that she was
very hot, could not breathe, and was getting sick. Francis further
states that she asked the officer to help her, but that one of the
policemen told her to step away from the car and then slammed the
door shut. Francis avers that she told the officer that Glenn had
multiple sclerosis, was very ill and that Glenn looked like she was
going to faint and could not take the heat of the police car. In
response, France states that the officer told her to stay out of
it. According to Francis, another neighbor shouted to the
6
policeman that Glenn was sick. That neighbor ran over to Glenn’s
door and Officer Rhodes also went to the door and “someone” opened
it. Glenn, according to Francis, began to dry heave. When Francis
tried to tell Officer Rhodes again that Glenn had multiple
sclerosis, the officer continued to yell at her.
Glenn admits that the air conditioner was on in the car
from the time that they left the house to their arrival at the
police station. She also states that when Francis told Officer
Rhodes that Glenn was sick, Officer Rhodes asked if she wanted to
go to the hospital. She told him that she did not need to go to
the hospital. She also did not ask the paramedics who had arrived
by ambulance to check on her. In addition, Glenn admits that
Officer Rhodes “never yelled at me” and that he did not physically
touch her other than placing the handcuffs on her. However, she
asserts that “[h]e showed no concern.” She claims that Officer
Rhodes “taunted” her by telling her that she would have to spend
the night in jail.
II. DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION
Glenn contends that this court does not have jurisdiction
over this interlocutory appeal because the order denying summary
judgment finds that there are disputed fact issues. This court has
jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision to the extent
that it turns on an issue of law. See Lemoine v. New Horizons
7
Ranch & Center, Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1999). The
materiality of factual disputes may be reviewed but not their
genuineness. Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000).
After accepting all of Glenn’s factual allegations as true, this
court may determine as a matter of law whether the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. See Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d
96, 98 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054 (1998). “If
those facts do not materially affect the outcome–i.e., if even
under such a factual scenario the officers’ actions may be deemed
as a matter of law objectively reasonable–the denial of summary
judgment is immediately reviewable as a question of law, and
qualified immunity should be granted.” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213
F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). On the other hand, if there are
disputed factual issues material to qualified immunity, the
district court’s denial of summary judgment is not appealable.
Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 918 (5th Cir. 1995). However, “[t]he
mere allegation of a factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat” a summary judgment motion. Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274,
276 (5th Cir. 1995). This court reviews the district court’s order
denying summary judgment de novo. Hale, 45 F.3d at 918.
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Qualified immunity protects government officials who
perform discretionary functions from liability “unless their
conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional
8
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gibson, 44
F.3d at 276. The qualified immunity analysis is a two-step
process. First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Hale, 45 F.3d at
917. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional
violation, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively
reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the
challenged conduct occurred. Id. “The touchstone of this inquiry
is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct
conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the
information available to him and the clearly established law.”
Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). This
means that “[e]ven law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably but
mistakenly [commit a constitutional violation]’ are entitled to
immunity.” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryan, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112
S.Ct. 534 (1991)).
1. Unlawful Warrantless Arrest Claim
The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported
by a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause. The
officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest if “a
reasonable person in their position could have believed he had
probable cause to arrest” Glenn for assault. Goodson, 202 F.3d at
740. In particular, the “arrest must be based on probable cause,
which exists ‘when the totality of the facts and circumstances
9
within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense.’” Spiller v. Texas City,
130 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1997).
Under Texas law, a police officer may arrest, without a
warrant, “persons who the peace officer has probable cause to
believe have committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to a
member of the person’s family or household.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 14.03(a)(4)(Vernon 1999). A person commits an assault if
she “intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with
another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the
other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (Vernon 1994).
Here, Officer Rhodes arrested Glenn only after he
ascertained that Glenn and Clark had been physically fighting. He
knew that Clark claimed that her mother had pulled her earring out,
causing some bleeding. He also knew that the two had, at a
minimum, pushed each other, and that the altercation resulted in
shelves falling on top of Glenn. In addition, he was aware that
the two had been told not to see each other without police
accompaniment, and that an ambulance had been called. Finally,
Clark had red splotches and blood on her. All of these facts are
undisputed. These, alone, are enough for an officer to reasonably
believe that probable cause exists under Texas law to arrest Glenn.
10
Pushing, by itself, plainly satisfies the standard for assault.
This court is “not willing to second guess the officer . . . who
must act on the spur of the moment if that officer’s action can be
classified as ‘arguably reasonable.’” Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277.3
Officer Rhodes “exercis[ed] reasonable discretion based on his
perception of the circumstances on the scene,” and this court finds
that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983
claim to the extent that it was grounded on a wrongful arrest. Id.
at 277-78.
2. Unreasonable Seizure Claim
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
seizures may be implicated during an arrest. See Valencia v.
Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993). Generally, when
probable cause to arrest exists, “the government’s interests in
enforcing its laws outweigh the suspect’s privacy interest and
arrest of the suspect is reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
Atwater v. City of Lago, 195 F.3d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1999) (cert.
granted). “We deviate from this principle . . . only when an
3
The district court erred in its assessment of the disputed facts,
because those facts are not material to the claim. For example, the court points
out that Glenn testified that she did not know if she caused Clark’s earring to
fall out and that she did not tell Officer Rhodes that she pulled it out. The
court also stated that Glenn testified that she did not tell Officer Rhodes that
she pulled Clark’s hair and that she does not recall biting Clark. The officers
must make an assessment, based on the totality of circumstances, whether probable
cause exists to make an arrest. Whether or not Glenn or Clark told the officers
certain things is immaterial if the surrounding circumstances would validly lead
a reasonable officer to conclude that Glenn assaulted Clark. In addition,
probable cause is not destroyed by a suspect’s denial. See, e.g., Hill v.
California, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1110 (1971). Based on the undisputed facts and those
facts presented by Glenn, the officers acted reasonably.
11
arrest is ‘conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful
to an individual’s privacy or even physical interests.” Id.
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817, 818, 116 S.Ct.
1769, 1776 (1996)). For example, the Supreme Court has found it
necessary to perform a balancing analysis, notwithstanding the
existence of probable cause, where a “search or seizure involves
deadly force, an unannounced entry into a home, entry into a home
without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body.” See id.
(citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 818).
As we have already stated, Officer Rhodes had probable
cause to arrest Glenn. After reviewing the undisputed material
facts and the plaintiff’s evidence, this court concludes that he
did not conduct the arrest in an extraordinary manner. See
Atwater, 195 F.3d at 245. Glenn stated in her affidavit that she
was left in an unventilated vehicle which was placed in the sun for
almost an hour before she was taken to jail and that her multiple
sclerosis was exacerbated by the heat and street. However, as
defendants point out, Glenn stated during her deposition that she
was put in the police car between 4:27 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. She
testified that they then left the house at 4:57 p.m. Glenn also
admitted during her deposition that Officer Rhodes asked if she
wanted to go to the hospital and that she refused. Both
acknowledge that the ambulance was there and that Glenn did not ask
for medical attention. Both also agree that the air conditioner
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was on during the drive from Glenn’s house to the police station.
Based on the evidence presented by Glenn, this arrest was not
conducted in an extraordinary manner and therefore does not amount
to an “unreasonable seizure.”
3. Excessive Use of Force Claim
Finally, Glenn claims that Officer Rhodes used excessive
force. To succeed on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff bears
the burden of showing “‘(1) an injury (2) which resulted directly
and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and
(3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.’” Goodson, 202
F.3d at 740 (quoting Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 766, 703 (5th Cir.
1999)). Although a showing of “significant injury” is no longer
required in the context of an excessive force claim, “we do require
a plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim to have ‘suffered at
least some form of injury.’” Williams, 180 F.3d at 703 (quoting
Jackson v. R.E. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993)). The
injury must be more than a de minimis injury and must be evaluated
in the context in which the force was deployed. Id. In Williams,
for example, this court held that the loss of breath and dizziness
suffered when the suspect was allegedly choked while an officer
searched his mouth did not amount to an cognizable injury. This
court stated that “[w]henever a detainee is physically searched by
an officer, a physical confrontation inevitably results” and
therefore concluded that fleeting dizziness, temporary loss of
13
breath, and coughing did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Id. at 704. Where, however, the suspect was choked a
second time, this court found that the choking rose to the level of
a constitutional violation because the second choking was motivated
by malice. Id.
Other than placing the handcuffs on Glenn, according to
Glenn’s own testimony, Officer Rhodes did not touch her.
Therefore, her sole contention is that the officer put the
handcuffs on her too tightly, causing her right wrist to swell.
This court finds that handcuffing too tightly, without more, does
not amount to excessive force. There is no allegation here that
Officer Rhodes acted with malice.
4. State Claims
Appellants contend that they are entitled to immunity for
Glenn’s two state claims for negligent use of tangible objects and
malicious prosecution. Although the appellants raised this issue
in their summary judgment motion, the district court neither
discussed nor ruled on this issue. “[A]n order denying qualified
immunity under state law is immediately appealable as a ‘final
decision,’ provided that ‘the state’s doctrine of qualified
immunity, like the federal doctrine, provides a true immunity from
suit and not a simple defense to liability.” Cantu v. Rocha, 77
F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, however, there is no final
decision from the district court. Accordingly, this court remands
14
this issue to the district court with instructions to review the
appellants’ claims of immunity regarding Glenn’s state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment
is reversed regarding the officers’ qualified immunity as to the
federal claims. This case is remanded to the district court for a
determination regarding the officers’ claim of immunity on Glenn’s
state claims.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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