13-2397
Russo v. DiLieto
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 19th day of May, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 CHESTER J. STRAUB,
8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 PAUL ANDREW RUSSO, PRIVATE
13 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
14
15 Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17 v. 13-2397
18
19 EDWARD DILIETO, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND
20 PRIVATE CAPACITY; STATE MARSHAL
21 COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF
22 ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES; THOMAS
23 TERRIBILE, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND
24 PRIVATE CAPACITY; GUILFORD POLICE
25 DEPARTMENT; CITY OF GUILFORD; DOES,
26 1 THROUGH 30 INCLUSIVE,
27
28 Defendants-Appellees.
29 ____________________________________
1 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: PAUL ANDREW RUSSO, pro se,
2 Guilford, CT.
3
4 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: JOSEPH BREE BURNS, Rome
5 McGuigan, P.C., Hartford, CT for
6 Defendant-Appellee Edward
7 DiLieto.
8
9 CARMEL A. MOTHERWAY, Assistant
10 Attorney General, Connecticut
11 Office of the Attorney General,
12 Hartford, CT for Defendants-
13 Appellees State Marshal
14 Commission and Department of
15 Administrative Services.
16
17 MICHAEL T. RYAN, Ryan Ryan
18 Deluca LLP, Stamford, CT for
19 Defendants-Appellees Thomas
20 Terribile, Guilford Police
21 Department, and City of
22 Guilford.
23
24 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
25 Court for the District of Connecticut (Covello, J.).
26
27 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
28 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
29 AFFIRMED.
30
31 Paul Andrew Russo, pro se, appeals from the district
32 court’s judgment dismissing his complaint for lack of
33 subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
34 doctrine. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
35 underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and
36 the issues presented for review.
37
38 On appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for
39 lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review factual
40 findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. See
41 Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008)
42 (per curiam). A complaint must be dismissed “when the
43 district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power
44 to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,
2
1 113 (2d Cir. 2000). While we disfavor dismissing a
2 complaint without giving a pro se litigant an opportunity to
3 amend, leave to amend is not necessary when it would be
4 futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
5 2000).
6
7 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts lack
8 subject matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively
9 challenge state court judgments. See District of Columbia
10 Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (“[A]
11 United States District Court has no authority to review
12 final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.”);
13 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)
14 (“[N]o court of the United States other than [the Supreme
15 Court] could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [a
16 state court’s] judgment for errors . . . .”). This
17 jurisdictional rule bars challenges to “cases arising out of
18 judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that
19 the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” Feldman,
20 460 U.S. at 486. Specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
21 acts as a jurisdictional bar to cases: (1) “brought by
22 state-court losers,” (2) “complaining of injuries caused by
23 state-court judgments,” (3) that were “rendered before the
24 district court proceedings commenced,” and (4) “inviting
25 district court review and rejection of those [state court]
26 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
27 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
28
29 As the district court held, Russo’s claims were barred
30 by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because: (1) Russo lost in
31 state court; (2) his injuries stemmed directly from the
32 state court’s foreclosure judgment; (3) Russo filed his
33 action in the district court after the state court judgment
34 had been rendered; and (4) Russo’s requested relief (an
35 order prohibiting eviction or foreclosure) required the
36 district court to review and reject the state court’s
37 foreclosure judgment. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of
38 Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005). It does not
39 matter that Russo added parties to the federal action who
40 were not parties to the state action.
41
42 The district court did not err in denying Russo leave
43 to amend, because amendment would have been futile in light
44 of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
45
3
1 We have considered all of Russo’s remaining arguments
2 and conclude that they are without merit. The judgment of
3 the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
4
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
7
8
4