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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-12441
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-20586-JAL
JACK L. PRICE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 6, 2014)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jack Price, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Price argued that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to strike a prospective juror whose responses during voir dire
suggested that she thought a defendant should testify at trial. We issued a
certificate of appealability to resolve “[w]hether the district court erred in finding
that Price’s consent to the jury panel precluded him from establishing that counsel
was ineffective for failing to challenge juror Magda Brau for cause.” Because it
was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for the
Florida courts to conclude that Price could not argue that counsel had been
ineffective for failing to strike a juror that Price had approved, we affirm.
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the jury panel if they “would expect
Mr. Price or any defendant to sit on that witness stand and testify.” Juror Brau’s
responses arguably suggested that she thought a defendant should testify:
Mr. Friedman: . . . Do you understand [the defendant] has no burden
whatsoever placed upon him and that is the way the law is created.
The defendant doesn’t have to defend himself or he doesn’t have to do
anything?
Prospective Juror Brau: Doesn’t he want to help himself because he
already hired you? Doesn’t he want to help himself as well?
Mr. Friedman: Perhaps the evidence states that the case against Mr.
Price is so week (sic) that he doesn’t have to get in the witness stand.
That is a possibility. Perhaps he is the type of individual who doesn’t
speak well in front of others and he gets so nervous and fluster[ed]
that he wouldn’t present himself as a good witness. There could be
multiple scenarios of why a person choses (sic) not to testify for
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himself. You understand the way our legal system [was] created, the
fifth amendment doesn’t allow you to incriminate against yourself.
They have to proffer everything. Ms. Brau?
Prospective Juror Brau: As far as I am concerned, he is here. Why is
he here? Wouldn’t he have to go up there to say why he is here?
Mr. Friedman: Are you saying there are absolutely no scenarios where
a person who does not testify on his own behalf end up being found
[not] guilty. That is possible isn’t it?
Prospective Juror Brau: I am sure it is. I haven’t—I don’t know. It
feels like he should defend himself.
Mr. Friedman: I appreciate your honesty.
Defense counsel and the State accepted Juror Brau for the petit jury. Before
the jurors returned to the courtroom, the district court asked Price if he was
satisfied with the jurors seated by his attorney, and he responded affirmatively.
The Court: Mr. Price, you have been sitting here throughout this
process. Do you agree with the jurors that have been selected by your
lawyer?
The Witness [Price]: Yes, I do.
The jury convicted Price of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. See
Fla. Stat. §§ 775.087, 784.045(1)(a)(2). The verdict form stated that Juror Brau
served as the foreperson of the jury. The Florida court sentenced Price to 15 years
of imprisonment. Later, the state appellate court affirmed Price’s conviction and
sentence. Price v. State, 932 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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Price filed a motion for postconviction relief, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850,
which a Florida court denied. Relevant to this appeal, Price argued that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to remove Brau from the jury panel. Price
argued that Brau was biased because she thought he needed to prove his innocence
and that he was prejudiced because Brau served as the foreperson of the jury. The
Florida court ruled that Price could not acquiesce in counsel’s decision to select
Brau as a juror and later relitigate that decision in a collateral proceeding under the
guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state appellate court affirmed
summarily. Price v. State, 986 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Price filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and raised the same
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court accepted the
recommendation of a magistrate judge and denied Price’s petition. The district
court ruled that “Price produced no evidence proving trial counsel’s deficiency”
when “Price consented to the selection of the jury, including Brau” and the “denial
of [Price’s] claim [was] not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Strickland.”
Price must “[s]urmount[] [a particularly] high bar” to obtain a writ of habeas
corpus on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, a petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if the
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state court reached a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state
court makes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law only
when the court “ ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the]
decisions [of the Supreme Court] but unreasonably applies that principle to the
facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S. Ct. 2527,
2534–35 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S. Ct. 1495,
1523 (2000)). “If [the] Court has not broken sufficient legal ground to establish an
asked-for constitutional principle, the lower federal courts cannot themselves
establish such a principle with clarity sufficient to satisfy the AEDPA bar.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 381, 120 S. Ct. at 1506–07.
The district court correctly denied Price’s petition. The state courts ruled
that Price could not prove that his counsel had been deficient for failing to remove
a juror whom Brau had agreed should be impaneled. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984) (“The
reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced
by the defendant’s own statements or actions.”); see also United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993) (“[W]aiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Price cites no precedent of the Supreme Court establishing that
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“the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 770,
786–87 (2011). The decision by the state court that trial counsel was not
ineffective is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law.
We AFFIRM the denial of Price’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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