UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1753
LENA HARDAWAY; ANGELENE HARDAWAY,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL HOLDING LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:13-cv-00149-DKC)
Submitted: October 25, 2013 Decided: December 5, 2013
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lena Hardaway, Angelene Hardaway, Appellants Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pro se Appellants Lena and Angelene Hardaway appeal
the district court’s order denying their motion to file an
amended complaint and dismissing their original complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a
claim. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
A federal court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis
case at any time the court determines the action or appeal is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To
survive the district court’s scrutiny, a complaint filed in
forma pauperis “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We
review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state
a claim. Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320
(4th Cir. 2012).
Angelene Hardaway is a disabled person and Lena is her
sister and guardian. They sought to assert three categories of
claims in their suit against the companies that owned and/or
managed Angelene’s apartment building, The Veridian, located in
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Silver Spring, Maryland: (1) disability discrimination and
retaliation; (2) gender and race discrimination; and
(3) miscellaneous state law claims. It is an understatement to
say that the gist of the claims is obscure, but the district
court seemed to discern, accurately, that the claims arise out
of an ongoing dispute over Angelene’s apartment lease agreement.
Indeed, in a prior action, the district court issued a
comprehensive memorandum opinion and order dismissing claims
that largely track the claims asserted in this case. See
Hardaway v. Equity Residential Management, LLC, 2012 WL 3903489
(D.Md. Sept. 6, 2012).
It appears the district court dismissed the disability
discrimination and retaliation claims on the basis of collateral
estoppel, relying on its earlier opinion and order. The
doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of
issues of fact or law that are identical to issues actually
determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation that
resulted in a final judgment on the merits in which the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate. Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468
F.3d 213, 217–18 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court erred,
however, in concluding summarily on the bare record before it,
that the Hardaways’ prior claims, asserted against different
defendants from those sued here, were precluded as a matter of
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law. This is because, as the Hardaways assert in their informal
brief on appeal, the claims alleged here arose after the
district court had dismissed their earlier case. Specifically,
they contend that here they complain of acts and omissions
occurring on and after November 12, 2012. Accordingly, it
remains to be seen whether the prior action operates as a bar to
the disability and retaliation claims alleged here.
Turning to the Hardaways’ claims of race and gender
discrimination, the court dismissed the claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, citing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. But the
Hardaways do not assert employment claims, and the protections
of Title VII are not at issue. Accordingly, whether any
exhaustion requirement applies to their ostensible race and
gender claims has not been resolved on the present record.
Finally, the district court did not address the
Hardaways’ state claims in its final order. Although the
district court seemingly declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims, the amended complaint alleged
the existence of diversity of citizenship. The complaint
alleged that the Hardaways are citizens of Connecticut and
Maryland, and that the Defendants are citizens of Illinois and
Delaware, and that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
If true, the court had diversity jurisdiction over the
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Hardaways’ state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The
district court did not address these allegations. Accordingly,
we vacate the dismissal of the Hardaways’ state law claims.
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings. We express no view as to how
the district court might best proceed upon remand, or whether
any asserted claims might survive further preliminary
proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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