IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60610
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STANLEY K. DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:99-CR-71-S-2
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July 23, 2001
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
Stanley K. Davis has filed a notice of appeal from his
guilty-plea conviction for distribution of marijuana, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and (b)(1)(D), and his jury conviction for
conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He first avers
that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of conspiracy to
distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. Davis preserved
this issue for review by moving for judgment of acquittal at the
close of the Government’s case-in-chief and at the close of all the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-60610
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evidence. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
examines the evidence, together with all credibility choices and
reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Maseratti, 1 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir.
1993). The verdict will be upheld if the court concludes that “any
reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
In light of the testimony that (1) between 1998 and 1999
Brad Davis and Davis were in the business of selling
methamphetamine; (2) Brad Davis furnished the methamphetamine and
Davis sold it; (3) on one occasion, Richard Lawrence purchased two
ounces of methamphetamine from Brad Davis; (4) on another occasion,
April 6, 1999, Stanley and Brad Davis sold 42.1 grams of
methamphetamine to Lawrence under DEA surveillance; and (5) Davis
bragged about selling 10 ounces of methamphetamine to a Jackson,
Mississippi, customer, the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that the offense of conviction involved more than 50
grams of methamphetamine.
Davis also avers that since the only seized amount of
drugs was 42.1 grams, and not in excess of 50 grams, his sentence
is unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000). Apprendi has no application to Davis’ case. Apprendi
is “limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the
statutory maximum, and does not invalidate a court’s factual
finding for the purposes of determining the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines.” United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1152 (2001). The indictment
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charged Davis with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in
excess of 50 grams, and the evidence was sufficient beyond a
reasonable doubt to prove the conspiracy charged. Moreover,
because Davis’ 324-month sentence did not exceed the statutory
maximum, his sentence is not invalid under Apprendi. See United
States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 786-87 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1163 (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
Davis avers next that the district court erred in
attributing relevant offense conduct to him because his drug
activity comprising the relevant offense conduct took place prior
to the formation of the conspiracy for which he was convicted.
Alternatively, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to
establish the relevant offense conduct.
“The amount of drugs for which an individual [defendant]
shall be held accountable represents a factual finding that must be
upheld unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d
1539, 1575 (5th Cir. 1994). We have reviewed the record and
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in attributing
the 7,456.05 grams of methamphetamine to Davis as relevant conduct.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
Lastly, Davis avers that the district court erred in
classifying him as a career offender. He contends that his federal
felony conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance may not serve to trigger career-offender status under the
sentencing guidelines. His argument is without merit. The
Sentencing Commission has now lawfully included drug conspiracies
in the category of crimes triggering classification as a career
No. 00-60610
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offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Lightbourn, 115 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.