UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1968
CATHY D. BROOKS-MCCOLLUM; SAMUEL J. MCCOLLUM,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
THE RESERVE @ ELK RIVER, (With Permission Of the Court upon
Indemnification Ruling and within Corporate Document),
Plaintiff,
v.
ASPEN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT COMPANY; BRADFORD L. CARILLO, JR.;
ALLISON FENWICK; MICHAEL NEALL & ASSOCIATES; ADELAIDE ARKU;
DAVID O’CONNOR; EUNITA BOOKER; MRA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
COMPANY; MCMULLEN & DRURY PA; RICHARD W. DRURY; PAUL TRAPANI;
NORMAN ANDERSON; MICHAEL S. NEALL; SCOTT J. SILVERMAN; NAGLE
& ZALLER, P.C.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-00324-JFM)
Submitted: November 14, 2013 Decided: January 8, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cathy D. Brooks-McCollum; Samuel J. McCollum, Appellants Pro Se.
Eric H. Haversack, HYATT & WEBER, PA, Annapolis, Maryland; Scott
Jon Silverman, Erin Kathleen Voss, NAGLE & ZALLER PC, Columbia,
Maryland; Michael Stuart Neall, MICHAEL NEALL & ASSOCIATES,
Annapolis, Maryland; Richard Warren Drury, MCMULLEN, DRURY &
PINDER, PA, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Cathy D. Brooks-McCollum and Samuel J. McCollum,
Plaintiffs, appeal the district court’s order dismissing their
complaint, as amended, against the Defendants. Plaintiffs
alleged numerous claims under Maryland state law and violations
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that they had
plausibly asserted violations of the FCRA and the FDCPA. We
affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(1).”
Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 408
(4th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs have the burden of proving subject
matter jurisdiction. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of
Caroll Cnty., Md., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008). We also
review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), accepting factual allegations in the complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Montgomery
Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
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“facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The only plausible basis for jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
action is federal question jurisdiction, with the FCRA and the
FDCPA providing the hooks for supplemental jurisdiction over the
alleged state claims. * See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367 (2006).
Although Plaintiffs have alleged violations of federal statutes,
a federal court may dismiss claims invoking federal question
jurisdiction for want of subject matter jurisdiction if the
claims are not “colorable,” such as claims that are “wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 513 n.10 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dixon
v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 818-19 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). Our review leads us to conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims
are not “wholly insubstantial or frivolous,” Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
at 513 n.10, in light of Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants
*
Although the district court did not identify the documents
upon which it relied in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, we have considered the allegations in
Plaintiffs’ complaint and the relevant documents attached to the
motion to dismiss. See CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts
may consider the complaint itself and any documents that are
attached to it.”); Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare,
Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) (providing that courts
may consider a document attached to motion to dismiss if the
document “was integral to and explicitly relied on in the
complaint and if the plaintiffs do not challenge its
authenticity”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
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attempted to collect their past-due homeowner’s association fees
and assessments through unlawful means.
Nonetheless, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to state a
claim under the FCRA because they did not allege at any point
that any Defendant was a credit reporting agency for purposes of
the FCRA or that any Defendant requested or used a credit
report. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(f), 1681n(a) (2012); Ausherman v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 2003).
We also conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim under the FDCPA. The officers of the homeowner’s
association are not debt collectors under the FDCPA, see 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(4), (6)(A) (2012), nor is MRA Property Management
Company, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2012). To the extent
the remaining Defendants may be considered debt collectors under
the FDCPA, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint did not allege any
violations of the FDCPA that occurred within one year of
Plaintiffs’ filing of the instant action. See 15 U.S.C. §
1692k(d) (2012) (providing a one-year statute of limitations
starting from the date of the violation of the statute).
Finally, in the absence of a federal question, the district
court did not err by declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3) (2006).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the action, deny all of Plaintiffs’ motions filed on appeal, and
deny as moot Defendants’ motions to strike. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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