13-140
Kudishev v. Holder
BIA
Page, IJ
A078 521 004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th
4 day of February, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 AMALYA L. KEARSE,
8 RALPH K. WINTER,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12
13 GENNADY KUDISHEV, AKA GENNADI
14 KUDISHEV, AKA GENNADY GAVRILETS,
15 AKA GENNADIY ANDREYEVICH
16 GAVRILETS,
17 Petitioner,
18
19 v. 13-140
20
21 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
22 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
23 Respondent.
24
25
26 FOR PETITIONER: Alexander G. Rojas, Barst Mukamal-
27 Kleiner, LLP, New York, N.Y.
28
29 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
30 General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant
1 Branch Director; Matthew A. Connelly,
2 Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
3 Litigation, United States Department of
4 Justice, Washington, D.C.
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
8 DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
9 Gennady Kudishev, a native of Uzbekistan and citizen of the
10 Russian Federation, seeks review of a December 20, 2012, decision
11 of the BIA, affirming the December 14, 2010, decision of
12 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Alan Page denying his applications for a
13 waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration
14 and Nationality Act (“INA”), and for adjustment of status. In re
15 Gennady Kudishev, No. A078 521 004 (B.I.A. Dec. 20, 2012), aff’g
16 No. A078 521 004 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 14, 2010). We assume
17 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
18 history in this case.
19 When the BIA’s decision affirms the IJ’s holding but
20 modifies or supplements it, we consider the decision of the IJ as
21 modified or supplemented by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.
22 Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v.
23 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
24 standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C.
25 § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510,
26 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
2
1 I. Inadmissibility
2 Kudishev first challenges the agency’s determination that he
3 is inadmissible based on its finding that he willfully concealed
4 a material fact when applying for lawful permanent resident
5 (“LPR”) status. Willful misrepresentation or concealment of a
6 material fact to procure an immigration benefit renders an alien
7 inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). A fact is material
8 if it “has a natural tendency to influence or was capable of
9 influencing[] the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it
10 was addressed.” Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 553 (2d Cir.
11 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 Here, the IJ reasonably found that when Kudishev applied for
13 adjustment of status in 2000, he knew of and thus willfully
14 concealed the fact that he had been charged in 1998 with the
15 murder of his former business partner. Kudishev indicated in his
16 application that he had never been charged with or indicted for
17 violating a law. However, as the IJ reasonably found, Kudishev
18 had a number of opportunities prior to applying for adjustment to
19 discover that a warrant for his arrest had issued on November 11,
20 1998: when speaking about the murder with his ex-wife, who was
21 present when police searched his apartment and who testified at
22 the trial of his alleged co-conspirators, and speaking with his
23 business associates and adult children in Russia after his
24 arrival in the United States. Based on this circumstantial
3
1 evidence, the BIA reasonably found that Kudishev in fact knew
2 about the charge and sought to evade capture given that he
3 departed Russia shortly before the search and arrest warrants
4 were issued, married a U.S. citizen and adopted her surname, and
5 touted his innocence in a handwritten letter to a Russian court
6 included with a 2003 petition filed by his purported attorney.
7 Substantial evidence therefore supports the IJ’s knowledge and
8 willfulness findings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
9 (“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
10 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
11 contrary”); see also Yanqin Weng, 562 F.3d at 513 (providing that
12 factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence).
13 As to materiality, the IJ did not err in finding that
14 Kudishev’s murder charge would have a “natural tendency” to
15 influence the adjudication of his adjustment application.
16 Adjustment of status is ultimately a discretionary form of
17 relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). In deciding how to exercise
18 discretion, the agency may weigh adverse factors, including an
19 applicant’s conduct that may or may not have led to a conviction.
20 See Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2010).
21 Accordingly, Kudishev’s murder charge was capable of influencing
22 the agency’s discretionary determination and was, thus, material.
23 See Monter, 430 F.3d at 558.
24 Once the Government has established a willful concealment of
25 material fact, it is presumed that the benefit sought would not
4
1 have been granted but for the concealment. See id. The burden
2 then shifts to the applicant to demonstrate otherwise. See id.
3 Here, because Kudishev did not proffer any evidence challenging
4 the proof of his indictment or evidence that he would, despite
5 the charge, be granted a favorable exercise of discretion, he did
6 not rebut the presumption that he would not have procured LPR
7 status but for concealing the charge. The IJ therefore did not
8 err in finding Kudishev inadmissible and ineligible for
9 adjustment of status. See id.; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i),
10 1255(a).
11 II. Waiver of Inadmissibility
12 Although we lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s
13 discretionary denial of Kudishev’s waiver application, we may
14 review constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C.
15 §§ 1182(i)(2), 1252(a)(2)(B), (D). Kudishev raises
16 constitutional claims by arguing that the IJ denied him due
17 process, but his arguments are frivolous and thus insufficient to
18 invoke our jurisdiction. See Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516
19 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review any
20 legal argument that is so insubstantial and frivolous as to be
21 inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.”).
22 Contrary to Kudishev’s argument, the IJ was not required to
23 reject the Government’s unauthenticated evidentiary submissions
24 simply because they were photographic copies. Because the
5
1 Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration
2 proceedings, the admission of evidence need only satisfy due
3 process of law. See Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.
4 2008). Due process requires that evidence be probative and its
5 use fundamentally fair. See id. The Government submitted the
6 search and arrest warrants and sentencing report from the Russian
7 prosecutor’s office and INTERPOL with translations and the
8 mailings’ respective cover letters, thereby establishing a chain
9 of custody and reliability. Accordingly, for the limited purpose
10 of establishing that Kudishev had been charged with murder and
11 knew of the charge, the IJ reasonably found the Government’s
12 documents probative and did not violate due process by admitting
13 them. See id.
14 Kudishev’s assertion that the IJ was biased because he
15 considered his murder charge serious is also frivolous as
16 consideration of such adverse factors is necessary in determining
17 how to exercise discretion. See Argueta, 617 F.3d at 113; see
18 also Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring
19 remand on a showing that apparent bias precluded meaningful
20 review). Kudishev therefore fails to raise a colorable
21 constitutional claim or question of law regarding the denial of
22 his waiver application. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)(2),
23 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).
24
25
6
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
3
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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