IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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NO.00-31145
USDC NO. 99-1266
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TERREBONNE HOMECARE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SMA HEALTH PLAN, INC., formerly known as SMA HMO, INC.;
ET AL
Defendants,
HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1 OF THE PARISH OF TERREBONNE,
doing business as Terrebonne General Medical Center and Nursing
Care Home Health Agency,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
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October 17, 2001
Before GARWOOD and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and SARAH S. VANCE,*
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether the artful
pleading doctrine may be invoked to assert federal jurisdiction
over a complaint alleging state antitrust law claims. Because
plaintiff alleged state law claims in a field that is not
*
District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
completely preempted by federal law, the artful pleading doctrine
does not apply. The district court therefore lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, and its orders must be vacated and the case
remanded to state court.
I.
Appellant, Terrebonne Homecare, Inc. ("THI"), a home health
care agency, sued Terrebonne General Medical Center in Louisiana
state court contending that Terrebonne General conspired with its
partially owned HMO to terminate appellant as a preferred
provider and to favor a competing home health care agency that
was owned by Terrebonne General. THI asserted claims for
violations of the Louisiana antitrust laws, the Louisiana unfair
competition statute, the Louisiana Constitution and for breach of
contract. Terrebonne General removed the case to federal court,
relying on the artful pleading doctrine to assert that
appellant’s complaint stated a federal antitrust claim. The
district court denied a motion to remand on the grounds that
appellant’s state antitrust claims were actually federal in
nature because they involved interstate commerce, and Louisiana
antitrust law applied only to intrastate commerce. The district
court concluded that THI had artfully pleaded its complaint to
avoid a necessary federal question. The district court found
that THI’s real claim was a federal antitrust claim, which
provided the basis for removal. After it assumed jurisdiction,
the district court granted summary judgment dismissing all of
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THI’s claims.
II.
We review a denial of a motion to remand de novo. Waste
Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d
781, 783 (5th Cir. 2000); Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch.
Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995).
The well-pleaded complaint rule governs whether a defendant
can remove a case based on the existence of a federal question.
Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475, 118 S. Ct.
921, 925 (1998); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987). Under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S. Ct. at 2429.
The artful pleading doctrine is a narrow exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule, and it prevents a plaintiff from
defeating removal by failing to plead necessary federal
questions. See Rivet, 522 U.S. 470 at 475, 118 S. Ct. 921 at
925; Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 367. The artful pleading doctrine
does not apply, however, unless federal law completely preempts
the field. See Waste Control Specialists, 199 F.3d at 784; see
also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107
S. Ct. 1542, 1546 (upholding removal based on complete preemption
by Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390
3
U.S. 557, 560, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 1237 (1968) (upholding removal
based on preemptive effect of Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S. Ct. at 2430
(stating that once state law has been completely preempted, "any
claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is
considered, from its inception, a federal claim."). In Waste
Control Specialists, we recently observed that the Supreme Court
has left no doubt that complete preemption is necessary for the
artful pleading doctrine to apply:
Without complete preemption, the artful pleading
doctrine does not apply. If this was once a matter of
debate, the Supreme Court recently has put the issue to
rest. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S.
470, 118 S. Ct. 921, 925, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998)
(further citations omitted). Indeed, even prior to
Rivet, this was the rule in this circuit and others.
199 F.3d at 783-84.
Federal antitrust law does not completely preempt state
antitrust laws. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 101-02, 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989) (declaring that Congress
intended federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace,
state antitrust remedies); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 403, 61
S. Ct. 962, 967-68 (1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S.
253, 259-60, 58 S. Ct. 167, 170 (1937); Pounds Photographic Labs,
Inc. v. Noritsu American Corp., 818 F.2d 1219, 1226 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that federal antitrust laws do not completely
preempt Texas antitrust statutes). Accordingly, the artful
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pleading doctrine does not apply here.
The district court reasoned that because THI’s antitrust
claim involved interstate commerce and, in its view, Louisiana’s
antitrust law applies only to intrastate commerce,1 THI’s claim
must be federal in nature. We addressed a similar issue in Waste
Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d
781 (5th Cir. 2000). There, the district court asserted
jurisdiction over a Texas antitrust law claim on the theory that
the claim was federal in nature because Texas antitrust law
applied only to intrastate commerce. After noting the absence of
complete preemption, we held that plaintiff remained the master
of its complaint and that, although it could have alleged a
federal cause of action in its state petition, it did not do so.
199 F.3d at 784. Rather, "[i]t filed a complaint in state court
alleging wholly state claims in a non-preempted field." Id. As
to the viability of the plaintiff’s state law claims, we held,
"[t]hat is for a Texas court to decide." Id. The same reasoning
applies here. If THI’s Louisiana antitrust claim is defective,
that is a question for a Louisiana state court.
1
Whether Louisiana antitrust law applies only to wholly
intrastate conspiracies is not a question that is free from
doubt. See Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 276 (5th
Cir. 1999) (certifying question to Louisiana Supreme Court),
certified question denied by, 739 So. 2d 216 (La. 1999), after
denial of certification, 176 F.3d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1999)
(assuming but not deciding that Louisiana antitrust law applies
to interstate conspiracies that have effects in Louisiana).
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Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter. We vacate its orders and remand
the case to the district court with instructions to remand the
action to the state court from which it was removed.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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