UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50430
Summary Calendar
DANIEL T. MADIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(W-00-CV-27)
_________________________________________________________________
November 5, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Daniel T. Madis appeals the affirmance of the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of his application for disability
insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 405. “Judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits ‘is limited to determining
whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence and
whether the proper legal standards are applied.’” Boyd v. Apfel,
239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001)(quoting Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d
413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, we “must affirm the
Commissioner’s determination unless this court finds that 1) the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard, or 2) that the ALJ’s
determination is not supported by substantial evidence”. Id.
Madis contends that there was not substantial evidence to
support the conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that
he did not suffer a disabling psychological infirmity. Although
Madis notes various physical injuries resulting from two assaults,
he does not challenge on appeal the conclusion that his physical
injuries had healed and did not qualify as disabling. Any such
contention is therefore deemed abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas
County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Next, Madis maintains that the ALJ erred in determining his
psychological anxiety-related problems were not disabling. Many of
Madis’ more severe antisocial problems had been alleviated by
treatment and medication in the past. A medical impairment that
can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment is not
disabling. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 346 (5th Cir. 1988).
Madis also asserts that, because he had undergone only one
psychological analysis, the ALJ should have ordered additional
testing. He provides no support for this assertion. He contends
also that the ALJ should have had a medical expert at the hearing
to analyze the relevance of the psychological information in his
medical records. Although an ALJ may ask for the opinion of a
medical expert at a hearing, it is not mandatory. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(f)(2)(iii), 416.927(f)(2)(iii). Madis has failed to
show that the ALJ’s interpretation of his medical records was
inaccurate.
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Madis next contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the
vocational expert was incomplete because it did not include his
anxiety-based disorders that prevented any contact with society.
A hypothetical is appropriate if it reasonably incorporates all of
the disabilities recognized by the ALJ and if the claimant may
supplement the hypothetical with additional information to correct
any deficiencies in the hypothetical. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d
431, 436 (5th Cir. 1994). The hypothetical included the
infirmities recognized by the ALJ, and Madis’ counsel had an
opportunity to supplement the hypothetical at the evidentiary
hearing. Because Madis’ antisocial tendencies were treatable with
medication, they did not constitute a disability that should have
been included. See Johnson, 864 F.2d at 346.
Finally, to the extent Madis contends the ALJ determined
improperly that Madis could perform other jobs existing in
significant number in the economy, the ALJ properly relied upon the
testimony of the vocational expert that established that such work
was available and that Madis could perform it. See Morris v.
Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1988)(ALJ may rely upon
testimony of vocational expert “in order to determine the nature of
[a claimant’s] disability and the availability of jobs to someone
with such a disability”).
AFFIRMED
3