UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4574
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDRE JERYANN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00117-FDW-1)
Submitted: January 27, 2014 Decided: February 12, 2014
Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Director, Elizabeth A. Blackwood, Ann Hester,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andre Jeryann Jones pled guilty in 2006 to being a
felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to seventy
months’ imprisonment. He began his term of supervised release
on April 12, 2012. In May 2013, Jones’ probation officer filed
a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging three
violations. At the hearing, Jones admitted to one of the
violations — testing positive for marijuana, a Grade C
violation. The district court revoked Jones’ supervised
release.
With a criminal history category of VI, Jones’ Policy
Statement range was eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment. See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 7B1.4(a) (2012). The
statutory maximum was twenty-four months’ imprisonment. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). The court imposed a ten-month
term, followed by twenty-four months of supervised release.
Jones noted a timely appeal. Jones’ attorney has filed a brief
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in
which he asserts that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether Jones’ sentence is plainly unreasonable.
Although advised of his right to file a supplemental pro se
brief, Jones has not done so.
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
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States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the governing statutory range and not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439–40
(4th Cir. 2006). Before determining whether the sentence is
“plainly unreasonable” we must decide whether it is
unreasonable. Id. at 438. In doing so, the court “follow[s]
generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in
reviewing original sentences. Id.
A sentence or revocation is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered the policy statements
contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440, and has adequately explained the sentence chosen, though
it need not explain the sentence in as much detail as when
imposing the original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, after
considering the above, the appeals court decides that the
sentence is not unreasonable, it should affirm. Id. at 439. In
this initial inquiry, the court takes a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than it
does applying the reasonableness review to post-conviction
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Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this court finds the sentence
unreasonable must the court decide whether it is “plainly” so.
Id. at 657.
We find that Jones’ sentence is not unreasonable. A
review of the record establishes that the district court
considered the advisory Policy Statement range and took into
account specific § 3553(a) factors (e.g., need for deterrence,
nature and circumstances of the offense, and history and
characteristics of the defendant) in determining the proper
sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Jones’ ten-month
revocation sentence was not unreasonable, nor was it plainly so.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the revocation of Jones’ supervised release
and his sentence. This court requires that counsel inform
Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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