FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAMARA GRIGORYAN, No. 10-70746
Petitioner, Agency No. A099-449-917
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS, N.R. SMITH, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Tamara Grigoryan, native of the Soviet Union and citizen of Armenia,
petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of her applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
(CAT) based upon Grigoryan’s lack of credibility and her failure to corroborate her
claims of persecution. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards
governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act.
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for
review.
1. The BIA found that Grigoryan was not credible based on several
inconsistencies and contradictory testimony. None of the cited inconsistencies and
contradictions were supported by substantial evidence. “[T]he BIA must provide a
petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived
inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of asylum.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 362
F.3d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the agency failed to afford Grigoryan with the
opportunity to offer an explanation. Further, to the extent that the BIA concluded
that Grigoryan’s testimony was vague, this conclusion also fails because Grigoryan
was not given an opportunity to clarify her testimony. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 361
F.3d 1194, 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[U]nclear [or vague] testimony may not
serve as substantial evidence for an adverse credibility finding when an applicant is
not given the chance to attempt to clarify his or her testimony.”). Therefore,
substantial evidence does not support the adverse credibility determination.
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2. Despite the BIA’s adverse credibility finding, the BIA concluded, in the
alternative, that her testimony was confusing and did not meet her burden of proof.
Therefore, corroboration of her testimony was required. See Ren v. Holder, 648
F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011). The IJ provided notice to Grigoryan on numerous
occasions that corroboration was necessary or that she needed third party
corroboration that the corroborating evidence would not be available. The matter
was continued several times with the warning that she needed to corroborate her
claim. Grigoryan failed to do so. Therefore, she was afforded a sufficient
opportunity to obtain the evidence. Id. at 1093-94. As a result, substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Grigoryan failed to corroborate her
claim. The BIA “was not compelled to conclude that [Grigoryan] met [her] burden
of proof without the corroborating evidence . . . requested.” Id. at 1094.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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