UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2194
ROBERT A. SNYDER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITIMORTGAGE, INCORPORATED; CITIFINANCIAL, INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:13-cv-02084-JKB)
Submitted: February 25, 2014 Decided: March 6, 2014
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert A. Snyder, Appellant Pro Se. Robert A. Scott, BALLARD
SPAHR, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert A. Snyder appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion to remand his quiet title action to state
court, granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and dismissing
his complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On appeal, Snyder contends
that the district court erred in denying his motion to remand
his case to the state court. We agree.
“We review de novo questions of subject matter
jurisdiction, including those relating to the propriety of
removal.” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1999).
“The burden of demonstrating jurisdiction resides with the party
seeking removal.” Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc.,
407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We “construe removal jurisdiction strictly”; thus,
“if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is
necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
Here, Defendants did not establish the existence of
diversity jurisdiction. Thus, we must be satisfied that
Defendants established federal question jurisdiction, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), which confers on
federal courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
2
States.” A case may “arise under the laws of the United States
if a well-pleaded complaint established that [the plaintiff’s]
right to relief under state law requires resolution of a
substantial question of federal law in dispute between the
parties.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
party seeking removal must therefore establish two elements:
“(1) that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
a question of federal law, and (2) that the question of federal
law is substantial.” Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811,
816 (4th Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff’s right to relief for a given
claim necessarily depends on a question of federal law only when
every legal theory supporting the claim requires the resolution
of a federal issue.” Id.; see Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic
Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f a claim is
supported not only by a theory establishing federal subject
matter jurisdiction but also by an alternative theory which
would not establish such jurisdiction, then federal subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist.”).
In this case, we conclude that Defendants failed to
establish the existence of federal question jurisdiction. State
law creates Snyder’s cause of action—an action to quiet title.
Defendants point to the portion of Snyder’s complaint in which
he alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
3
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act, and several
other federal statutes, to support their claim of federal
jurisdiction. Snyder does not, however, advance these alleged
violations of federal law as individual causes of action for
which he seeks relief. Moreover, Snyder’s state law quiet title
action does not depend on a finding that Defendants violated
federal law; Snyder advances many state law arguments in support
of his claim to quiet title, any one of which, if valid, could
support his action.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand to the district court with instructions to remand
Snyder’s action to the state court. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
4