FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 11, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
CRAIG DUNCAN NICHOLLS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 13-4065
(D.C. No. 2:09-CV-00982-TC)
ALFRED BIGELOW, Warden at the
Central Utah Correctional Facility, (D. Utah)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Craig Nicholls, a Utah state prisoner, filed a pro se application for relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district
court denied his application. Mr. Nicholls now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA)
from this court to pursue an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to
appeal denial of § 2254 application). He claims entitlement to relief on the grounds (1)
that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of his mental illness
(depression), his lack of participation in preparing his plea statement, an unfair plea
colloquy, and absence of a factual basis for his plea; (2) that the state judge engaged in
misconduct, including a violation of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(i), by
participating in the plea negotiations; (3) that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty; and (4) that the lack of an evidentiary
hearing in the state courts made the state-court decisions unreasonable and not binding on
the federal courts. He also challenges the denial of an evidentiary hearing in federal
district court. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Nicholls pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder in Utah state court.
He executed a Rule 11 waiver/statement of facts to demonstrate that his plea was
voluntary and intelligent and to set forth the facts of his offense. The Utah Supreme
Court later summarized the facts as follows:
After consulting with his girlfriend, Tamara Rhinehart, Nicholls agreed to
kill Rhinehart’s ex-husband, Michael John Boudrero. In July 2003,
Nicholls called Boudrero and asked him to come to a construction site to
help with a plumbing job. At the same time, Rhinehart was planning to
attend a movie with her children to provide an alibi for Nicholls, who
planned to show up late for the movie after he killed Boudrero.
Between 8 and 9 p.m., Boudrero arrived at the construction site, and
Nicholls led him to the basement. Nicholls then shot Boudrero in the back
and chest, dragged him into a storage room, stole property from him,
locked the body in the storage room, and escaped in Boudrero’s car.
Investigators quickly focused on Nicholls and Rhinehart as suspects.
Nicholls used a prepaid phone card to call Boudrero to set up the meeting;
the phone card was traced to Nicholls through video surveillance showing
him purchasing the card at a Wal-Mart in Brigham City. Investigators also
received tips from confidential informants who said that Rhinehart had told
them about a plan that “was going to happen soon,” by which she meant her
ex-husband “was going to be gone.” Rhinehart also told an informant that
her boyfriend was going to kill Boudrero.
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Nicholls was charged with one count of aggravated homicide, a
capital felony, and one count of purchasing, transferring, possessing, or
using a firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony. The State
initially sought the death penalty.
Nicholls v. State, 203 P.3d 976, 978 (Utah 2009) (footnote omitted).
The Utah trial court conducted a thorough plea colloquy. It began by inquiring
whether Mr. Nicholls was competent to proceed:
The Court: [A]re you under the influence of any drugs, medication or
alcohol?
[Mr. Nicholls]: No, sir.
The Court: Are you confident that you are in complete control of your
mental faculties and are able to proceed today?
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
The Court: Any reason you can think of not to proceed?
[Mr. Nicholls]: No, sir.
R., Vol. I at 37. The prosecutor then read aloud Mr. Nicholls’s plea statement, asking
him to confirm or deny everything included in the document. That exchange concluded
with the following:
[Prosecutor]: “No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me to
induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea.”
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: “No one has told me that I would receive any form of
leniency because of my plea.”
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
....
[Prosecutor]: “I have discussed this case and the plea with my attorneys as
much as I wish to. I have no further questions of my lawyer prior to the
court taking my plea.” Is that correct?
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: “I am satisfied with my lawyer’s counsel and advice.”
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: Seven, “My decision to enter this plea was made after full
and careful thought, with the advice of counsel and with a full
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understanding of my rights and the facts and circumstances of the case and
the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made and
I am not now under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants.”
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: “I have no mental reservations concerning this plea.”
[Mr. Nicholls]: Yes, sir.
Id. at 54–55. After the statement was read aloud and confirmed by Mr. Nicholls, the
court asked him (1) if he understood that if he did not plead guilty he would have a
presumption of innocence and would be entitled to a jury trial and (2) if he was making
his plea “intelligently, knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally.” Id. at 56. The court
also established that he understood that immediate imposition of sentence would mean he
could not withdraw his plea. The court then accepted the plea and sentenced
Mr. Nicholls to life in prison without parole.
Mr. Nicholls later filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea. The state trial court
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it had already imposed sentence. He then filed
a pro se motion under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) to correct his sentence and
arrest judgment, and the court dismissed again for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Nicholls
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal, stating that he could
challenge his guilty plea only in a postconviction proceeding. The Utah Supreme Court
eventually affirmed denial of his later postconviction challenge. See Nicholls, 203 P.3d
at 978. He then filed his § 2254 application in federal district court. The district court
denied relief, and Mr. Nicholls appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
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A. Standard of Review
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a
demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, the applicant must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional
claim was either “debatable or wrong.” Id.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), provides
that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state court, a federal court can
grant habeas relief only if the applicant establishes that the state-court decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), (2). As we have explained:
Under the “contrary to” clause, we grant relief only if the state court arrives
at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Court has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.
Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted). Relief is provided under the “unreasonable application” clause “only if
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the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a federal court may not issue a
habeas writ simply because it concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.
See id. Rather, that application must have been unreasonable. For those of
Mr. Nicholls’s claims which the Utah Supreme Court adjudicated on the merits,
“AEDPA’s deferential treatment of state court decisions must be incorporated into our
consideration of [his] request for [a] COA.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th
Cir. 2004).
In reviewing the state-court decision, we are “limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.
1388, 1398 (2011). If a petitioner desires an evidentiary hearing on a claim that the state
court did not decide on the merits, AEDPA requires the applicant to have “develop[ed]
the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2). If
the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis in state court, then he cannot receive an
evidentiary hearing unless the claim “relies on—(i) a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court . . . or (ii) a factual
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” Id. § 2254(e)(2)(a). If the applicant did not fail to develop the factual basis of
his claims in state court proceedings, then pre-AEDPA standards apply, and the applicant
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must show that “his allegations, if true and not contravened by the existing factual record,
would entitle him to habeas relief.” Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 858 (10th Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Whether the Plea was Knowing and Voluntary
Mr. Nicholls argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. First, he alleges
that his mental condition at the time, in part caused by his not having access to
prescription medication for depression that he had been taking before his arrest,1 caused
him not to understand the plea process or the plea hearing. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected this claim on the grounds that “[n]othing in the plea colloquy suggested that
[Mr.] Nicholls was incompetent.” Nicholls, 203 P.3d at 981. It summarized the plea
proceedings, observing that he participated in the proceedings, gave “precise, appropriate
answers at appropriate times,” and indicated that he understood what was going on. Id.
In addition, the court stated that “[d]epression is not sufficient . . . to establish
incompetence,” which is measured by whether the defendant can rationally consult with
his lawyer and understand the proceedings against him. Id. at 982. Mr. Nicholls has
never presented any evidence, or even an allegation, that he was suffering from any
mental infirmity other than depression at the time of the plea. The court’s ruling was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Cf. United States v.
Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his circuit has long recognized
1
Mr. Nicholls alleges that the jail administration would not let him have access to his
medication and that state detectives were withholding the medication from him. But he
provided no evidence to support the allegations.
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that the presence of some degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily
mean that he is incompetent to assist in his own defense.” (brackets, ellipses, and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Second, Mr. Nicholls argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because
he took no part in preparing his plea statement and had not read or touched it before the
hearing. But he presents no evidence, as opposed to unsworn allegations, to support his
factual assertions.
Third, Mr. Nicholls argues that his statements at the plea hearing should not be
used to defeat his claims because his answers in the plea colloquy were crafted by the
prosecutor, he was constrained to one-word answers, and he was instructed by counsel to
answer as he did. The only evidence to support this claim was his sworn statement in
state court that his counsel told him “you must convince the judge this is your decision.”
R., Vol. I at 77. But this statement is not an allegation that counsel compelled him to
answer any specific question in any specific way.
Finally, Mr. Nicholls argues that his plea did not have a sufficient factual basis.
This claim is squarely contradicted by his plea statement, which sets out in detail the
actions he took to plan and commit the murder. These admissions were sufficient to
establish the elements of the offense.
No reasonable jurist would debate the district court’s rejection of Mr. Nicholls’s
claim that his plea was not knowing or voluntary.
C. Judicial Misconduct
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Mr. Nicholls contends that he is entitled to relief because of judicial misconduct.
First, he relies on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(i)(1), which states, “The judge
shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the
prosecuting attorney.” He contends that the trial judge violated the rule by participating
in his plea negotiations. A violation of state law, however, does not in itself provide a
ground for § 2254 relief. See Davis v. Workman, 695 F.3d 1060, 1079 (10th Cir. 2012).
Mr. Nicholls must show “that the trial judge’s participation denied [him] due process of
law by causing him not to understand the nature of the charges against him or the
consequences of the guilty plea, or [that] the judge’s participation coerced the defendant
to enter into a plea bargain involuntarily.” Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1467 (10th
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even if we were to read Mr. Nicholls’s § 2254 application as alleging a due-
process violation, there is no evidence to support the allegation. Mr. Nicholls relies on a
statement by the judge at the plea colloquy:
I would like in a discussion we had in your absence, Mr. Ward [a
prosecutor], but in the presence of Mr. Caine [defense counsel] and his co-
counsel, Mr. Demler, in order to proceed with this matter I would prefer
that the defendant be sworn and take the witness stand for examination
relative to his competency and his understanding of the plea and in
connection with the Rule 11 statement of waiver. Mr. Daines [a
prosecutor] indicated that he would like to conduct that examination and I
think that would be an appropriate procedure.
R., Vol. I at 36. Although this statement alludes to a meeting between the court and
counsel before the plea colloquy, there is no indication that the court participated in
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negotiating the substance of the agreement, and Mr. Nicholls has provided no evidence
that the prehearing meeting was anything other than a meeting to discuss procedure
during the colloquy. Certainly nothing rose to the level of coercing Mr. Nicholls to
accept the plea (after all, Mr. Nicholls was not present at the meeting).
Next, Mr. Nicholls contends that the trial judge demonstrated bias by not asking
the state what evidence it had to support the plea and not inquiring properly into whether
the plea was knowing and voluntary. But we see no shortcoming in the trial court’s
conduct of the plea hearing. Certainly Mr. Nicholls has not provided any Supreme Court
decision that required the court to do more than it did.
No reasonable jurist would debate the district court’s denial of the claim of
judicial misconduct.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Nicholls next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
preparing his case and deciding to accept a plea. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the “defendant must show [(1)] that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that he was prejudiced by the
substandard representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). “In
cases where a defendant complains that ineffective assistance led him to accept a plea
offer as opposed to proceeding to trial, the defendant [has] to show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (internal
10
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Nicholls alleges that his counsel were ineffective when
they (1) failed to investigate and prepare his case, (2) coerced him into entering a guilty
plea, and (3) failed to apprise the court of his mental-health issues. We examine each
allegation in turn.
1. Investigation and Preparation
Mr. Nicholls asserts that his counsel spent very little time with him, refused to
accept his phone calls, and did not file sufficient motions, conduct an independent
investigation, develop a defense strategy, or review his medical history. He further
alleges that counsel improperly waived a preliminary hearing and interviewed only one
potential witness. The Utah Supreme Court considered these claims and found them
insufficient to meet Strickland’s first prong, representation “below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” See Nicholls, 203 P.3d at 983 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court correctly observed that there was insufficient evidence to support allegations
that defense counsel had done so little work on the case. See id. Although Mr. Nicholls
stated in his sworn state-court petition that his lead counsel “never accepted one phone
call from petitioner” and that he “came to the jail twice totalling [sic] about 30 mins,” R.,
Vol. I at 78, he also submitted a log from the jail detailing his visits and phone calls, and
it indicates that he had at least eight visits from his attorneys before the date of the plea
hearing. The Utah court also reviewed the plea colloquy, noting that Mr. Nicholls
expressed his satisfaction with his legal representation. See Nicholls, 203 P.3d at 983.
And, of course, counsel enabled Mr. Nicholls to escape the death penalty. The Utah
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Supreme Court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established law.
2. Coercion
Mr. Nicholls alleges his counsel used tactics on the day of the plea to coerce him
into pleading guilty. His brief in our court alleges that his counsel told him that he
needed to accept a plea that day, although he had not authorized plea discussions; that
when he told counsel he wanted to go to trial, counsel argued with him for an hour and a
half until it was clear that counsel were unwilling to go to trial and he agreed to plead
guilty; and that during this meeting counsel promised him “medications, an appeal, [his]
family and even Prisneyland” if he pleaded guilty. App. Br. at 18. But the only evidence
in the record to support these allegations is Mr. Nicholls’s assertion in his sworn state-
court petition that “Counsel was aware of the petitioner[’]s precarious state of health but
forced him to capitulate to their demands anyway by badgering and verbally abusing the
petitioner for the next 3 hrs so that the 13h00 deadline would be met using statements like
. . . you will get medication as soon as you get to prison.”2 R., Vol. I at 76‒77.
Pointing to Mr. Nicholls’s statements at the plea colloquy that he was not
threatened or promised anything in return for the plea, the Utah Supreme Court rejected
this claim. See Nicholls, 203 P.3d at 983. Its ruling was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of clearly established law: “[T]he representations of the
2
Mr. Nicholls also cites to an affidavit filed in federal district court with his § 2254
application. But that document was not before the state courts that decided this issue on
the merits, so we cannot consider it. See Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
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defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [the plea] hearing, as well as any findings
made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent
collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). We have
recognized that sometimes this barrier can be overcome, but the court must “look[]
closely at both the petitioner’s allegations and the circumstances in which he pled guilty.”
Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds
by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). “Solemn declarations in open court
carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory
allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions
that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. For
example, although Mr. Nicholls’s brief suggests that his counsel had threatened him with
deprivation of his medication if he did not plead guilty, Mr. Nicholls has not actually
sworn to that assertion. Indeed, in his § 2254 application he acknowledges that counsel’s
statement that he could get his medications in prison was a true statement. Although he
argues that the statement was nevertheless coercive, presenting the brutal facts to a client
is the job of counsel; it is not coercion. The gist of Mr. Nicholls’s claim appears to be
only that his counsel strongly urged him to plead guilty. But this is proper conduct by an
attorney if he believes that a plea is the best course. See Miles, 61 F.3d at 1470.
Mr. Nicholls also claims that his counsel did not explain the rights he would give
up by pleading. But any failure in this regard was rendered harmless by the trial court’s
exhaustive colloquy, which advised him of his rights before he pleaded guilty. See
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United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209, 1216 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In light of the court’s
careful explanation of the plea’s consequences and [defendant’s] testimony that he
understood those consequences, [defendant’s] allegation that he would have gone to trial
but for his attorney’s failure to advise him of the career-offender provision is insufficient
to establish prejudice.”).
Finally, Mr. Nicholls argues that the short amount of time between the arrest and
the plea (three months and 12 days) shows that the plea was rushed. But he cites no
authority, and we are aware of none, that such a period of time between an arrest and a
plea indicates a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.
3. Failure to Communicate with the Court
Mr. Nicholls further argues that his counsel should have, but did not, present to
the court evidence about his mental-health issues that rendered him incompetent to plead
guilty. But as discussed earlier, there is no evidence in the record that he was
incompetent when he pleaded. His counsel’s failure to present a meritless argument did
not cause his representation to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
No reasonable jurist would debate the denial of Mr. Nicholls’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
E. Evidentiary Hearing
Mr. Nicholls argues that the refusal of the state courts to grant him an evidentiary
hearing to develop the factual basis of his claims undermines their decisions and the basis
for this court to grant them deference. But he does not suggest what specific evidence
14
would have been elicited at such a hearing or why the new evidence would entitle him to
relief.
Mr. Nicholls also challenges the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing in
district court. But a § 2254 applicant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he “has
failed to develop the factual basis of [his] claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2). Requesting an evidentiary hearing in state court is not always sufficient, on
its own, to meet the standard. See Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1176–77 (10th Cir.
2004). “The federal district court should not be required to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on a claim when the applicant for relief has not presented evidence that would be
readily available if the claim were true.” Id. at 1177. If Mr. Nicholls’s claims are
meritorious, he should have personal knowledge of facts establishing their merit. Yet, the
one sworn pleading filed in state court does not, as discussed above, provide evidence
sufficient to overcome Mr. Nicholls’s sworn statements at the plea colloquy.
Mr. Nicholls failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in state court, so the district
court properly declined to grant an evidentiary hearing.
III. CONCLUSION
We DENY Applicant’s motion for a stay. We DENY the application for a COA and
DISMISS the appeal. We GRANT Applicant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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