IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30339
Summary Calendar
RONALD WILLIAMS
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee
--------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-3864-C
--------------------
January 15, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ronald Williams, Louisiana prisoner # 100849, appeals the
district court’s application of the procedural default doctrine
and the court’s refusal to review several of Williams’ 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 claims. The district court determined that Williams’
claims of 1) discrimination in the selection of the grand jury
foreperson, 2) an unconstitutional reasonable-doubt instruction
under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), 3) improper
prosecutorial comments affecting the fairness of Williams’ trial,
and 4) discrimination with the selection of the petit jury under
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-30339
-2-
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 89 (1986), had been denied by the
state habeas courts based on Williams’ failure to raise a
contemporaneous objection to each of these issues in the trial
court. A certificate of appealability was granted on whether the
district court erred in applying the procedural default doctrine
to these claims.
Federal habeas review of a claim is procedurally barred if
the last state court to consider the claim “clearly and
expressly” based its denial of relief on an “independent and
adequate” state procedural rule. Glover v. Cain, 128 F.3d 900,
902, (5th Cir. 1997); see Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d at 250,
254 (5th Cir. 1999). Even if Williams’ failure to raise a
contemporaneous objection with respect to the above listed habeas
claims would have barred review of the claims in state court,
“the mere existence of a procedural default does not deprive
federal courts of jurisdiction.” Bledsue, 188 F.3d at 250, 256
(5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). To prohibit federal
collateral review, “the state court must have expressly relied on
the procedural bar as the basis for disposing of the case.” Id.
None of the state court judgments addressing the four § 2254
claims expressly indicated that the denial of relief was based on
an independent and adequate state law. The application of the
procedural default doctrine to these claims was error. The
judgment of the district court dismissing these claims as
procedurally barred is VACATED, and this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings.