UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4461
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CAESAR PONCE RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Cora
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00362-NCT-2)
Submitted: January 13, 2014 Decided: January 22, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Rafael Rodríguez, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Sandra Jane
Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Caesar Ponce Rodriguez appeals his conviction and
eighty-six-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). On appeal, counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether the court adequately complied with Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 in conducting the plea colloquy and whether it
imposed a reasonable sentence. Rodriguez was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so.
The Government has declined to file a response brief. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court
must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant
of, and determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of
the charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible
penalty he faces, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the rights
he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
The court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary, supported
by an independent factual basis, and not the result of force,
threats, or promises outside the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(2), (3).
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Because Rodriguez did not assert in the district court
any error in the plea proceedings, we review the adequacy of his
plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. Massenburg, 564
F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009). To establish plain error,
Rodriguez must demonstrate that (1) the district court erred,
(2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his
substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1121, 1126 (2013). In the guilty plea context, an error affects
a defendant’s substantial rights if he demonstrates a reasonable
probability that he would not have pled guilty but for the
error. Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343. Even if these requirements
are met, we will “exercise our discretion to correct the error
only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Our review of the record reveals that the district
court substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11 in
conducting the plea colloquy. While the court made minor
omissions or misstatements during the colloquy, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), (N), we are satisfied that any error did
not affect Rodriguez’s substantial rights. See Massenburg, 564
F.3d at 343. The court otherwise complied with the requirements
of Rule 11, ensuring that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and
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supported by a factual basis. We therefore find the plea valid
and enforceable.
We review Rodriguez’s sentence for reasonableness,
applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We “must first ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error,” including improper calculation of the Guidelines range,
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, and inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
575 (4th Cir. 2010). In explaining the basis for its sentence,
“a court need not robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection,” but need only provide “some indication” that it
considered the § 3553(a) factors as they apply to the defendant
and any nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties. United
States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006). The
rationale “need not be elaborate or lengthy,” but it must be
“tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit
meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If we find no procedural error, we examine the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence under “the totality of
the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy
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the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume
that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable,
and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 379
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and discern no
error in Rodriguez’s sentence. The court properly calculated
Rodriguez’s Guidelines range and sentenced him within this range
and the statutory sentencing range applicable to his offense.
Although the court’s explanation for its sentence was brief, it
was sufficiently grounded in the § 3553(a) factors and provided
adequate explanation for its reasoning to support the sentence.
Rodriguez also fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his within-Guidelines sentence. See Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d at 379.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Rodriguez’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Rodriguez, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Rodriguez requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Rodriguez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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