13‐1475
Russo v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
3 New York, on the 6th day of December, two thousand thirteen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
7 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 JOHN G. KOELTL,*
10 District Judge.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 Paul Russo,
14
15 Plaintiff‐Appellant,
16 v. 13‐1475
17
18 GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al.,
19
20 Defendants‐Appellees.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Paul Russo, pro se, Guilford, Connecticut
*
Judge John G. Koeltl, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
1 FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: Marissa Delinks, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP,
2 Boston, Massachusetts
3 Gerald A. Gordon, Hunt Leibert Jacobson, P.C.,
4 Hartford, Connecticut
5 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
6 Connecticut (Covello, J.).
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
8 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
9 Appellant Paul Russo, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s
10 judgment dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
11 Rooker‐Feldman doctrine. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
12 facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
13 On appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter
14 jurisdiction, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
15 conclusions de novo. Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008) (per
16 curiam). A complaint must be dismissed “when the district court lacks the statutory
17 or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113
18 (2d Cir. 2000). We can also affirm the district court’s dismissal “on any basis for
19 which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds
20 upon which the district court did not rely.” Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine
2
1 Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). While
2 we disfavor dismissing a complaint without giving a pro se litigant an opportunity
3 to amend, leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile. See Cuoco v.
4 Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
5 United States District Courts lack subject matter jurisdiction under the
6 Rooker‐Feldman doctrine over claims that effectively challenge state court judgments.
7 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (holding that
8 “a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state
9 court in judicial proceedings”); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)
10 (recognizing that “no court of the United States other than [the Supreme Court]
11 could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [a state court’s] judgment for
12 errors”). This jurisdictional prohibition covers challenges to “cases arising out of
13 judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was
14 unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. Specifically, the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine
15 acts as a jurisdictional bar to cases: 1) “brought by state‐court losers,” 2)
16 “complaining of injuries caused by state‐court judgments,” 3) that were “rendered
17 before the district court proceedings commenced,” and 4) “inviting district court
18 review and rejection of those state court judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
19 Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
3
1 Here, the district court properly held that many of Russo’s claims against the
2 defendants were barred by the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine because: (1) Russo lost in
3 state court; (2) his injuries stemmed directly from the state court’s foreclosure
4 judgment; (3) Russo filed his action in the district court after the state court
5 judgment had been rendered; and (4) by seeking a court order prohibiting Appellee
6 GMAC Mortgage, LLC from taking possession of, or foreclosing on, his property,
7 Russo’s requested relief required the district court to review and reject the state
8 court’s foreclosure judgment. See Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d
9 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005). It does not matter that the plaintiff added parties to the federal
10 action who were not parties to the state action. The Rooker‐Feldman doctrine bars
11 “cases . . . brought by state‐court losers complaining of injuries caused by state‐court
12 judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
13 district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284
14 (emphasis added); see also Joseph v. Cohen, 66 Fed. App’x 278, 280 (summary order)
15 (applying the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine and rejecting the appellant’s argument that
16 her federal action was distinct form her state‐court action because the federal action
17 “included additional defendants and asserted other alleged improper actions by
18 defendants”).
4
1 To the extent that any of Russo’s claims do not fall under Rooker‐Feldman’s
2 jurisdictional bar, the claims are barred by claim preclusion. A “federal court must
3 give a state‐court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that
4 judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”
5 OʹConnor v. Pierson, 568 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Under
6 Connecticut law, claim preclusion provides that “[a] valid, final judgment rendered
7 on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent
8 action between the same parties . . . upon the same claim or demand.” Gaynor v.
9 Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 595‐96 (2002) (internal citation omitted). Connecticut courts
10 have adopted “a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action
11 involves the same claim as an earlier action.” Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69 Conn. App. 279,
12 296 (2002). Claim preclusion prevents not only claims that “were actually made”
13 but also those that arise out of the same transaction and “might have been made”
14 in the original proceeding. LaSalla v. Doctor’s Associates, Inc., 278 Conn. 578, 590
15 (2006). The claims that Russo raises here both arise from the same transaction that
16 was litigated in the foreclosure proceeding and could have been raised in that
17 proceeding. Thus, they are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
18
5
1 Finally, the district court did not err in denying Russo leave to amend because
2 amendment would have been futile in light of the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine and claim
3 preclusion.
4 We have considered Russo’s remaining arguments and find them to be
5 without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
6 FOR THE COURT:
7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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