UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-31192
Summary Calendar
WILLIAM WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION, LOUISIANA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
(99-CV-333-B)
June 1, 2001
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant William Wilson contests the district
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-
Appellee Formosa Plastics Corporation. Wilson, an African-
American, claims that Formosa’s decision to promote white employees
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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to three supervisory positions amounted to unlawful discrimination
against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Wilson also contends that Formosa breached contractual
obligations arising from its employment policies.
I. Facts
Formosa Plastics Corporation purchased the Baton Rouge
plastics manufacturing plant in 1981. William Wilson worked as
either a lab technician or mechanic at the plant since 1966. The
plant is divided into several sections related to different
manufacturing processes. Before Formosa restructured the chain of
command, each section included a supervisor, who managed the
section, and a planner, who acted as an assistant supervisor.
Formosa also employed Harmony, an independent contractor, which
managed its own employees at the plant.
In 1998, supervisory positions opened in the PVC, VCM-II, and
Powerhouse sections. When the former supervisors resigned, Formosa
decided to restructure the chain of command in the VCM-II and
Powerhouse sections by combining the Supervisor and Planner jobs
into one position. Formosa chose not to restructure the PVC
section.
Formosa put Maintenance Manager Michael Koai in charge of
evaluating candidates for the three supervisory positions. Using
a scale of one to ten, Koai ranked the candidates according to
their experience in the section, communication skills, supervising
experience, and past performance record. Koai included Wilson as
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a candidate for the PVC and VCM-II positions, but decided not to
include Wilson in his consideration for the Powerhouse position due
to Wilson’s lack of experience in that section. After Koai
concluded his review, Formosa promoted Sam Blanchard, the former
Planner in the Powerhouse section, as Supervisor/Planner in the
Powerhouse section; Harold Caminita, the former Planner in the VCM-
II section, as Supervisor/Planner in the VCM-II section; and Gerard
Smith, the Harmony foreman, as the Supervisor in the PVC section.
According to Koai, these three white males were more qualified for
the position than Wilson.
Wilson filed a claim with the EEOC alleging age and race
discrimination.1 After receiving a right to sue letter from the
EEOC, Wilson sued Formosa in the Middle District of Louisiana,
alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and seeking damages for breach of Formosa’s employment policies.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Formosa.
Wilson timely appeals the district court’s final judgment.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court. See Walker v.
Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment is
proper when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
1
The district court dismissed Wilson’s age discrimination claim
under the ADEA for lack of evidence. Wilson does not raise an age
discrimination issue on appeal.
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non-movant, reflects no genuine issues of material fact.”
Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 218
F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1393 (2001).
“If a fact question is dispositive of a motion for summary
judgment, ‘we must review the facts drawing all inferences most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See Walker, 214 F.3d
at 624 (quoting Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1159 (5th Cir.
1989)).
III. Wilson’s Title VII Claim
To survive a motion for summary judgment, a Title VII
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Pratt v. City
of Houston, Texas, 2001 WL 327165, *3 (5th Cir. April 19, 2001).
A prima facie case consists of proof that the plaintiff (1) is a
member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position;
(3) was not promoted; and (4) either the position was filled by
someone not in the protected class, or the person was not promoted
because of his race. See Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas, 197
F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1999). We will presume for purposes of
this appeal that Wilson presented sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case.
Once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its employment decision. See McDonnell
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Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-04. If the employer articulates a
non-discriminatory explanation, the burden once again shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer’s reason was merely pretext
for discrimination. See id.
To review a district court’s order granting summary judgment,
we must determine “whether a rational fact finder could find that
the employer discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of
race.” Pratt, 2001 WL 327165, at *3 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). A “plaintiff’s prima facie
case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). However, “if the
plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the
employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and
uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination
occurred,” summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
Formosa claims that the three white employees were better
qualified for the position than Wilson. According to Formosa’s
uncontradicted evidence, the two employees who filled the
Supervisor/Planner positions in the VCM-II and Powerhouse sections
previously served as the Planner in each of their respective
sections. Under the former management structure, the Planner was
second in the chain of command and would periodically perform the
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Supervisor’s duties. Formosa contends that the Harmony foreman who
filled the PVC Supervisor position was also more qualified than
Wilson. The Harmony foreman had extensive supervisory experience
over the Harmony employees at the Formosa plant and was familiar
with Formosa’s administrative procedures. Formosa also claims that
the former PVC section supervisor recommended the Harmony foreman
as his successor. Formosa argues that Wilson did not have the
supervisory experience or administrative skills to qualify for the
jobs.
Wilson argues that there is sufficient evidence to rebut
Formosa’s non-discriminatory explanation. Wilson claims that Koai
neglected to consider his supervisory experience in comparing him
to the other candidates and that Formosa should have considered him
for the Powerhouse position. He also argues that Formosa’s
original statement to the EEOC that he was not considered for any
position was false, and therefore undermines Formosa’s non-
discriminatory explanation.
Wilson’s arguments fall short of creating an issue of fact
concerning the legitimacy of Formosa’s non-discriminatory reason.
Even if Koai should have considered Wilson for the Powerhouse
position and failed to take account of all Wilson’s supervisory
experience, and even if Formosa misrepresented facts to the EEOC,
there is no evidence that the individuals who Formosa promoted were
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not more qualified than Wilson.2 Wilson has not produced evidence
that his supervisory and administrative experience was comparable
to the individuals who were hired. On the basis of the summary
judgment evidence, a rational factfinder could not conclude that
Formosa intentionally discriminated against Wilson. We therefore
affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
favor of Formosa on Wilson’s Title VII claim.
IV. Breach of Employment Policies
Under Louisiana law, an employment policy may bind the
employer if the policy amounts to a contractual obligation. See
Keller v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 597 So.2d 1113,
1115 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1992). A valid contract requires four
elements: “(1) the parties must possess the capacity to contract;
(2) the parties’ mutual consent must be freely given; (3) there
must be a certain object for the contract; and (4) the contract
must have a lawful purpose.” Id. An employer may also “be
obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the
promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment
and the other party was reasonable in so relying.” LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 1967.
2
Formosa later corrected its original statement to the EEOC that
Wilson was not considered for any of the positions. In light of
the abundant and uncontroverted evidence that Formosa promoted the
most qualified individuals, its originally misstatement creates, at
best, a weak issue of fact as to whether Formosa’s non-
discriminatory reason was false. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
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Louisiana courts have declined to impose contractual
obligations on employers for policies that create only general
guidelines for employment decisions. See Keller, 597 So.2d at
1115; Schwarz v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 699
So.2d 895, 898 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997). However, employment
policies that assure employees that they will receive certain
benefits, combined with evidence that the employees relied on the
policy as a part of their employment contract, may create a binding
obligation. See Fairbanks v. Tulane University, 731 So.2d 983,
985-87 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1999).
Wilson points to the following language in Formosa’s 1-3
Employment Policy:
In filling vacancies, all the Company locations will,
whenever possible, promote a qualified employee to the
position before considering outside applicants. In
pursuing this goal the Company will adhere to the
principles of equal employment opportunity and
affirmative action. This means that all qualified
applicants will receive consideration for employment,
promotions, and transfers regardless of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age or disability.
Wilson contends that Formosa breached a contractual obligation
arising from the policy when it hired the Harmony foreman as
Supervisor of the PVC section and failed to consider Wilson for the
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Powerhouse position. Wilson did not present any evidence of
employee reliance on the policy provision.
We find that Formosa’s policy falls into the category of cases
involving general employment guidelines. See Keller, 597 So.2d at
1115; Schwarz, 699 So.2d at 898. The policy simply states a
preference for promoting qualified applicants within the company
over applicants outside the company and claims that Formosa will
abide by the laws against discrimination when it makes employment
decisions. The policy does not confer a material benefit on which
Wilson reasonably relied. See Fairbanks, 731 So.2d at 985-87
(concluding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment
involving Tulane University’s policy of providing faculty children
with tuition waivers). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of Formosa on Wilson’s
claim for breach of the employment policy.
AFFIRMED
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