13-3073
Obot v. Bailey
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
2 the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
3 on the 4th day of March, two thousand fourteen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 Otu A. Obot,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 13-3073
17
18 Ekaete O. Bailey,
19
20 Defendant-Appellee.
21 _____________________________________
22
23
24 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Otu A. Obot, pro se, Amherst, NY.
25
26 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Ekaete O. Bailey, pro se, Buffalo, NY.
27
28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New
29 York (Arcara, J.).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
2 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3 Appellant Otu A. Obot, pro se, appeals from a final judgment sua sponte dismissing his 42
4 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
5 claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the
6 case, and the issues on appeal.
7 We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint de novo. See McEachin v.
8 McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). “[T]he exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is left
9 to the discretion of the district court, and this court’s review is limited to whether the district court
10 abused its discretion.” Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994); see 28 U.S.C. §
11 1367(c) (stating that the district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
12 claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).
13 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of
14 factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”
15 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). After an independent review of the
16 record and relevant case law, we affirm for substantially the reasons articulated by the district court
17 judge in his decision entered August 5, 2013.
18 We have considered all of Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
19 merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
20
21 FOR THE COURT:
22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
23
24
2