UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4641
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TREVOR D. JAMES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:09-cr-00265-GRA-1)
Submitted: January 23, 2014 Decided: January 27, 2014
Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Trevor James pled guilty to making a false statement
to a federal agent and was sentenced in 2009 to five years of
probation. In August 2013, the district court revoked James’
probation and sentenced him to fourteen months of imprisonment
after James admitted to violating a condition of his probation.
On appeal, James’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the
revocation sentence is reasonable. James was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done
so. Finding no error, we affirm.
Upon finding a probation violation, the district court
may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any
sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d
505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). “[W]e review probation revocation
sentences, like supervised release revocation sentences, to
determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). We first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we determine that a
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
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“decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at
439.
Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along
with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012),
“‘the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (quoting United
States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656–57.
In addition, “[t]he court must provide a statement of reasons
for the sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing
procedure, but this statement ‘need not be as specific as has
been required’” for original sentences. Moulden, 478 F.3d at
657 (quoting Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). We have thoroughly
reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence imposed is
both procedurally and substantively reasonable; it follows,
therefore, that the sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform James, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If James requests that a
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petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on James. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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